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Prisoners' rights are human rights first. Any investigation of such rights has to
have regard to that fact. In order to clearly understand the context within which
prisoners' rights are provided for and protected or abused, a holistic approach
is necessary. Accordingly, chapter one deals with introductory and histor ical
perspectives. The magnitude of the problem under investigation is highlighted,
the objectives of the study are outlined and the hypothesis is stated in these
terms:
The rights of prisoners under the South African Constitution
are protected, observed and compare well with international
norms and standards.
A brief indication of the methodology of research is given and a literature
survey undertaken. The chapter also deals with definitions and classifications
wherein prisons and prisoners are defined and classified. An overview of the
various justifications (purposes) of imprisonment is given and the chapter
concludes with a survey of the origins and history of prisons and prisoners '
rights.
As with all other human rights, the protection of prisoners' rights takes place at
two levels: the domestic and the international level. A study of prisoners'
constitutional rights necessitates a basic understanding of certain aspects of
international human rights law. Chapter two begins with an overview of
international protection of human rights and proceeds to explain how
international human rights norms can be enforced in domestic law. The larger
part of the chapter is dedicated to the law governing international human rights
protection for prisoners . The instruments providing for such protection are
outlined and discussed. The application and interpretation of such instruments
are also examined. It is then concluded that, in spite of the problems inherent
in the enforcement of human rights standards through international
mechanisms, international law plays an important role in the protection of
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prisoners' rights.
Chapter three provides a detailed discussion of the rights of prisoners as
provided for under section 35 of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa (Act 108 of 1996). The discussion is enhanced and reinforced with case
law illustrating the approach taken by the courts in interpreting and applying
the said rights. Other constitutional rights relevant to prisoners are also
discussed together with the pertinent case law. It is then concluded that the
introduction of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution has brought a new dimension
and challenge to the protection and realisation of prisoners' rights in South
Africa. It is also concluded that the courts, especially the Constitutional Court,
have risen to the challenge in attempting to give some effect and meaning to
the rights of prisoners brought about by the new constitutional order.
In an effort to place South Africa in a regional context, chapter four adopts a
comparative approach. The rights of prisoners in various African countries are
discussed. The countries include Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia and Uganda.
Prisoners' rights under the constitutions of each country are first outlined. This
is followed by a discussion of the approaches taken by the courts in
interpreting those rights and then the views of observers regarding the
protection of prisoners' rights in those countries are outlined. The conclusion
is that at least on paper and in terms of judicial practice, the rights of prisoners
in South Africa enjoy more constitutional protection than in other African
countries.
The focus of chapter five is on the investigation regarding the extent to which
prisoners' rights in South Africa are implemented and protected in actual
practice. The chapter contains an analysis of the statistical data obtained
through field study based on prisoners' perceptions of the realization of their
constitutional rights. In analysing the data, statistical illustrations are used.
Statistical methods are also used in testing the hypothesis.
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The main conclusion of the study is that the constitutional rights of prisoners in
South Africa are not sufficiently protected and implemented. This and other
conclusions and recommendations are set out in chapter six. The thrust of the
conclusions and recommendations is that something has to be done regarding
police brutality, prison conditions and overcrowding, juvenile offenders,
mentally ill prisoners , ratification and incorporation of relevant international
human rights instruments and access to courts. Suggestions on how to
address these issues are made. Other recommendations include abolishing
the privilege system in prisons, increasing the role of NGO's, provision of
education and public awareness, privatization of prisons and legislative
intervention .
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTORY AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Over the years there has been profound disregard for human rights in
South African prisons. Before 1994 this was understandable because of
the general lack of a human rights culture due to the apartheid system.
Before 1993 the South African Constitutional framework did not contain a
Bill of Rights. Fundamental human rights were first introduced in the
country's constitutional history by the Interim Constitution.' In that
Constitution provision was not only made for the protection of the rights of
all South Africans, but protection was guaranteed for specific rights of
prisoners." This development was carried over to the 1996 Constitution of
the Republic.
Apart from the lack of a general human rights culture, it could be argued
that in the days of apartheid imprisonment was used as a vindictive
means of dealing with the opponents of the system. Indeed, incarceration
played an important part in what some have referred to as 'regime
maintenance' in South Africa.3 Coupled with the fact that South Africa is a
party to a host of international instruments providing for the protection of
prisoners' rights, the demise of apartheid and the introduction of a human
rights culture in the constitution would have been expected to change the
human rights situation in prisoners' favour. Some observers, however,





Section 25 of the Interim Constitution.
See Van Zyl Smit and Dunkel in Imprisonment Today and Tomorrow:
International Perspectives on Prisoners' Rights and Prison Conditions (1990) at
538. '
1
A 1998 newspaper report" estimated that one third of the then 145,000
people in South African prisons were unsentenced prisoners who would
be awaiting trial for an average of five months before a verdict was given.
The report said:
'Prisoners are held for as long as two years before coming to trial - in
contravention of the South African Constitution which stresses
accused must be brought to trial without unreasonable delay. In one
case a woman accused has been in custody awaiting trial for five
years."
The report further pointed out that there were 22 879 children and
juveniles (then) in South African prisons and at least 1 230 were aged
between 7 and 16 years old. Other issues raised by the report included
overcrowding in prisons, shortage of correctional services personnel and
the inhuman conditions in the prisons. A year later a different newspaper"
reported that overcrowding in South African prisons had reached
nightmarish proportions. 'So acute has it become that to incarcerate an
individual under such conditions comes close to infringing his basic rights
and the prospect of rehabilitation close to zero' ," said the paper. A few
months later, the same newspaper reported that the shocking levels of
overcrowding in Durban prisons had been roundly condemned by an
influential church orqanisation." Prisoners were said to be living in a state
of 'depression and despair'." Referring to Durban's Westville Prison, Mr
Colin Somas of the Mathew 25 Prison Ministry was quoted as saying:
'There is terrible overcrowding in the prison. The overcrowding ... is
not so much because of an increase in crime, but because of a slow-







City Press, 19 April 1998. The report was entitled 'One third of our prison
inmates are awaiting trial '. .
Ibid.
Daily News, 8 March 1999. The report was entitled 'Nightmare in our Prisons'.
Ibid .




courts and some prisoners have been awaiting trial for two to three
years.:"
A year later, a delegation of parliamentarians and prison stake-holders
visiting Westville Prison concluded that chronic overcrowding in South
African prisons was forcing the country's nearly 65 000 awaiting-trial
prisoners to live in inhuman conditions , sometimes for as long as four
years." The stake-holders, including Parliament's Portfolio Committee
for Correctional Services and the South African Prisoners' Organisation
for Human Rights (SAPOHR), who were visiting the prison after
allegations of ill-treatment and torture of inmates, unanimously agreed
that the situation was appalling. The prison was found to have more than
12 000 inmates, a 211% occupancy rate. In one instance the visitors
found 65 awaiting-trial prisoners crammed in one cell."
In the Budget Vote Speech of 9 March 1999, the Minister of Correctional
Services told the National Assembly that overcrowding and lack of space
are among the most pressing challenges the Department of Correctional
Services has to tace." The Minister also pointed out that at the time
South African prisons had a total of 146 000 prisoners in custody as well
as 56,000 offenders on probation. There were 236 prisons countrywide
for which the approved accommodation available was for 99 295
prisoners. Since 1994 only nine new prisons had been opened with a
total accommodation capacity of 7 000 inmates. Another two prisons (at
Kokstad and Empangeni) were nearing completion." Building had also









Daily News, 01 June ?OOO, The report was entitled 'Chronic overcrowding is
"main problem" in prisons'.
Ibid.
BUdget Vote Speech to the National Assemby by Minister of Correction Services
Mr B.M. Skosana MP, 9 March 1999. '
Ibid.
According to SABC TV News of 26 May 2000.
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The following tables will illustrate how the prison population in South
Africa grew from 1995 to 1999:
Table 1: Daily average of male prisoners
SENTENCED UNSENTENCED TOTAL
1995 83466 25120 108586
1996 89475 29865 119340
1997 98396 38496 136892
1998 90137 50013 140150
1999 102802 53667 156469
Source: National Department of Correctional Services, Pretoria
Table 2: Daily average of female prisoners
SENTENCED UNSENTENCED TOTAL
1995 1 904 650 2554
1996 2135 844 2979
1997 2467 1 105 3572
1998 2233 1 192 3425
1999 2654 1 211 3865
Source: National Department of Correctional Services, Pretoria
4
Table 3: Daily average of male childrenljuveniles in custody
SENTENCED UNSENTENCED TOTAL
1995 9229 5301 14530
1996 10846 8232 19078
1997 12570 8930 21 503
1998 10941 12916 23857
1999 12441 13882 26323
Source: National Department of Correctional Services, Pretoria
Table 4: Daily average of female childrenljuveniles in custody
SENTENCED UNSENTENCED TOTAL
1995 153 71 224
1996 207 162 369
1997 197 202 399
1998 197 204 401
1999 224 248 472
Source: National Department of Correctional Services, Pretoria
N.B. All the above figures represent the daily average of prisoners in
custody for December of each year.
The above statistics clearly indicate that there has been a steady increase
in the prison population of South Africa. This applies to both sentenced
5
and unsentenced prisoners. For purposes of comparison, in 1988 there
were 110 481 prisoners in South Afrian prisons, of whom 90 485 were
sentenced prisoners." According to these figures, in June 1988 306
persons per 100 000 of the officially estimated population of South Africa
were in custody as sentenced prisoners. Including unsentenced prisoners
the total ratio at the time was 373 per 100 000.17 Today the official prison
population is estimated at 172,000 sentenced and unsentenced prisoners ,
having increased dramatically over the last few years. This would then .
indicate that presently the ratio is about 397 prisoners per 100 000
persons." These figures ·can clearly be supported by the following graph
which shows prisoners in South African prisons (all races, all genders, all
ages, all categories of crimes and all sentence groups) over a five to six
year periods.
Fig 1: PRISONERS IN CUSTODY (1995 - 2000)
1995 1996 1997 1996





See Van Zyl Smit and Dunkel 537.
These figures assume that the official population estimate of 29 617 000 for
June 1988 ~as correct and they exclude the former rave territories. See also
Van Zyl smit and Dunkel at 537.
This.calculation is.b~sed on the 2000 national population estimate of 43291 441
obtained from Satlstlcs, South Africa and prison population estimates of 172 000
of both .sentenced and unsentenced prisoners , obtained from the Department of
ccrrecnonet Services.
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Table 5: Prisoners in custody (provincial estimates)
Average Eastern Free Gauteng Kwa Zulu Mpumalanga North Northern Northern Western All
for periods Cape State Natal West Cape Province Cape RSA
Average for
1995 12452 11 170 28393 16554 7977 7541 3443 2672 20889 111 090
Average for
1996 14207 11 528 31 308 17879 8460 8592 3730 3334 21 356 120394
Average for
1997 16349 12601 35895 20591 9408 9902 4607 3896 22817 136066
Average for
1998 16803 12533 39100 21 849 9242 10397 5020 4234 23247 142425
Average for
1999 18415 13252 42118 25035 9744 11 054 5841 4696 25875 156 031
Average for
2000 19915 13963 45484 28144 10315 11 907 6803 4661 27932 169124
Source: NanonalDeparlmenfofCoffecnonalServwes
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The table above shows the regional/provincial breakdown of the prison
population (averages) for the years 1995-2000. The figures represent all
ages, all genders, all races, all sentence groups (sentenced and
unsentenced).
From the above figures the following is the regional breakdown of the
prison population per 100 000 persons."
Eastern Cape Province 277
Free State Province 489
Gauteng Province 539
KwaZulu Natal Province 281
Mpumulanga Province 325
North West Province 311
Northern Cape Province 671
Northern Province 88
Western Cape Province 621
It can be seen from the above prison population density figures that the
more industralized and cosmopolitan provinces have higher prison
population densities .
It is not as if overcrowding and unreasonable delays in bringing accused
persons to trial are the only problems. On 22 March 2000 a newspaper
reported that prisoners being held in Khayelitsha's police cells in Cape
Town had to share a cell with a dead man for three days before the body
was removed." 'Prisoners locked in the cell lived and ate their meals
alongside the body of Mr Lungisa Mauki which lay there from Thursday to
19
20
The calculation is based on the provincial population estimates obtained from
statistics South Africa, and prison population estimates obtained from the
Department of Correctional Services.
Daily News, 22 March 2000. The article was entitled 'Prisoners share cell with
corpse'.
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Saturday before it was removed',21 said the report. The body had
apparently been placed in the cell by the police in the full knowlege that
there were other occupants.
In a hard-hitting editorial the following day the editor2 of the newspaper
said, among other things:
'This intolerable breakdown in moral rectitude shows not only a
complete disrespect for the dead, but is excerbated by an equal
disregard for the sensitivities of the prisoners. And no matter what
the policemen involved believe, even prisoners have a right to be
treated like human beings.'23
The matters noted above and others that will unfold as the research
progresses are contemporary human rights issues that affect the
livelihood of prisoners. Imprisonment is a key element in the system of
social control, not only in South Africa, but in many other countries. South
Africa is presently going through a period of transformation. So too are
the country's institutional structures. There is need to keep pace with
such developments. Hence the necessity, the interest and the desire for
this study.
Another important reason for this study is the realization of the extent of
society's ignorance of what happens in prisons. Society tends to think
that by committing crimes prisoners have forfeited their fundamental rights
and what happens to them in prisons is what they deserve and no one
should care. The general public has no interest in what happens in
prisons. According to the Minister of Correctional Services, imprisonment





Then Mr Kaizer Nyatsumba.
Editorial, Daily News, 23 March 2000 entitled 'Respecting the dead',
9




'Similarly, the public's general attitude and occasional interest in
prisons is one of least concern, usually created by a sensational
treatment of the subject in the press; otherwise, it is shockingly
ignorant of the whole matter.:"
This study attempts to look over the prison wall. It does so with objectivity
and comparison. The findings may not necessarily change the status
quo, but will at least shed more light on an institution that society would
love to ignore.
1.2 OBJECTIVES, HYPOTHESIS AND STATEMENT OF THE
PROBLEM
Following from the above public concerns, the objectives of the study can







to investigate the extent to which provision is made under
South African law for the protection of the rights of prisoners;
to investigate the extent of the reality to which the rights of
prisoners in South Africa are realised and enjoyed (the
discrepancies between the law and the practice);
to determine how South Africa compares with international
norms in relation to the promotion and protection of the rights
of prisoners;
to determine how South Africa compares with some African
(mainly neighbouring) countries in the promotion, protection,
realisation and enjoyment of prisoners' rights;
See Minister's Budget Vote Speech to Parliament, 9 May 2000.
Ibid.
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(5) to determine whether there is need for policy and/or legislative
intervention to address any shortcomings in the protection of
prisoners rights in this country.
The Research problem can be stated as follows:
Are the constitutional rights of prisoners in South Africa observed
and realised as required by and compared to international norms and
standards?
Stated as a hypothesis this would translate into:
The rights of prisoners under the South African Constitution are
protected, observed and compare well with international norms and
standards.
1.3 METHODOLOGY
For obvious reasons the study was mainly based on library research.
However, no single method of approach can be adequate in academic
research. The researcher therefore also undertook some empirical
research, which included interviews and questionnaires presented to
prisoners and prison authorities. In the main, this was intended to
determine the discrepancies, if any, between law and practice or theory
and reality. It was also intended to prove or disprove the hypothesis as
stated above. In so doing the quantitative method was mainly adopted.
Details of this approach will be elaborated further below."
26 See Chapter Five (5.1) below.
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1.4 LITERATURE SURVEY
Prisons and prisoners' rights are areas of overwhelming social and legal
interest. Accordingly, substantial research has obviously been conducted
mainly in the general field of prisons. This study however will identify a
lacuna in the said research and focus thereon. The South African
Constitution is only a few years old. The said lacuna will be identified in
that context .
To begin with Dirk van Zyl Smit and Frieder Dunkel compiled a collection
of contributions from some participants of the Buchenbach Seminar, held
in September 1989 at Buchenbach near Freiburg in the Federal Republic
of Germany." The text deals not only with prisoners' rights but also the
broad question of the significance of incarceration in the general system
of social control and gives an overview of the prison systems of a number
of countries. In addition, the book deals with the philosophical approach
and legal framework defining the various prison systems. It also
addresses specific problems of the prison systems including;
(i) complaints procedures and the judicial control of the prison
administration
(ii) the political control of the prison system
(iii) the medical treatment of prisoners
(iv) problems relating to prison labour
(v) disciplinary and security measures
(vi) visits and other contacts with the outside world, etc.
Also addressed in the book are the conditions of detention of specific
classes of prisoners including women, juveniles, ethnic minorities and
political detainees.
27
Van Zyl Smit and Dunkel, (note 3 above) .
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The chapter on South Africa, written by Dirk van Zyl Smit follows the
general trend outlined above. It has to be remembered that the book was
written before the new constitutional dispensation. South Africa did not
have a Bill of Rights at the time and that explains why specific violations
of prisoners' rights are not dealt with. A lot of water has passed under the
bridge since, bringing with it a Bill of Rights that has had a significant
impact on imprisonment in South Africa. So too has the new Correctional
Services Act.28
.,
In another benchmark literary piece of work, Dirk van Zyl Smit expounds
the law and the practice relating to prisons as it was by 1992.29 Smit
begins with the historical and sociological aspects of imprisonment and
describes the background and context from which the law relating to
prisons came. Emphasis is laid not only on the unique features of the
South African prison system but also its similarities to prison systems in
other countries. The book defines prison law and analyses systematically
how prison law relates to the more traditional subdivisions of legal
thought. From this analysis emerges a picture of the rights and duties of
both prisoners and prison authorities. The purposes of imprisonment are
also dealt with, so too is the structure of the South African prison system.
Van Zyl Smit concludes his book with two chapters dealing with
specialised aspects of prison law, namely prison offences and the release
of sentenced prisoners.
Although Van Zyl Smit's book deals with the rights of prisoners, it does so
against a background of a general absence of a human rights culture in
South Africa at the time. With the new constitutional dispensation and a
Bill of Rights not only for all South Africans but also for prisoners, Van Zyl
Smit's book is now rather irrelevant and outdated, at least as far as the




Van Zyl Smit, South African Prison Law and Practice, (1992).
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The closest literary attempt towards the rights of prisoners in a
constitutional context in South Africa was made by Jody Kollapen in a
four page article." This very short article attempts to highlight the issue
of prisoners' rights, problems existing in South African prisons and efforts
by the authorities to address them. The article further attempts to show
how the Interim Constitution" would promote and widen the category of
rights enjoyed by prisoners. Unfortunately this article is too short and
rather perfunctory to say the least. In any case it was based on the
Interim Constitution which has since given way to the final (1996)
Constitution.
An even narrower focus was taken by ON Swart in another short article."
In it he draws a distinction between rights and privileges. He then
proceeds to discuss section 35 of the Constitution and other relevant
rights in relation to the role of the state and access to courts. Although
the article is based on the new (1996) Constitution, it is unfortunately also
too short and demonstrates a serious lack of depth, which is quite
understandable for a seven-page piece of work.
Further afield, a lot has been written on prisons, penal reform and
prisoners' rights under different legal systems and on the international
level. Reference can only be made to a few authors. The most prominent
of these is Nigel Rodley.33 His book deals with the international law of
human rights applicable to prisoners. Much emphasis is laid on the use of
torture by some states and other forms of ill-treatment of prisoners.
Rodley also discusses the death penalty and corporal punishment. Also





See Kollapen, 'Prisoners' Rights under the Interim Constitution' Acta
Criminologica Vol 8 No. 2 1995.
200 of 1993.
Swart, 'The Constitutional Rights of Prisoners with Reference to Access to
Courts'. Acta Criminologica Vol 11 (2) 1998.
Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law, (1987).
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arbitrary arrest and detention. All in all, the book is a scholarly statement
of international law applicable to prisoners as it then was. However, much
has since changed on the international scene and most of the aspects
discussed in the book (for example the death penalty, corporal
punishment, torture) are now constitutionally outlawed in South Africa.
Perhaps that is what makes the book a good starting point. It also has
the added advantage of including, as annexures, all important
international instruments pertaining to the treatment of prisoners.
Another prominent international literary work on the subject is by Micheal
Mushlln." Unfortunately, Mushlin only focuses on the American legal
system, but he gives a comprehensive description of the complex body of
law that has developed in the United States to govern prisons and
prisoners' rights. His book, which comes in two volumes, gives in the first
volume a historical background and general overview of prisoners' rights.
It then proceeds to discuss the laws governing life in prison. These
include aspects like prevention of violence, protection against
overcrowding, medical care, discrimination issues, freedom of expression
and speech, religion and prison labour. It then goes on to discuss laws
gqverning control in prisons. These include aspects such as privacy and
related issues, disciplinary proceedings, classification and transfers of
detainees. Volume 2 concentrates on the laws governing access to
courts, visiting, personal correspondence, access to medical care and
civil disabilities.
Mushlin's book is an authoritative statement of the law governing
prisoners in the United States legal and prison system. It is detailed and
draws heavily on the US Supreme Court jurisprudence. It can however,
only be used as a point of comparison with the newly developed South
African constitutional system. Even then, there is still a world of
difference .
34
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Thomas Mathiesen has also written a critical assessment of the role of
imprisonment as a major type of punishment and sanction in modern
society." His book critically analyses the various purposes of
imprisonment including rehabilitation, general prevention, incapacitation
and other theories of social defence. Mathiesen concludes his book with
a look at 'the future of prison'." In his conclusion he makes it clear that
all the theories of the rationale for imprisonment 'are unable to defend the
prison'." He therefore concludes that the prison is a fiasco in terms of its
own purposes."
Again, although Mathiesen explores certain aspects of imprisonment his
work has a number of short-comings. First he does not deal with
prisoners' rights per se and secondly his critique of the prison system is
based on the British model. In fact his work follows on the writings of
several other authors whose focus is the British penal system. These
include Mike Fitzgerald and Joe Sim39; Peter Evan" and Louis Blom-
Cooper." All these writers do not deal specifically with prisoners' rights,
let alone in the South African constitutional context. They however
provide a theoretical background from which the present study finds a
point of departure. From the American perspective, this background is
provided by authors like Leonard Orland" and Jessica Mitford.43
It is practically impossible to review all the literature that has been written
on prisons and prisoners. The above review is only a point of departure.
What is revealed in the review is that a specific area of prisoners' rights
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prisoners under the South African (1996) Constitution. This study, as
already indicated, will attempt to fill that gap.
1.5 DEFINITIONS AND CLASSIFICATIONS
A prisoner is defined as 'one who is kept in prison or in custody ... as the
result of a legal process, either as having been condemned to
imprisonment as a punishment, or as awaiting trial for some offence.:"
Flowing from that definition, imprisonment means 'the condition of being
kept in captivity or continernent.:" the consequence of which is 'the
forcible deprivation of personal liberty'." A prison, is therefore a place
where such confinement takes place, 'oo. such a place properly arranged
and equipped for the reception of persons who by legal process are
committed to it for safe custody while awaiting trial or for punishrnent.:"
According to the World Book Encyclopedia, a prison 'is an institution for
confining and punishing people who have been convicted of a crime.:"
This is done by severely restricting their freedom for example by limiting
where they may go, what they may do and with whom they may
associate." The Encyclopedia Americana defines a prison as 'a place in
which prisoners are kept in custody pending trial, or in which they are
confined as punishment after convictton.f" And according to the








Simpson and Weiner, Oxford English Dictionary 2nd Ed, Vol XII, (1989) at 513.
Simpson and Weiner, (note 44 above) at 511.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 15, (1992) at 809.
Ibid. .
See Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. 22, (1988) at 606.
17
persons convicted of major crimes or felonies.f"
1.5.1 Types of prisons
Various terms are usually used to refer to prisons or such institutions that
confine lawbreakers or people awaiting trial. The most common of these
terms include jails, gaols, penitentiaries, correctional centres, correctional
facilities and reformatories. Prisons or such institutions are generally
categorised according to the length of sentence, severity of crime and
type of offender.
1.5.1.1 Maximum security prisons
These are generally meant for those prisoners serving long sentences.
Such prisoners are usually thought to be very dangerous. They will have
committed crimes like murder, robbery, kidnapping, rape, treason and
other serious crimes. These prisons are usually characterised by
optimum security with many strong barriers and foolproof devices such as
high fences, electronic detection devices and powerful spotlights. The
length and number of visits by family and friends to such prisons are
usually restricted.
1.5.1.2 Medium security prisons
These are usually meant for prisoners of medium term sentences who
have committed less serious crimes such as assault and theft. Such
prisoners are generally considered to be less dangerous and the security
measures and restrictions in such prisons are less stringent. There are
usually more recreational facilities at such prisons.
51
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1.5.1.3 Minimum security prisons
These are usually least restrictive and they hold prisoners considered to
be least dangerous. Such prisoners would have generally committed non-
violent crimes like forgery, evading taxes, perjury and obstruction of
justice. These prisons have even more recreational facilities and are
even less restrictive.
1.5.1.4 Juvenile Correctional Institutions
These are institutions meant for juvenile offenders - minors usually under
the age of 18. They hold young people who have been accused of crimes
and are usually awaiting trial or who have been sentenced to a prison
term. They are meant to keep young prisoners from the bad influence of
dangerous adult criminals and they are supposed to offer counselling, job
training and other corrective facilities .
The foregoing categorisation is based on the American prison system.52
Types of prisons may vary from country to country. What the above
categorisation seeks to do is to throw more light on the definitions and
meanings of 'prisons' and 'prisoners'.
1.5.2 Types of prisoners
Prisoners are generally not categorised in the same way as prisons or
according to the length of sentence and severity of crime, but along
different lines altogether.
52
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1.5.2.1 Unconvicted prisoners
This category refers to prisoners lawfully detained but not yet convicted
and sentenced to imprisonment by a criminal court. Their classification is
supported by Rule 95 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners which provides that
.... persons arrested or imprisoned without charge shall be protected
by the general Rules applicable to all sentenced and unsentenced
prisoners and by the specific Rules applicable to untried prtsonersf
It is also widely recognised that unconvicted prisoners have traditionally
enjoyed definable rights at common law.54 Prisoners awaiting trial in
particular are not supposed to be subjected to conditions that amount to
punishment. They are only supposed to be kept in safe custody until
lawfully discharged or removed from prison. Other unconvicted prisoners
include prisoners detained in police cells before being transferred to
prison, judgment debtors and security detainees.
1.5.2.2 Convicted prisoners
This category refers to prisoners who have been lawfully convicted and
sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Such prisoners may be serving
short-term or long-term prison sentences. The general effect of their
incarceration is that their personal liberty is taken away. This category
forms the bulk of prisoners in this study.
53
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Under the old Correctional Services Act55, a juvenile was defined as any
person under the age of 21 years. The new Correctional Services Act56
does not define a 'juvenile' but instead defines a 'child' as a person under
the age of 18 years. Specific rights are provided for under Section 19 of
the new Act for children who are prisoners. Provision was made under
the old Act for the establishment of special prisons for juveniles. No such
provision is made under the new Act.
1.5.2.4 Mentally ill prisoners
This category of prisoners is governed by the Mental Health Act,57 which
requires prison authorities to report prisoners who appear to be mentally
ill or who appear to have psychopathic disorders. A rather complex
procedure has to be followed in order to detain a mentally ill prisoner in
an institution or prison hospital." Mentally ill prisoners do not necessarily
enjoy special benefits other than being removed to special institutions
where treatment is available to them.
1.5.2.5 Prisoners of War (POW's)
A prisoner of war is a person captured by a belligerent power during war.
In most cases prisoners of war have surrendered to their enemy but
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'prisoner of war' only applied to members of regularly organised armed
forces, but the status has now been extended to other categories
including guerillas, civilians who take up arms against an enemy openly,
or non-combatants associated with a military force. This category of
prisoners falls outside the definition of 'prisoners' envisaged by this study.
It also falls outside the ambit of human rights law, being mainly governed
by humanitarian law. It has only been mentioned here for purposes of
distinguishing it from other categories of conventional prisoners and
thereby excluding it from this study.
In this study, therefore, the term 'prisoners' will be used to refer to all the
above categories apart from the category of prisoners of war, and unless
otherwise specified. The need for and relevance of the above definitions
and categorisations are pretty obvious. It is important to have clarity on
precisely whose rights this work seeks to examine.
1.6 JUSTIFICATION AND RATIONALE FOR IMPRISONMENT
It is generally agreed that prisons have five major purposes. These
purposes are; (1) rehabilitation, (2) retribution, (3) deterrence, (4)
incapacitation and (5) justice. What is not agreed is whether these
objectives are actually achieved by imprisonment. To determine the
extent to which these objectives are achieved a brief look at each of them
follows.
1.6.1 Rehabilitation
According to Huber, 'imprisonment is the ultimate tool of society's reaction
against considerably deviating, socially harmful behaviour.:" Taken to
extremes, this view is supported by those who think that lawbreakers are
suffering from a mental illness that needs to be treated. Thus as early as
59
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1870, a speaker at that year's Congress of the American Prison
Association said:
'A criminal is a man who has suffered under a disease evinced by the
perpetration of a crime, and who may reasonably be held to be under
the dominion of such disease until his conduct has afforded very
strong presumption not only that he is free from its immediate
influence, but that the chances of its recurrence have become
exceedingly remote.,60
This mental illness theory of criminality was not very widely supported but,
surprisingly, it found favour with some prison administrators, judges,
prosecutors and law enforcement officers. This inevitably led to the
replacement of 'imprisonment-for-punishment with imprisonment-for-
therapy" under the term 'treatment'. In prison terms, 'treatment' is 'an
umbrella term meaning diagnosis, classification, various forms of therapy,
punishment as deemed necessary, and prognosis, or the prediction of the
malfeasant's future behavlour.:"
Over the years this treatment theory has lost popularity, beginning, not
surprisingly, with prisoners themselves. Mitford quotes one participant in
an interview: 'Most prisoners I know would rather be thought bad than
mad. They say society may have the right to punish them, but not a
hunting licence to remould them in its own sick image:63
In spite of its loss of popularity 'treatment' still remains one of the most
important functions of imprisonment in the general system of social
control. This function is usually decently referred to as 'rehabilitation.' In
ordinary terms 'rehabilitation' therefore refers to activities designed to
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educational courses in prison, teaching job skills, and offering counselling
with a psychologist or social worker.
Many commentators think that the 'idea of imprisoning a man in order to
somehow make him a better person is of relatively recent vintage.'64
Those commentators think that 'although recent theories are based on
goals of treatment and rehabilitation, more traditional notions rested on
premises of retribution, general deterrence, and isolation.,65 Others
actually argue that not only is prison ineffective as an institution for
rehabilitation, most likely it can in fact dehabilitate." Quoting an
authoritative Swedish source Thomas Mathiesen says:
'What criminological research nowadays has taught us is, however,
that the idea of being able to improve the punished individual through
a punishment implying deprivation of liberty, is an illusion. On the
contrary, today it is generally acknowledged that these kinds of
punishment lead to poor rehabilitation and a high recidivism rate. In
addition, they often have a destructive effect on personallty.:"
This leads us to punishment (retribution) as a purpose or rationale for
imprisonment.
1.6.2. Retribution
Retribution means punishment for crimes against society. Depriving
criminals of their freedom is seen as a way of making them pay a debt to
society for their crimes. Retribution was initially not seen as an important
purpose of imprisonment. All through the Middle Ages and in the early
modern period the dominant principle was career enim ad continendos
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keep men, not to punish them)." This was largely due to the fact that at
that time jails were primarily places of detention before trial, where the
defendants often spent several months or years before the case came to
an end. When the role of the prison changed to that of housing convicted
criminals, retribution became a more popular justification for
imprisonment. According to Orland: 'The infliction of terrible punishment
on the wrongdoer was seen as a moral good.,69 This is reflected in the old
Latin maxim qui malum fecit, malum feral.70 This is also known as the
doctrine of retributive justice. Today there is a streetwise equivalent: you
do crime, you do time.
The theological basis of this doctrine is explained by Kant thus: .
'Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a
means for promoting another good either with regard to the
criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be
imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has
committed a crime.,71
Kant's conclusion is that 'only the law of retribution can determine exactly
the kind and degree of punishment'."
This doctrine was supported by Pope Pius XII in 1954 when he stated that
punishment 'accomplishes its purpose ... inasfar as it compels the
criminal, because of the act performed, to suffer, that is it deprives him of
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defended and supported by many Victorian jurists including Sir James
Stephen, Herbert Packer, Jackson Toby and Emile Durkheim. According
to Durkheim, 'unpunished deviance would tend to demoralize the
conformist, the "upright people", while punishment would "heal the
wounds made upon the collective sentiments of the people."?" He
concludes therefore that the rationale for punishment 'is not that it deters
and not that punishment of the evil-doer is a good in itself; rather
punishment of the criminal reinforces the collective sentiments of the
majority that crime is bad, and that he who commits a criminal act should
be punished.:"
Commentators and penologists are not agreed on the efficacy of
retribution as a worthwhile objective or justification for imprisonment.
Some penologists have argued however that punishment, as an objective
of imprisonment, has virtually been dropped from the lexicon of the
modern prison man, althought this is the only objective that prison actually
achieves. "
1.6.3 Deterrence
Deterrence is another familiar justification for imprisonment. It has to be
viewed from two perspectives; first, deterrence as general prevention and
second, deterrence as individual prevention. Its main aim is the
prevention of future crime. It is hoped that prisons provide warnings to
people thinking about committing crimes, and that the possibility of going
to prison will discourage people from breaking the law. The theory of
general deterrence has been popular since the eighteenth century and it
has its foundation in the belief that the potential criminal would be
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exceeded the pleasure expected from the act." According to Bentham,
'everyone, even the madman, calculates pleasure versus pain.:" Again
commentators and penologists are not agreed on how successful the fear
of prison is as a deterrent to crime. But it is safe enough to say that
obviously those who have been caught and convicted were not deterred.
It is also clear that the large numbers of repeaters do not gain much in the
way of deterrence from the prison experience.
It has been argued that the notion of general prevention does not only
raise questions about the effectiveness of punishment but also raises a
basic moral question. One commentator asks:
'What is the moral basis for punishing someone, perhaps hard, in
order to prevent entirely different people from committing equivalent
acts, when those punished are to a large extent poor and highly
stigmatized people in need of assistance rather then punlshrnentv'"
The theory of deterrence as individual prevention does not have a
position in modern penal theory. The arguments used against prison as a
method of general prevention may also be used against the notion of
prison as a means of deterring the individual offender.8o It has also been
argued that deterrence 'has become a dirty word in penological
discussion because it has so often been the battle cry of those who
supported capital or corporal punishment..81 It has further been argued
that deterrence 'cannot threaten those beyond the point of hope. It
cannot improve the morality of those whose value system is closed. And,
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cruel and rigorous enforcement and by widespread suppression of
individual freecorn.:"
1.6.4 Incapacitation
Another justification for imprisonment, which is closely related to the
theory of deterrence is incapacitation. It is also known as isolation, or
'keeping them off the streets'." Incapacitation became an important
criminological concept in the 1980s.84 The theoretical basis of this
justification lies in the fact that as long as a man is locked up in prison, he
will not be able to commit other crimes. The basic idea is that the
offender is to be incapacitated by being removed from society.
Incapacitation therefore refers to the removal of criminals from society so
they can no longer harm innocent people. Orland argues that the problem
with this justification theory is again one of prediction." He thinks that the
theory assumes that it is possible to predict that the person actually
isolated for a specific crime is likely to commit other crimes. He concludes
that:
'Unfortunately, our knowledge is not advanced to the point where we
can predict human behaviour with any degree of confidence, let alone
predict that a convicted burglar will, if he is released, commit another
burglary. The logic of isolation theory is that it permits criminals to be
locked up for a long period of time even though there is no basis for
reliably predicting that they will recidivate.'86
Thomas Mathiesen has argued that incapacitation raises two basic
questions: the question of accuracy and the question of principles." On
the first he asks: how accurately is it possible to predict who will commit
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will incarceration in prison function as a method of incapacitation. The
smaller the accuracy, the more poorly it will function." On the second he
asks: what is the justification for locking up many who are actually not
dangerous in order to secure ourselves from a few who are? To that he
says that the result is a violation of principles. Just like accuracy the
violation of principles varies. The more one-sided the emphasis on future
acts as a basis for sentencing, the more the principles in question are
violated." Matheisen concludes that incapacitation as a reason for
imprisonment poses major problems."
1.6.5 Justice
This is a relatively new theory in penal policy, although it actually goes
back to the days of Rousseau and Voltaire who advocated that first, there
should be as little regulation of human behaviour as possible, and second
the little regulation which had to be there should be highly specified in
advance." Accordingly:
'The relationship between the offence on the one hand and
punishment on the other should be precise, and determined by the
seriousness of the offence.'92
The rationale for justice as a purpose for imprisonment lies in the common
legal maxim that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be
done. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between justice and
punishment as theories for justification of imprisonment. It could however
be said that the punishment value of an offence is determined on the
basis of the objectionability or the gravity of the offence while the justice
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caused. Imprisonment is therefore in a way seen as reparation for that
act.
In South Africa, prison legislation does not deal directly with the purpose
of imprisonment. Such purpose can however, be implied from the
provisions of the new Correctional Services Act.93 Section 2 provides for
the purpose of the correctional systems as;
a) enforcing sentences of the courts in the manner prescribed by this Act;
b) detaining all prisoners in safe custody whilst ensuring their human dignity; and
c) promoting the social responsibility and human development of all prisoners and
personssubject to community correctlons.'"
This is a significant departure from the functions of the Department of
Correctional Services as provided for under the old Correctional Services
Act95 , section 2(2) of which provided that;
The functions of the Department shall be
a) to ensure that every prisoner lawfully detained in any prison be kept therein in
safe custody until lawfully discharged or removed therefrom; and
b) as far as practicable, to apply such treatment to convicted prisoners ... as may
lead to their reformation and rehabilitation and to train them in habits of industry
and tabour."
A comparison of the two provisions immediately reveals that emphasis
under the old Act was laid more on treatment (rehabilitation) and safe
custody and less on punishment, while under the new Act emphasis is laid
more on punishment and safe custody than on treatment and
rehabilitation. The old Act specifically mentions treatment, reformation
and rehabilitation while the new Act terms it 'promoting the social
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implied between convicted prisoners and prisoners awaiting trial. This
distinction was carried further by De Villiers CJ when he stated in
. ~ hWhittaker v Roos and Bateman, Morant v Roos and Bateman t at
'The object of the imprisonment before trial is to obtain the
appearance of the accused at the trial, and not to punish him
except for offences committed against the regulations of the
gaols.,98
If the new Correctional Services Act is anything to go by, which it should
be, South Africa has, over the last few years, shifted with the rest of most
of the world from the 'treatment' objective to the 'retribution' and 'safe
custody' objectives.
1.7 ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF PRISONS
Prisons can be said to have existed since the beginning of organised
society, that is, when 'people developed the technical skills to build
securely enough to incarcerate others'." From the early Roman times
through the Middle Ages there was evidence of imprisonment, mainly as
a form of punishment. Imprisonment for example, was used by Roman
masters to punish their disobedient slaves. In the Middle Ages it was also
used for the detention of prisoners awaiting trial and for debtors who had
failed to pay their debts.
In England the origin of prisons may be traced to as early as the eighth
century when some kind of 'prison' is presumed to have first existed.'?'
The word 'prison' was first used in a code of laws in c.890. The laws said
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be imprisoned in a royal manor for forty days and while there .., to submit
himself to punishment of the bishop's devising' .101 At that time
imprisonment seemed to be punitive. It was only later however, that
people who committed more serious offences like witchcraft or arson were
also sent to 'prison'. Imprisonment continued to have a penal aim.
It must be pointed out that such 'prisons' were quite different from those of
today. It should also be noted that the early 'prisons' functioned only to
detain prisoners prior to trial; they were not used to punish people after
conviction. 'Mutilation, death, outlawing and, above all, compensation in
cash were, in a general way the proper punishment for convicted
criminals,.102 According to Orland, I •• • the idea of sending men to prison
as postconviction punishment did not arise until the early decades of the
nineteenth century.'103 Orland further points out:
'The prison as we know it today - a barred and walled institution to
house felons after conviction - emerged from several closely related
English institutions which housed pretrial detainees. These
institutions date back to the twelfth century. As early as 1116, Henry
11 declared that "gaols" (lalls) were to be erected in walled towns or
within royal castles, but their sole function was to confine prior to
punishment.,104
Gradually imprisonment came to be accepted not only as a device for
holding persons awaiting trial but also as a means of punishing convicted
criminals.
In continental Europe and England the construction of the first 'institutions
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place in the sixteenth century .105 The earliest such institution, known as
Bridewell Palace, was opened in London in 1552. In Continental Europe
the first such institution known as the 'Raphius' was established in
Amsterdam in 1596. The 'Spinhuis' (for women) was founded in 1602.106
In 1775 the Ghent House of Correction was opened in England following
the passing of an Act of Parliament in 1711 fixing the maximum term of
imprisonment at three years.
In spite of the early developments outlined above, it has been argued,
however, that prison 'as a place of confinement for the ordinary
lawbreakers is less than 200 years old, an institution of purely American
origin, conceived by its inventors as a noble humanitarian reform befitting
an Age of Enlightenment in the aftermath of a revolution against ancient
tyrannles.'!" The prison therefore 'was not born amid the tyranny of
Europe's divine-right monarchs or Asia's Draconian potentates, but rather
among the free citizens of the United States of America' .108
For a long time imprisonment as a form of punishment did not gain much
popularity both in America and England. Consequently until the end of
the eighteenth century, prisons as places of punishment were as little
known in America as they were in England. All this was to change within
a few succeeding decades when the Americans conceived and created
the prison in the form that we still know it today. Much of this
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The Quakers were shocked by the brutal corporal punishment of that time,
especially the shedding of blood, and their revulsion led to the substitution
of imprisonment for corporal punishment in those American colonial areas
which the Quakers dominated. 'As a result of their efforts the first
penitentiary (their word), the Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia, was
established in 1790:110 A block of cells on the principle of solitary
confinement was constructed in the yard of the Walnut Street Jail
between 1790 and 1792, and in this manner the modern prison system
had its permanent and effective birth.!" At the Walnut Street Jail the
Pennsylvania Prison system was first worked out, and from it, later on, the
variant known as the Auburn System. These two systems were copied by
Europeans and they dominated the prison building and administration of
the world during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.l"
In 1829 the Eastern State Penitentiary was opened on Cherry Hill in
Philadelphia with far greater emphasis on solitary confinernent.!" Each
prisoner of this institution remained in his cell or its adjoining yard,
working alone and saw no one except the officers of the institution and an
occasional visitor. This method of prison management known as the
'separate system' became a model for penal institutions constructed in
several other American states and other parts of the world, and it
remained the dominant philosophy of prison management through much
of Europe and the United States during the 19th and 20th centuries.
In South Africa, prisons have a relatively more recent history. According
to Van Zyl Smit, although 'imprisonment as a means of compulsory
detention of accused persons has a long history ..., incarceration as a
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recent origin in South Africa.'!" Imprisonment was not regarded as a
primary form of punishment until the first half of the nineteenth century.
Before that there is hardly any evidence of imprisonment in this part of the
world. This was largely due to the fact that the customary law of pre-
colonial Southern Africa made no provision for imprisonment as a
punishment!"
The first Europeans came to the Cape in 1652. The Dutch East India
Company immediately took control. There is little documented evidence
of imprisonment during the period of the Company. However, some form
of convict labour is known to have existed at the time but it appears to
have been rare and unco-ordinated. There are also unclear reports of
deportation of convicts to Robben lsland.!" The end of the first Dutch
occupation (1795) marked the beginning of the first British occupation
(1795 - 1803) which brought some kind of new penal system.
Clear evidence of prisons only begins to emerge in the 1820's with a few
lock-ups that were built specifically for offenders against 'pass laws' and
other legislation that created petty offences. A Commission of Inquiry
sent by the British authorities in 1823 to investigate matters in the Cape
colony published a report in 1828 which observed numerous abuses in
the colonial penal system. However, not much change was effected. The
numbers of incarcerated increased but the system remained disorganised.
It was not until 1844 that legislation was first passed regarding prisons in
the Cape Colony.!" In 1887 a Committee of Inquiry was set up by the
Cape Legislative Assembly to look into the convict system. The findings
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consolidate and amend the law relating to Convict Stations and Prisons'!"
The Act was passed by the Cape Parliament in 1888. One of its
objectives was to minimise the distinction between convict stations and
local lock-ups by combining them in a single prison systern.!" The Act
also provided for, inter alia, segregation of sexes, segregation of prisoners
awaiting trial, juveniles and debtors. There were minor subsequent
amendments to the Act, but they did not bring about any significant
changes.
As these developments were taking place in the Cape Colony during the
19th century, provision was also made for prisons in Natal, the Republic
of the Orange Free State and the South African Republic.120 In Natal the
first prisons were built by the Voortrekkers in Pietermaritzburg and Durban
in 1847. Legislation regarding prisons was first passed in 1862 after
British annexation of the territory.!" In 1868 a Commission of Inquiry was
set up to investigate the state of prisons in the territory and the findings of
the Commission led to a new legislation.122 In 1906 the Prison Reforms
Commission attempted to overhaul the penal system in Natal, but
unfortunately its recommendations were not implemented and no major
reforms of the Natal penal system took place until after 1910.123
Little is known about the early prison history of the Orange Free State and
the Transvaal. Only during the short period of British annexation (1877 -
1881) was legislation first passed regarding prisons in the Transvaal .!"
In 1900, the British occupation of the two Republics led to a major
reorganisation of the penal system of both territories. In 1903 a law was
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that territory had been annexed.!" In 1906 a law was also passed in
Transvaal'" following the findings of a Commission of Inquiry into
conditions at the Fort in Johannesburg, the major prison in Transvaal.
The Commission had found that the prison was inadequate and the whole
system needed to be overheuleo.!"
In 1911 immediately after the Union of South Africa came into being, a
prisons department was created by an Act of Parliarnent.?" After several
amendments this Act was later repealed by the Prisons Act129which, after
a number of amendments including change of name, was recently
repealed by the Correctional Services Act.130 This is the Act by which
prisons in South Africa are presently governed.
1.8 ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF PRISONERS' RIGHTS
Early prisoners had no rights at all. In fact in one American decision,
prisoners were characterised as slaves of the state.?' Although this view
did not hold substantial support for a long time, the so-called 'hands-off
doctrine' prevented judges from interfering in prison matters. According to
this doctrine, federal courts were not allowed to intervene because it was
'not the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline
of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those
who are illegally confined.'132
The 'hands-off doctrine'survived in the American judicial system for more
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of the United States Supreme Court in the early 1970s. In Wo/ff v
McDonnell, 133 Justice White said:
'There is no Iron Curtain between the Constitution and the prisons of this
country .'134
And a year later, in Procumer v Marlinez,135 Justice Powell proclaimed:
'A policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take
cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state
institution . When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental
constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect
constitutional rights.,l36
These two decisions marked the end of the 'hands-off doctrine'. In
addition, several factors combined to accelerate the demise of the
doctrine. First of all, prisoners were becoming increasingly aware of their
constitutional rights and therefore becoming more militant and assertive.
At the forefront of this struggle was a group known as the Black Muslims.
Their efforts to practice their religion were being continuously ignored and
sometimes punished by correctional authorities. The Black Muslims'
challenges to the First Ammendment represented some of the initial
judicial victories for prisoners and opened the floodgates to litigation on
several prisoner-related issues.!" Secondly, this was the hey-day of the
civil rights movement. Not only were prisoners becoming more and more
aware of their civil rights and liberties, a group of civil rights lawyers was
also emerging to fight for the enforcement of those liberties. The
involvement of these lawyers gradually led to successful challenges to the
abuse of prisoners' rights, and set important precedents for future
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aware of the plight of society's underprivileged and the sordid conditions
which often characterised prison life.
At the national level the responsiveness of the judiciary was reflected in
the Supreme Court's decisions in a number of cases including United
States v Wade138 (dealing with the right to an attorney at a line-up) and
Miranda v Arizona139 (dealing with the right to warnings before
interrogations).
The decline of the 'hands-off doctrine' was accompanied by the
incorporation of most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment. In the Lower Courts of many American states
cases started streaming in thick and fast. In 1974, the United States
Supreme Court was involved in the first landmark case concerning
prisoners' rights. This was in Wolff v Mc Donnell,140 where the Supreme
Court was faced with the issue of legal representation of inmates in prison
disciplinary proceedings. Although the Court's decision was more in
favour of prison management than inmates, the Court used the occasion
to state that in situations involving either illiterate inmates or complex
issues they 'should be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate or ... to have
adequate substitute aid ... designated by the staff'.141 'Since then the
Supreme Court has regularly addressed the question of the rights of
prisoners in a variety of contexts' . 142 In Jones v North Carolina Prisoners'
Labour Union'" for example, the Court made it clear that prisoners do not
forfeit all constitutional rights. The same was held in Bell v Wolfish. 144
In Europe the advent of prisoners' rights was a result of widespread
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1966. Norway and Denmark followed suit in 1967 and Finland in 1968.
These protests resulted in the formation of various prison organisations
that spearheaded demands for the observation and realization of
prisoners' rights.
In Britain, a prisoners' rights organisation was formed in 1972. It called
itself PROP (Preservation of the Rights of Prisoners). A call by the
organisation for a nation-wide strike in British jails was heeded by about
5,500 prisoners. Their demands included a right to parole, a right to
appeal to the High Court for refusal of parole and the right of unimpeded
access to prisons by the public and the press. Although the British
government refused to grant any recognition to PROP, the organisation
continued to actively campaign for prisoners rights. For example,
following a riot at Hull Prison in 1976, PROP published a detailed account
of the aftermath of the roof top protest alleging that prisoners who had
taken part in the disturbance were beaten and that their personal property
was destroyed by some prison ottlcers.!" Although the Home Office
completely exonerated prison staff, at the end of 1978, more than two
years after the riot, twelve prison officers and an assistant governor were
sent for trial on charges arising out of the aftermath of the prisoners'
dernonstration.!"
PROP still exists today and continues to campaign for the preservation of
prisoners rights. However, it has subsequently become more sophiscated
and broad based in its campaigning. There have also been misgivings
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In South Africa prisoners rights have their onqm in the Prisons and
Reformatories Act.14B Before that Act came into force, the courts were
called upon to interpret the Transitional Ordinance 6 of 1906. 'Their
general pronouncements on the rights of prisoners made in this regard
were to mark the beginning of modern jurisprudence on South African
prison law.'149 In 1911 the Transvaal Provincial Division made a
watershed decision as far as prisoners' rights were concerned. This was
in Whittaker v Governor of Johannesburg Gao/150 where the court was
called upon to rule on the lawfulness of detaining prisoners awaiting trial
in conditions which amounted to solitary confinement. Two prisoners had
been subjected to severe ill-treatment in gaol while awaiting trial. It was
unanimously held that the Prison Governor was not allowed to
discriminate against an individual prisoner even if he had been ordered to
do so by the Director of Prisons. The ill-treatment was discontinued in
consequence of an order of court against which the governor of the gaol
made an unsuccessful appeal. This judgment brought into South African
jurisprudence 'the principle that a prisoner who has been illegally treated
in gaol has the legal standing to approach the court for relief ,151 thus
paving the way for a new approach towards the rights of prisoners in
South African jails.
General prison reforms again began to emerge as a public issue in the
1940's. This initiative was mainly spearheaded by welfare organisations
such as the South African Prisoners' Aid Association and the Social










appointment of a judicial commission, the Lansdown Commission on
Penal and Prison Reform. Although the findings of the Commission were
rather cautious they were quite sympathetic to the views of the reformists.
Prisoner's rights were dealt a major blow by the introduction of the 1959
Prisons Act.152 Not only did the Act explicitly entrench the policy of
apartheid in the prison service, it also failed to address some of the
recommendations of the Lansdown Commission. The Act also had the
effect of isolating the prison service by abolishing the prescription that
prisoners had to be visited regularly by magistrates and boards of visitors
and also by excluding the review of prison conditions by informed
outsiders.l'"
The 1960s and 1970s were characterised by two important developments.
The first was an increase in the number of political prisoners, the effect of
which was a new generation of prisoners who were more articulate and
self-consciously dedicated to attacking the legitimacy of the state and all
its organs. The second was a wave of Supreme Court decisions that were
not sympathetic to the cause of prisoners' rights.154 The leading case in
this respect was Goldberg v Minister of Prisons,155 which placed on the
Commissioner the power to determine how sentenced prisoners should be
treated, thereby defining the rights of prisoners far more narrowly than
had been done even in Whittaker v Governor of Johannesburg Gao/,156
more than sixty years earlier. In Goldberg the appellants, who were
political prisoners, had unsuccessfully instituted proceedings in a lower
court claiming a right to newspapers, radio news services, news
magazines and periodicals. The substance of their case was that in,
denying them any form of access to news of current events the,
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were entitled. The court held, inter alia, that in so far as the appellants'
application for relief had been founded upon the alleged existence of
rights enforceable in a court of law, it had rightly been rejected.
It should be noted, however, that in a dissenting judgment Corbett JA (as
he then was) held that the respondents were not entitled to apply a rule or
policy depriving applicants of all access to news. Quoting American
Jurisotuoence'" Corbett JA said:
lA prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those
expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law.'l58
The effect of such decisions was that the courts allowed prison authorities
a wide discretion in dealing with prisoners and prisoners' rights were
restricted more than they had been before. Another development in the
1970's was the appointment of the Viljoen Commission in 1976. The
Commission proposed extensive reform to the penal system as a whole as
a result of which certain intermediate sentences were abolished and some
system of releasing prisoners, similar to parole, was introduced.
The 1980s were characterised by further attacks on the legitimacy of the
prison system and a series of disclosures about conditions in certain
prisons. A State of Emergency in 1988 did not help matters. It resulted in
the incarceration, without trial, of a large number of people which led to
further attacks on the prison system and the State, both from within and
outside South Africa. The Courts did very little to promote the protection
of the rights of detainees during the State of Emergency. In Omar v
Minister of Law and Order,159 for example, the validity of an Emergency
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legal advisers, were upheld by the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court.
The late 1980's and early 1990's saw greater strides in the direction of
prisoners' rights protection in South Africa. The first major development
was the formation of the Police and Prison Officers Civil Rights Union
(POPCRU). Although POPCRU was founded in 1989, it established a
significant presence especially among black prison warders in the early
1990s. Amongst other things, POPCRU was, and still is, committed to the
recognition of the civil rights of all prisoners.l'" On its formation POPCRU
did not enjoy the support of the government of the day. In fact initially the
Union had to fight for survival, but with the new political dispensation, it
has since weathered the storm and is now one of the affiliates of the all-
powerful Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).
Another significant development was the formation of the South African
Prisoners Organisation for Human Rights (SAPOHR). Formed in 1988
SAPOHR has its mission statement as '[T]o address the legacy of the
apartheid criminal justice and prison systems and to contribute to a
culture of human rights and social justice in a non-racial, non sexist
democratic South Africa. ,161 A SAPOHR national office was opened in
1992. SAPOHR claims that its broad aim is to reform and democratise the
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(3) Fighting for the restoration of human rights and dignity to all who
come into contact with police and the Department of Correctional
Services system;
(4) Bringing an end to economic and talent exploitation by replacing
forced slave labour with a basic wage for all work done in prison by
prisoners; and
(5) Fighting for genuine education, training and rehabilitation
programmes in prisons.!"
The specific objectives of SAPOHR are stated as follows:
(i) To reform and democratise the 'Correctional Services' and
'Criminal Justice System' of South Africa;
(ii) To address human rights abuses in South African prisons that have
been brought about by a system of apartheid, and to promote
human and civil rights of suspects, prisoners, ex-prisoners and
their next-of-kin;
(iii) To act as a voice of suspects, detainees, prisoners, ex-prisoners
and their next-of-kin, to bring attention to their plight and to
respond to needs for reform, justice, reintegrative
training/education and employment;
(iv) To identify and target specific needs groups including those most
disadvantaged by apartheid; women, youth, the ill, elderly and
disabled; and
(v) To forge links and working relations with other community based
and non-government organisations to co-ordinate and strengthen
(our) services and reform.163
As to what extent the above objectives have been achieved, it is difficult to
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including curbing abuses on prisoners by fellow prisoners and abuses on
prisoners by prison authorities. SAPHOR for example claims that it
receives an average of 22 letters of complaints a week from prisoners in
KwaZulu Natal alone. 90% of these letters are complaints from prisoners,
of assault by prison staff. SAPOHR then dispatches its paralegal officers
to the prison heads in these areas who then institute internal
investigations which are usually unsuccessful due to unwilling
witnesses.!"
It should be mentioned that from its inception SAPOHR did not enjoy
much government support. It has been viewed with much scepticism and
suspicion, particularly by the Department of Correctional Services. For
that reason its significance as an organ for the protection of prisoners
rights has been somewhat muted. That notwithstanding, it remains an
important development in the history of prisoners' rights in South Africa.
The most important development in the history of prisoners' rights in
South Africa was the introduction of constitutional rights for prisoners in
the country's jurisprudence. This was done initially through the Interim
Constitution165 and then later through the 'final' Constitution.l" Not only is
provision now made for the enjoyment and protection of a number of
rights in the Bill of Rights (for example the right to life, equal protection,
right to dignity, privacy , and so on),167 specific provision is also made for
the rights of detained persons.!"
The Constitution also establishes a Constitutional Court. The court is
accessible to all, including prisoners. Provision is also made for the
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democracy.169 These institutions include the Human Rights Commission
and the Office of the Public Protector. The Human Rights Commission
has the power to investigate any alleged violation of human rights either
on its own initiative or on receipt of a complaint. The Public Protector has
the power to investigate any maladministration in state affairs and any
abuse of power by people performing public functions . It can also
investigate the conduct of people performing public functions, if such
conduct results in impropriety or prejudice. The Public Protector is
accessible to all people and communities including prlsoners .?"
The Constitution and the structures established by it are a very important
development in the history of prisoners' rights in South Africa. They have
the potential of not only promoting and protecting prisoners' rights but
also widening the range of rights that prisoners have hitherto enjoyed. To
what extent this potential is translated into reality is one of the main
questions to be answered by this study.
Finally, the recent enactment of the Correctional Services Ace71is another
gigantic leap in the direction of the protection of prisoners' rights. The
Act, which repeals the Prisons Act,172 provides for, inter alia, 'the custody
of all prisoners under conditions of human dignity, the rights and
obligations of sentenced prisoners, the rights and obligations of
unsentenced prisoners and a system of community corrections' .173
According to the preamble, the object of the Act is to give effect to the Bill
of Rights in the 1996 Constitution and in particular its provisions with
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the Act also brings South Africa's Correctional Services legislation in line
with international standards and lays a foundation for the futurs.!"
Although details of the provisions of the Act will be discussed at a later
stage,175 it is important at this stage to mention that the Act provides for,
inter alia, the establishment of a National Council for Correctional
Services176 to advise the Minister on all aspects regarding corrections.
The Act also establishes the office of the Independent Inspecting
Judge.177 The office of this functionary is already up and running. Also
provided for is the appointment of Independent Prison Visitors whose
duties will include visiting prisons, interviewing prisoners, recording and
discussing their complaints, and generally ensuring that their rights are
not abused. Provision is also made under the Act for a new system of
Parole Boards.!" All these organs and functionaries established by the
new Act are important developments in the history of the rights of
prisoners in this country.
1.9 CONCLUSION
The prison population in South Africa, as this chapter shows, has
increased dramatically over the last few years. This increase has not
been matched by a proportional increase in prison accommodation and
space. The resulting overcrowding is accompanied by various other forms
of human rights abuses. Due to the nature of their position in society,
prisoners are sometimes unfortunately regarded as having chosen to
forfeit their fundamental rights. This study is an attempt to examine the
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This chapter gives a background to that attempt by first defining a
prisoner and a prison. It also enumerates and explains the various types
of prisoners in order to specify the particular categories that the study is
concerned with. A number of purposes or objectives for imprisonment are
also discussed and it is submitted in this chapter that South Africa
subscribes mainly to the 'retribution' and 'safe custody' objectives for
imprisonment.
A clear understanding of the present state of prisoners' rights requires
some historical insight. For that reason this chapter looks at the origin
and history of prisons and also the history and development of prisoners'
rights. What emerges is a protracted prison reform struggle spanning
more than a century. In the United States this struggle was assisted by a
'judicial revolution' that led to the abandonment of the so-called 'hands-off'
doctrine . In Europe the struggle was assisted by widespread protests in
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and England. These culminated into
the formation of prisoners' rights organisations, most notably PROP
(Preservation of Prisoners' Rights) in Britain. In South Africa the history
and development of prisoners' rights have been related to and largely
affected by the country's unique political history. One historical landmark
of this political development is the enactment of the present Constitution.
It is within this constitutional context that this study is premised. The
foregoing chapter provides the contextual background.
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CHAPTER TWO
PRISONERS' RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Prisoners' rights are human rights first. Any discussion of the protection of
such rights has to be viewed in that context. Protection of human rights
generally takes place at two levels: the domestic level and the international
level. Most of the discussion concerning human rights in South Africa today
is focused on the domestic protection of such rights through a Bill of Rights.
At a different level there is the international dimension of human rights
protection . It is this dimension, with particular reference to prisoners' rights,
that this chapter is essentially concerned with. The chapter therefore looks
at how prisoners' rights are protected through the system of international
law. A study of prisoners' rights from this perspective necessitates a basic
understanding of certain aspects of international human rights law, a brief
overview of which follows here below.
2.2 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
OVERVIEW
2.2.1 Sources and characteristics of International Law
. According to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice1
I
the Court is instructed to apply
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting
states
Annexure to the Charter of the United Nations.
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(b) international custom as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations
(d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.
The sources of international human rights law therefore include treaties or
conventions, customs and general principles of international law, decisions
of various authoritative bodies (e.g. resolutions of UN General Assembly),
and writings of experts.
International law is a different kind of legal system in comparison with
domestic legal systems. First, international law operates primarily between
states. Individuals have very limited standing in international law and have
to rely largely on states to ensure the protection of their human rights .
States therefore, and not individuals, are traditionally the subjects of
international law. Secondly, international law lacks a sovereign legislative
authority. This means that consensus between states is the underlying basis
of international law. Thirdly, there is no precise equivalent in international
law of an executive and judicial branch of government. Finally, the principle
of state sovereignty is recognised as being fundamental to international law.
This principle was described by Brownlie as 'the basic constitutional doctrine
of the law of nations'. 2 Those are some of the basic characteristics of
international law.
2.2.2 Instruments providing for the international protection of human
rights
After the Second World War, world leaders recognised that a commitment to
the protection of human rights was essential to world peace. This
2
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (1990) at 287.
51
commitment was embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.3 In an
attempt to give substance to 'human rights and fundamental freedoms'
envisaged in the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights4 was
adopted by the United Nations in 1948. Although this document is in the
form of a declaration rather than a convention and therefore lacks formal
binding force, it has been widely recognised as binding due to the
obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations or because parts
of the Declaration have become part of customary international law. The
importance of the Declaration as a human rights instrument cannot be over
emphasised. As Scot Davidson puts it:
'It has not only formed the basis for the drafting of two international
convenants and three regional human rights treaties, but it has also
been the paradigm for the drafting of the human rights provisions of
over 25 domestic constitutions. ,5
States, international institutions, NGO's and individuals alike see the
Declaration as the cornerstone of human rights and the 'mother' of an
international human rights culture.
In 1966 two covenants were adopted by the UN General Assembly. Unlike
the Universal Declaration of Human rights they contained binding
obligations. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) came into force in 1976.6 To date, more than
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Declaration on Human Rights, those covenants are usually regarded and
described as the 'international bill of rights'.
In addition to these general international human rights instruments, a
number of declarations and conventions dealing with specific human rights
issues have come into being under the auspices of the United Nations.
These include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (1948), the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (1965) and more relevantly the Convention against
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (1984). These are but a few of a host of instruments that have
been adopted by the UN over the years.
At a regional level various human rights instruments have also been
promulgated. The European system based on the Council of Europe is the
most advanced. It is primarily composed of two major treaties: the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (the European Conventionf dealing with civil
and political rights and the European Social Charter" dealing with social,
economic and cultural rights. The Inter-American System for protecting
human rights is based on the Organisation of American States (OAS) which
is composed of states from North and South America. Under this system
there is the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man9 and
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The African system is based on the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)
which is the most recent regional organisation to adopt a human rights
instrument. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,11
sometimes known as the Banjul Charter after the capital of Gambia where it
was drafted, 'differs considerably from its other regional counterparts, both in
the catalogue of rights protected and in the means of implementation and
protection' . 12 This is because the Charter is a product of a different world
order from that which prevailed in the years when the other major human
rights instruments were being drafted. It is therefore a result of the entrance
into the world community by underdeveloped countries, giving rise to claims
for the recognition of new kinds of human rights such as the right to
development. This is reflected in the incorporation of 'people's rights' into
the provisions of the Charter.
2.2.3 Implementation and Supervision
The implementation of international human rights obligations is a rather
problematic and complicated process. This is mainly because the primary
method of implementation is more political than judicial . This in turn is due to
the absence of an authoritative enforcement mechanism resulting in states
ignoring their human rights obligations sometimes with impunity. As Raylene
Keiqhtley says:
'The problem arises from the fact that international law is
dependent in most respects on the consensus of states and in
general it lacks authoritative enforcement agents ...
Consequently most of the implementation mechanisms which are
provided for in the various human rights instruments are political
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What this means is that states can sometimes breach the rules of
international law and get away with it. Even the occasional
threats of collective economic sanctions and the use of force
against a violating state, have in some cases proved pretty
ineffectual.
2.2.3.1 Implementation and Supervision by the United Nations
Implementation of human rights by the United Nations takes place through
its specialized organs, namely, the General Assembly, the Security Council ,
the Secretariat, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and other
agencies . These bodies, the General Assembly in particular, may raise a
country's violation of human rights in debate and may adopt Resolutions
dealing with the matter. A Resolution is meant to put political pressure on
the violating state to rectify the human rights situation . More direct pressure
may be placed on states by, for example, imposition of economic sanctions
as was done in respect of South Africa's apartheid system. As the plenary
organ of the UN, the General Assembly has broad competence to consider
questions concerning human rights. It therefore plays an important role in
implementation and supervision.
The Secretariat is also a principal organ of the UN in terms of the UN
Charter and it functions under the Secretary-General. One of its main
functions is to submit annual reports to the General Assembly. Its reports
have occasionally included human rights matters. The Economic and Social
Council also plays a big role through making recommendations for the
purpose of promoting respect for and observance of human rights and by
submitting draft conventions to the General Assembly." ECOSOC, which is
also established by the Charter of the United Nations, operates mainly
through Commissions. The most important of these Commissions, as far as
human rights are concerned, are the Commission on Human Rights, the
14
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Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of
Minorities and the Commission on the Status of Women. One Committee
that requires special mentioning is the Committee Against Torture.
Established in 1987, the Committee monitors the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The
procedures used by these organs for implementing human rights include
investigations and fact-finding through specially constituted groups. Human
rights violations may also be raised in debate during the public sessions of
these bodies and resolutions may be taken in respect of such violations.
The Security Council also plays an important role in the field of human
rights. Established under the Charter of the United Nations, the Security
Council is not mandated with any specific responsibility for human rights.
However, Chapter VI of the Charter of the UN (providing for disputes and
situations likely to endanger maintenance of international peace and
security) and Chapter VII (providing for enforcement action) have given the
Security Council the basis from which, on a number of occasions, to make
pronouncements on such matters. The Council, for example, was
instrumental in considering the question of apartheid in South Africa and the
treatment of Palestinians in the Israel occupied territories." More recently,
it has been involved in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and
Kosovo.
2.2.3.2 Implementation and supervision at regional level
A strong regional system for protecting human rights can be very effective as
has been proven and demonstrated by the European system. Under the
European Convention a Commission for Human Rights and a Court of
Human Rights have been established. By complementing and
supplementing each other these two play an important role in the
implementation of human rights norms. Individuals may submit complaints
15
See Davidson (note 5) above 74.
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concerning alleged violations of human rights to the Commission provided
certain requirements are met and provided the state concerned has made a
special declaration in this regard." Interstate complaints do not need to
meet these requirements. Individuals do not have standing to bring
complaints before the Court." Enforcement of the decision of a Court or a
recommendation of the Commission lies in the hands of the Council of
Europe's governing body, the Committee of Ministers.
The American system has similar, although less successful, implementation
mechanisms. The American Convention also establishes a Commission and
a Court. The functions of the Commission are spelled out in Article 44 of the
Convention, and those of the Court in Article 63 and 64. The Commission
can be said to have been far more successful in promoting and implementing
human rights than would be expected in a region known for political
excesses.
Under the African Charter only a Commission was established. A Court has
only been recently provided for through a Protocol to the African Charter."
As explained by Mubangizi and O'Shea, 'the court will become an invaluable
addition to the African Commission's somewhat limited protective role ....'.19
The African Commission is mandated with four main functions: promotional,
protective, interpretative and consultative. It has the power to accept
interstate complaints and individual communications. One feature of the
African Charter's individual petition system which distinguishes it from the
other regional systems is that it deals not with individual violations of human
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serious or massive violations of human and peoples' rights,.20 On the whole
the Commission has served as a limited means of control over human rights
abuses, and the African regional system has generally been perceived to be
weak and ineffective in implementing human rights norms.
2.2.3 .3 Supervision by the International Court of Justice
As the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) has jurisdiction to adjudicate on matters involving human
rights. The Court has both contentious (adjudicatory) and advisory
jurisdictions. Some human rights instruments, such as the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crimes of Apartheid, and more
importantly the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, specifically provide that, in the event
of a dispute between contracting parties concerning the interpretation or
application of the Convention in question, any of the disputing parties may
refer the matter to the ICJ.21 Advisory opinions may be sought from the ICJ
by the General Assembly and the Security Council. Over the years the ICJ
has been more successful in fulfilling this jurisdictional mandate than the
contentious jurisdiction which has only been exercised in a handful of cases
involving human rights.
2.3 DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS NORMS
For human rights to be successfully protected and implemented, there ought
to be a meaningful interplay and overlap between international human rights
standards and domestic or national standards. According to Henkins:
20
21 See Davidson (note 5 above) at 161.
Under the Conv~ntion against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or PUnishment provision, for this is made under Article 30.
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'The purpose of international law is to influence states to recognise
and accept human rights, to reflect these rights in their national
constitutions and laws, to respect and ensure their enjoyment
through national institutions, and to incorporate them into national
ways of Iife.'22
The need for a coherent incorporation of international human rights norms
into domestic law becomes even more urgent when regard is had to the
difficulties and complications inherent in international human rights-
enforcement mechanisms. Domestic enforcement of international human
rights norms, however, largely depends on the relationship between
international law and domestic law.
2.3.1 The relationship between international and national law
According to section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa:
The Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct
inconsistent with it is invalid and obligations imposed by it must be
fulfilled.'23
This means that national law takes precedence over any other law, including
international law. However, it really all depends on the perspective and the
context in which the particular law is to be applied. One commentator has
observed:
'The relationship between the international legal system and the
national legal system will be perceived differently from the
perspective of a judge or arbiter operating within the international
22
23
see Henkin in Meron (ed) Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy
Issues (1984) . .
See section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996).
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framework applying international law and by the national judge
operating within the national legal system and applying national law.'24
The implication of the above observation is that states mayor may not allow
and apply international law in their national legal systems. Consequently
some states apply the principle that international norms automatically form
part of domestic law and even have priority over domestic norms. In other
states international norms have to be incorporated into the domestic legal
system by way of legislation. South Africa falls in the latter category. In
addition to that, the South African Constitution has attempted to clarify the
relationship between international law and the South African legal system
through various provisions." The most pertinent of these is section 39(1)
which directs that 'in interpreting the Bill of Rights courts and tribunals must
consider international law'.26
2.3.2 International Treaties and Conventions
As has been mentioned." international treaties and conventions are one of
the main sources of international law. According to Steiner and Alison:
'[Treaties] have become the primary expression of international law
and ... the most effective if not the only path towards international
regulation of many contemporary problems. [They] for example,
have been the principal means for the development of the human





See O'Shea, 'International Law and the Bill of Rights' Bill of Rights Compendium
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in which state parties participate and to which they may owe
obligations.,28
A state becomes bound by a treaty in terms of international law by
participating in a process which includes negotiation, signing and ratification.
Ratification means depositing an instrument of ratification with the relevant
authoritative body. Under South African law, the procedures for concluding
and becoming bound by an international treaty are provided for in section
231 of the Constitution:
(1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of
the national executive.
(2) An intemational agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by
resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces ...
(3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an
agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by
the national executive, binds the Republic without approval by the National
Assembly and the National Council of Provinces ...
(4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into
law by national legislation ....
Clearly section 231(4) is intended to subject international treaties to a
Parliamentary legislative process before being incorporated into the
domestic law. The whole of section 231 indicates that international human
rights norms have no guaranteed applicability in all domestic legal systems,
least of all South Africa's.
2.3.3 Customary international law
Custom is regarded as 'the oldest and original source of international law,.29
Customary international law refers to general state practice regarded as
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international customary law in South African municipal law was initially rather
confusing. There were those who took the approach that international
customary law was part of South African law," while others believed that it
should be regarded as a source of law available to the courts only in
appropriate cases." It was in the context of the first approach that cases
like Nduli v Minister of Justice33 and Inter Science Research and
Development Services v Republic Pupular da .Mocambique34 were decided.
In Nduli's case it was held that international law was to be regarded as part
of South African law. The court made it clear that rules of customary
international law that were either universally recognised or had received the
assent of the country were to be regarded as part of South African law.
All the initial confusion has since been cleared by section 232 of the new
Constitution which provides that:
'Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is
inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.'
This provision entrenches the original common law position and
automatically incorporates customary international law into South African
municipal law. This is likely to play a significant part in human rights
protection if regard is to be had to the fact that South Africa is usually not in
a hurry to ratify important international human rights agreements and
incorporate their provisions into municipal law.
The question that arises however is; which human rights may be classified
under customary international law? It is significant to note that the
prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
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customary norms listed by the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States." Standards for treatment of prisoners as outlined in
the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
have been added by the courts."
In view of the foregoing discussion it is clear that international law plays an
important role in the protection of human rights generally and prisoners'
rights in particular. Although it has been seen that implementation and
enforcement of international human rights norms are beleaguered with
problems and complications, consolation can be taken in the fact that certain
procedures have been put into place for the enforcement of international
human rights norms at domestic level. Where such norms are not directly
enforceable , at least their influence plays an important role in shaping
constitutional human rights provisions.
2.4 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION FOR
PRISONERS
International law does not prohibit imprisonment as such except where the
incarceration is effected in violation of internationally recognized human
rights and fundamental freedoms. It is a basic principle of international
human rights law that convicted prisoners do not thereby lose their
fundamental rights, except those which are incidental to their lawful
detention." Accordingly, provision is made under Article 10(1) of the
International Convenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that:
'All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
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Article 5(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights provides, inter
alia, that:
'All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.'
These instruments, together with a host of others including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights,
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the UN Convention
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, all prohibit torture, and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment." Other specific international instruments have implicitly or
explicitly included these notions in their provisions. This section deals with
the development and content of certain specific international instruments
before looking at how these instruments have been applied and interpreted
to protect specific rights of prisoners.
2.4.1 Instruments providing for international human rights norms for
prisoners (under the United Nations system)
2.4.1.1 The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners
As early as 1926 the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission was
working on a draft set of standard minimum rules for prisoners. The
activities of the Commission mainly between 1929 and 1933 resulted in the
drafting of a set of such rules in 1934.39 In 1950 the United Nations became
involved in the process and in July 1951 at its last session, the International
Penal and Penitentiary Commission approved a revised draft of the Standard
38
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See Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 3 of the
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Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners." In 1954 a set of these rules
was approved by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crimes and the Treatment of Offenders. The United Nations Economic and
Social Council endorsed the text in 1957 and in 1977 an additional article
(rule) 95 was added to ensure that persons arrested or detained without
charges should benefit from most of the provisions of the Standard Minimum
RUles.41 These Rules are reviewed on an on-going basis by the Committee
on Crime Prevention and Control of the Economic and Social Council. In so
doing, the United Nations tries to keep pace with current penological thinking
in an effort to achieve greater success with respect to adoption and
implementation of the Rules.42
The main objective of the Standard Minimum Rules is stated in the
Preliminary Observations thus:
'The following rules are not intended to describe in detail a model
system of penal institutions. They seek only, on the basis of the
general consensus of contemporary thought and the essential
elements of the most adequate systems of today, to set out what is
generally accepted as being good principle and practice in the
treatment of prisoners and the management of lnstltuttons.r"
The Rules are contained in two parts. Part I containing 55 articles provides
in specific detail for rules of general application regarding the following
matters; separation of categories of prisoners, accommodation, personal
hygiene, clothing and bedding, food, exercise and sport, medical services,
discipline and punishment, instruments of restraint, information to and
complaints by prisoners, contact with the outside world, books, religion,
retention of prisoners property, notification of death, illness, transfer,
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containing articles 56 - 95, provides for rules applicable only to special
categories of prisoners. These include rules applicable to prisoners under
sentence, rules regarding insane and mentally abnormal prisoners, rules
regarding prisoners under arrest or awaiting trial, rules regarding civil
prisoners and rules regarding prisoners under arrest or detained without
charge.
2.4.1.2 The Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners
In an effort to give greater meaning to the significance of the Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the General Assembly of the
United Nations adopted the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners
in 1990. These 'were specifically designed to facilitate the full
implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules by articulating the basic
principles underlying them'." This objective is clearly reflected in the
preamble to the resolution adopting the principles." Among other things, the
Principles confirm certain fundamental prisoners' rights and stipulate that all
prisoners should be treated with due respect for their inherent dignity and
value as human beings, without discrimination of any kind." Prohibition of
discrimination on various grounds is provided for under Principle 2.
Principle 5 declares that:
'Except for those limitations that are demonstrably necessitated by
the fact of incarceration, all prisoners shall retain the human rights
and fundamental freedoms set out in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and where the state concerned is a party, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Optional Protocol thereto, as well as such other rights as are set out in
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Principle 6 provides for the right of prisoners to take part in cultural activities
and education aimed at the full development of the human personality.
Principle 7 regards solitary confinement and the restriction or abolition
thereof. Principle 9 provides for access and availability of health services
and finally Principle 10 stipulates that favourable conditions should be
created for the re-integration of the ex-prisoner into society under the best
possible conditions."
It has to be emphasised that the Basic Principles for the Treatment of
Prisoners, just like the Standard Minimum Rules, is not per se legally
binding. Both these instruments do not constitute international treaties.
They are nevertheless, unanimously accepted by a large international
community of countries to which South Africa belongs. 'Indeed', says Van
Zyl Smit, 'the official South African response to the Rules was enthusiastic
and there is considerable evidence that the South African Prisons Act of
1959 was drafted as a conscious response to these Rules.,48 Both the Rules
and the Principles also provide guidance in interpreting general rules
applicable to prisoners, and serious or widespread non-compliance may well
be seen as violation of prisoners rights.
2.4.1.3 Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment
This instrument was a result of a study undertaken by the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights whose findings were initially published in
1962.
49
The study dealt with the right to be free from arbitrary arrest,
detention and exile.50 The conclusions of the study gave rise to a draft
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appointed by a Committee of the General Assembly. In 1988 the final draft
of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment was approved and adopted by the General
Assembly." The Body of Principles is prefaced with a 'scope' which says:
'These principles apply for the protection of all persons under any
form of detention or lrnprtsonrnent.:"
The Principles (39 in number) range from very general formulations of the
human rights of persons under any form of detention or imprisonment, to
more specific guarantees of a procedural nature, to provisions on particular
rights to be ensured in places of detention or imprisonment." A random
classification of the contents of the instruments would see the principles fall
into the following categories:
a) general provisions on human rights of detained or imprisoned persons
(Principles 1-8)
b) procedural safeguards (Principles 9-14)
c) treatment of detained or imprisoned persons (Principles 15-39)
A general clause providing that nothing in the Body of Principles shall be
construed as restricting or derogating from any right defined in the
International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights concludes the
instrument.
2.4.1.4 The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Juvenile Justice
This is one of two important UN instruments specifically formulated for the
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Treatment of Prisoners were not designed to regulate the management of
juvenile penal institutions. The United Nations therefore felt that there were
compelling reasons for treating adults and juveniles differently, and it was
therefore decided that a complementary set of standards be designed to
provide special safeguards for young offenders. The result was the United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice
(also known as the Beijing Rules) adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1985.54
Although the Rules discourage the use of institutionalisation for juvenile
offenders,55 they set out certain essential elements for the protection of such
offenders who are placed in institutions. These elements cover matters
such as minimum age of criminal responsibility, the objectives of juvenile
justice, the features of effective, fair and humane juvenile justice
administration and human rights principles to be applied." The Rules also
deal with the relationship between themselves and the Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, detention pending trial and objectives
of institutional treatment.
2.4 .1.5 The United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles
Deprived of their Liberty
This is the other UN instrument dealing with juvenile detention. It was
formulated in response to the fact that the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Juvenile Justice did not fully address the conditions in
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adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December
1990.58 The main objective of the Rules is stipulated in Rule 3 which states:
'The Rules are intended to establish minimum standards accepted by
the United Nations for the protection of juveniles deprived of their
liberty in all forms, consistent with human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and with a view to counteracting the detrimental effects of
all types of detention and to fostering integration in society.'
Rule 1 also reiterates the least possible use of institutionalisation for
juveniles. Imprisonment should be used as a last resort, says the Rule.
The instrument is divided into four parts; fundamental perspectives, scope
and application of the Rules, juveniles under arrest or awaiting trial and the
management of juvenile facilities . Regarding the conditions of detention,
provision is made by the Rules for juveniles to have the right of legal counsel
and be enabled to apply for free legal aid, where such aid is available, and
to communicate regularly with their legal advisers." Juveniles should also
be provided, where possible, with opportunities to pursue work, with
remuneration, and continue education and training.6o
Regarding management of juvenile facilities, the Rules provide in specific
detail for the proper keeping of records, admissions , registration and
transfer. Provision is also made for classification and placement,
accommodation, education, vocational training and work. The Rules also set
out juveniles rights in regard to recreation, practising of religion, medical
care, contacts with the wider community, disciplinary procedures and








2.4.1.6 Other instruments under the United Nations System
There are a number of other instruments under the United Nations system
for the protection of prisoners' rights. These include; Principles of Medical
Ethics Relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, Particularly Physicians , in
the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman Degrading Treatment or Punishment.61 The purpose of these six
Principles is to prohibit health personnel from using their knowledge and
skills in assisting in the interrogation of prisoners and detainees in a manner
that may adversely affect their health. Principle 2 specifically states that it is
'a gross contravention of medical ethics, as well as an offence under
applicable international instruments, for health personnel, particularly
physicians, to engage, actively or passively, in acts which constitute
participation in, complicity in, incitement or attempts to commit torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment'. Another
United Nations instrument is the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishrnent.f Adopted in 1975, the Declaration
seeks to prohibit torture and other forms of ill-treatment. It has its genesis in
the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishrnent.f These two instruments provide the basis for
standard-setting and implemention as far as torture and ill-treatment of
prisoners is concerned.
Another important instrument is the Principles for the Protection of Persons
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deals with treatment of mentally ill persons and requires that such treatment
should be based on humanity and respect for the dignity of the human
person. Of particular relevance is Principle 20 which deals specifically with
persons serving sentences of imprisonment for criminal offences, or who are
otherwise detained. It requires that such persons should receive the best
available mental health care. Finally, the Model Agreement on the Transfer
of Foreign Prisoners and Recommendations on the Treatment of Foreign
Prisoners" requires states to co-operate in facilitating the transfer or return
of persons convicted of crimes abroad to their country of nationality.
Provision is also made for the rights of such foreign prisoners and how they
should be treated.
2.4.2 Instruments providing for international human rights norms for
prisoners (under regional systems)
2.4.2.1 European Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners
These Rules are basically a European version of the United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. They were
adopted by the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers by Resolution
(73)5 of 9 January 1973. These rules (like the United Nations Rules) are
also divided into two parts. Part I deals with rules of general application
while Part 11 deals with rules applicable to special categories of prisoners.
Under Part I the Rules provide for matters relating to registration, distribution
of prisoners, accommodation, personal hygiene, clothing and bedding,
exercise and sport, medical services, discipline and punishment, information
to and complaints by prisoners, contact with the outside world, and such
other matters. Under Part 11 the categories of prisoners considered includes;
prisoners under sentence, insane and mentally abnormal prisoners,
prisoners under arrest or awaiting trial and civil prisoners .
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There are a few noticeable differences between the European Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and their United Nations
counterpart . First, while the latter talks of .separation of categories of
prisoners (under rule 8), the former speaks of 'distribution' of prisoners
(under rule 7). Under the European version, Rule 22 provides that prisoners
may not be submitted to medical or scientific experiments which may result
in physical or moral injury to their person. This prohibitiOn is missing in the
United Nations Rules. Rule 37 of the European version provides that;
'Prisoners shall be allowed to communicate with their family and all persons
or representatives of organisations and to receive visits from these persons
at regular intervals'. The reference to 'all persons or representative of
organisations' is absent from the equivalent provision of the United Nations
Standards (Rule 37).66 Finally, another noticeable difference is the omission
by the European Rules of the provision regarding privileges. Under the
United Nations Rules this is dealt with under Rule 70 which provides that:
'Systems of privileges appropriate for the different classes of
prisoners and, the different methods of treatment shall be established
at every institution, in order to encourage good conduct, develop a
sense of responsibility and secure the interest and co-operation of the
prisoners in their treatment .'
The European Rules do not have a regional equivalent.
2.4.2.2 Revised European Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners
The purposes of these Rules are set out in the preamble as, inter alia, to
establish a range of minimum standards for all those aspects of prison
administration that are essential to human conditions and positive treatment
in modern and progressive systems; and to serve as a stimulus to prison
administrations to develop policies and management style and practice
66
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based on good contemporary principles and equity. Also according to the
preamble , the rules place renewed emphasis on the precepts of human
dignity, the commitment of prison administration to humane and positive
treatment , the importance of staff roles and effective modern management
approaches.
Contained in 5 parts, the Revised European Rules 'reflect a re-assessment
of penal philosophy and prison adrrunistration'." They also reflect a 'shift in
priorities and emphases, whilst maintaining the basic principles and norms
of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules.68 Under Part I, the usual
basic principles are laid down, Part 11 provides for the management of
prisons, Part III for personnel, Part IV for treatment objectives and regimes
and finally Part V lays down additional rules for special categories of
prisoners. These include untried prisoners, civil prisoners and insane and
mentally abnormal prisoners.
2.4.2.3 The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture
This instrument, adopted by the General Assembly of the Organisation of
American States on 9 December 1985 is in a way a regional reflection of the
United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The objective of the Convention is
spelled out in Article 1 as the prevention and punishment of torture in
accordance with the terms of the Convention.
Although the instrument is not restricted to prisoners, like its United Nations
counterpart it was formulated and drafted with prisoners and detainees
mainly in mind. This is reflected in Article 5 which provides inter alia, that:
67
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'Neither the dangerous character of the detainee or prisoner, nor the
lack of security of the prison establishment or penitentiary shall justify
torture.'
Other regional instruments relating to human rights norms for prisoners
include the Draft European Convention on the Protection of Detainees from
Torture and from Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
whose aim is to supplement the remedies provided for in the European
Convention on Human Rights by creating a procedure for the protection of
detainees from torture and other forms of ill-treatment." They also include a
number of resolutions and recommendations. One of these relates to the
custody and treatment of dangerous prisoners." It recommends that
governments should as far as possible apply ordinary prison regulations to
dangerous prisoners, and that extra security measures should only be
applied to the extent to which they are necessary and in such a way that
respects the prisoners' dignity and rights.
A resolution dealing with prison labour" sets down a number of measures
regarding the use thereof. Another resolution deals with electoral, civil and
social rights of prisoners." It contains a number of important
recommendations concerning the electoral, civil and social rights of
prisoners. The basis of these recommendations is that the mere fact of
imprisonment does not necessarily prohibit prisoners from exercising their
civil rights. Finally, a recommendation dealing with prison leave73 stipulates
that prison leave should be granted to the greatest possible extent on
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factors should always be taken into consideration including the nature and
seriousness of the offence, length of sentence, period of detention
completed , personality and behaviour of the prisoner, risk to society, family
and social situation of prisoner, purpose of leave, its duration and its terms
and conditions.
No specific instrument relating to prisoners' rights or prison conditions has
been formulated under the African regional system. This is mainly because
in comparison to the other regional systems, the African system is the
newest, the least developed, the least effective, the most distinctive and the .
most controversial.74 Steiner and Alison say:
'For these reasons the African system has not yielded anywhere
near the same amount of information and "output" of
recommendations or decisions - state reports and reactions thereto,
communications (complaints) from individuals and state responses
thereto .... as have the other two regional regimes, let alone the
United Nations system:75
2.4.3 Application and interpretation
In order to give context or meaning to the instruments outlined above, it is
important to explain briefly how they have been applied and interpreted.
This will not be done on an instrument to instrument basis, but rather on the
basis of the various human rights norms that the instruments are meant to
protect.
2.4.3.1 Deprivation of liberty (arrest and detention)
Almost all international instruments relating to prisoners' rights recognise
that imprisonment is an extreme measure. Indeed Rule 57 of the United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules states that:
74
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'Imprisonment and other measures which result in cutting off an
offender from the outside world are afflictive by the very fact of
taking from the person the right to self-determination by depriving him
of his liberty. Therefore the prison system shall not ... aggravate the
suffering inherent in such a situation.1
It is in this light that provision is made under the Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons Under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment that:
(i) all persons under any form of detention or imprisonment should be
treated in a humane manner and with respect and dignity;76
(ii) arrest, detention or imprisonment should only be carried out strictly in
accordance with the law and by competent officials;77 and
(iii) any form of detention or imprisonment should be ordered by, or be
subject to the effective control of, a judicial or other authority."
These sentiments are expressed in one form or another in many other
instruments.
While almost all international human rights instruments have something to
say about deprivation of liberty, it is perhaps the European Convention on
Human Rights that is most elaborate on the matter. Article 5(1) contains an
exhaustive enumeration of the cases in which deprivation of liberty is
allowed. They include, inter alia, lawful detention after conviction by a
competent court, 79 lawful detention for non-compliance with the lawful order
of a court," and lawful arrest or detention of a person for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority." The emphasis is














Kingdom82 was interpreted to mean that the arrest or detention must be
lawful under the applicable domestic law.
Another occasion on which the application and interpretation of article 5(1)
of the European Convention came before the European Commission was in
the case of Cyprus v Turkey.83 The case involved an inter-state complaint
form Cyprus against Turkey (both parties to the Convention) that up to 2,000
Greek Cypriots who had been in Turkish custody from the time of the Turkish
invasion of North Cyprus in 1974 were years later still missing and
unaccounted for. The Commission held that the wording of Article 5 shows
that any deprivation of liberty must be subject to law and that any
unaccounted disappearance of a detained person must be considered as a
particularly serious violation of the Article." The European Court of Human
Rights has also addressed the issue of deprivation of liberty on several
occasions, including Singh v United Kingdom,85 and Guzzardi v Italy.86 In
both cases the court held that the provisions of Article 5 of the European
Convention had been violated.
The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has in a number of
cases dealt with deprivation of liberty (protected under article 6 of the African
Charter). In Achutan (on behalf of Banda); Amnesty International (on behalf
of Orlon and Vera Chirwa) v Malaw/-87 the Commission held that massive
arbitrary arrest of trade unionists and church leaders constituted violations of
Article 6. In Commission Nationale des Oroits de L'Homme v Chac!8 the
Commission held that arrest without charge and forced disappearances of
certain individuals amounted to a violation of Article 6. And in Abubakar v










(1992) 15 E.H.H.R. 509.
See Janis, Kay and Bradley, European Human Rights Law, (1995) 299.
(1996) 1 BHRC (E Ct HR) 119.
(1980) (No 39) 3 E.H.R.R. 333.




the Commission urged the Ghanaian government to take steps 'to repair the
prejudice suffered'.
2.4.3 .2 Torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment
The wording of this principle prohibition has its origin in the 1688 English Bill
of Rights.90 Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights provide, in exactly the
same words :
'No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punlshrnent.:"
The other human rights instruments have a similar provision with slight
variations in wording. The wording of the Principle prohibition has given rise
to considerable controversy due to the fact the it extends to several distinct
modes of conduct. However it was held in Ireland v United Kingdom92 that
the prohibition extends equally to all those modes of conduct, and in all
cases the obligation is absolute, non-derogable and unqualified. All that is
therefore required is finding that the state concerned has failed to comply
with one of these modes of conduct.93 It was thus held by the European
Human Rights Commission in the famous Greek case94 that:
'It is plain that there may be treatment to which all these descriptions
apply, for all torture must be inhuman and degrading treatment, and
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The Commission further explained that:
'the word "torture" is often used to describe inhuman treatment which
has a purpose such as obtaining information or a confession, or the
infliction of a punishment and is generally an aggravated form of
inhuman treatment:"
On inhuman treatment the Commission said:
'The notion of inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as
deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which in the
particular situation is unjustifiable.'97
And regarding degrading treatment the Commission stated that:
'Treatment or punishment of an individual may be said to be
degrading if it grossly humiliates him before others or drives him to
act beyond his will or conscience.,98
The European Commission has addressed the question of torture and other
forms of ill-treatment on several other occasions including the Northern
Ireland case" where the alleged violations related to detention without
charge and to torture or other ill-treatment of those suspected of politically
motivated violence. This case was also heard by the European Court of
Human Rights which held, inter alia, that the convention prohibits in absolute
terms, torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
irrespective of the victim's conduct.
More recently the European Court of Human Rights held in Aksoy v
Turkei oo that when determining whether any particular form of ill-treatment
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Article 3 of the Convention between the notion of 'torture' and that of
'inhuman or degrading treatment'I a distinction which was embodied in the
convention to allow the special stigma of 'torture' to attach only to deliberate
inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering. The form of
treatment known as 'Palestinian hanging', was of such a serious and cruel
nature that it could only be described as torture and, as such, it constituted a
violation of Article 3 of the Convention.'?'
2.4.3.3 Capital Punishment
Many United Nations studies have affirmed that the death penalty has very
little or no deterrent effect at all on crime as a whole. In the first of such
studies the conclusion was that 'the deterrent effect of the death penalty is,
to say the least, not demonstrated'.102 In spite of this more than 100
countries today still have the death penalty as a legal sanction for certain
offences. In view of this, it is hardly surprising that most international human
rights treaties initially saved the death penalty.l'" The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights is silent on the issue, so is the African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights. Both the ICCPR and the American Convention
restricted the death penalty to the most serious crimes. They also required it
to be imposed only by a final judgement of a competent court in accordance
with non-retroactive laws. They further conferred a right to seek pardon or
commutation of sentence and provided that amnesty, pardon or
commutation may be granted in all cases."?" The American Convention went
further and in addition to exempfirig ·persons-who were below the age of 18
when they committed the capital offence, persons over 70 were also
exempted. It also prohibited the death penalty for political offences or other
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death penalty by prohibiting its extension to new crimes, or its re-
establishment once it has been aboltshed.'?"
In 1984, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Crime Prevention
and Control, the Economic and Social Council approved the Safeguards
Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty.106
The instrument acknowledges the existence of the death penalty in certain
countries and attempts to prescribe conditions or safeguards to be adhered
to in carrying it out.
In 1989 the United Nations General Assembly adopted by a narrow majority
the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aimed at the abolition of the
death penalty. This Protocol constitutes an elaboration of Article 6 of the
ICCPR and is the first universal, as opposed to regional, instrument to
explicitly seek the abolition of the death penalty.?" In 1990 the Organisation
of American States adopted the Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty.'?" A similar step had been
taken earlier by the Council of Europe when it adopted Protocol NO.6 to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty.109 These are some
of the attempts that have been made both at universal and regional level to
abolish the death penalty. As a result the death penalty is, in fact, now very
rare among the signatory states of the European Convention, for example.
There have been other attempts, mainly judicial , aimed at the abolition of the
death penalty. Many of these attempts have been based on the ground that
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Furman v Georgia110 that the imposition of the death penalty was not
necessary as a means of stopping convicted criminals from further crimes.
There was no reason to believe that the death penalty as then administered
was necessary either to deter the commission of capital crimes or to protect
society, and the death penalty could not be shown to be serving any penal
purpose which could not be served equally by some less severe punishment.
The European Court of Human Rights has had to address the issue on
several occasions. In Soering v United Kingdom,111 it was argued - and the
court agreed - that a violation was caused by the prison conditions in
connection with the 'death-row phenomenon'. This was the extended period
of time involved in appeals and collateral proceedings between imposition
and execution of sentence during which time the condemned person would
suffer severe and ever increasing stress and anqulsh.!" The same issue
was addressed extensively by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in
Pratt v Attorney-General for Jemeice'" Citing the Soering case the Privy
Council held that a delay of 12 years after the pronouncing of a sentence of
death amounted to the infliction of 'inhuman or degrading punishment or
other treatment' in contravention of section 17 of the Constitution of Jamaica.
The same Privy Council held as recently as 1996 in Henfield v Bahamas114
that the lapse of an overall period of six years and eight months awaiting
execution following sentence of death was sufficiently prolonged as to
render execution after the period inhuman punishment contrary to section 17
of the Constitution of the Bahamas. In Fisher v Minister of Public Safeti 15
the Privy Council held that a delay of two years and six months was not
sufficiently substantial to render the subsequent execution of the appellant








11 E.H.R.R. 439. Judgment of 7 July 1989 (No. 161).
Janis, Kay and Bradley (note 84 above) at 155.
[1993] 4 All E.R. 769 PC.
(1996) 1 BHRC 369, PC
(1998) 4 BHRC 191, PC.
83
Interestingly, the UN Human Rights Committee held in Johnson v Jemeice'"
that the length of the period a condemned person spent confined to death
row did not in itself amount to cruel and degrading treatment and/or
punishment constituting a violation by a state party of its obligation under
Article 7 and 10(1) of the Convenant (ICCPR) in the absence of some further
compelling circumstances. Indeed, the Committee said, if the mere length of
detention on death row were to be determinative, the effect would be to
expedite executions, and that would clearly be inconsistent with the
Convenant's object of reducing the death penalty."? The defendant was
however granted further clemency in addition to the commutation of his
death sentence on grounds that Article 14(3)(c) and (5) of the Convenant
(providing for the right to be tried without undue delay and the right to have
one's sentence and conviction reviewed by a higher tribunal) had been
violated.
It can be said that attempts both at universal and regional treaty level and
also judicial attempts to abolish the death penalty have been fairly
successful. That is not to say, however, that the death penalty is about to
disappear as a penal sanction. A lot more needs to be done before capital
punishment can be eliminated altogether.
2.4.3.4 Corporal Punishment
Most international human rights instruments (including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, ICCPR, and the regional conventions) do not
address themselves explicitly to the question of corporal punishment as a
judicial sanction.!" As far as corporal punishment for disciplinary offences
in prison is concerned, provision is made under the UN Standard Minimum
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'Corporal punishment, punishment by placing in a dark cell, and all
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment shall be completely
prohibited as punishment for disciplinary ottences.'!"
Provision is also made under the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules
for the Administration of Juvenile Justice that 'juveniles shall not be subject
to corporal purushment.'l"
Not many cases of corporal punishment are reported to have come before
either the Human Rights Committee (of the UN), the Inter-American Court
and Commission of Human Rights or the African Commission. However, the
European Commission and Court have had occasion to address the issue in
Tyrer v United Kingdom.121 Tyrer was sentenced by a juvenile court in the
Isle of Man, a self-governing territory of the UK, to three strokes of the cane.
He petitioned the European Commission of Human Rights arguing that his
punishment was in violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (which prohibits torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment). Both the Commission and the Court concluded that the issue
at stake was whether corporal punishment amounted to degrading
punishment within the meaning of Article 3. They both held that indeed it
did:
'Juvenile corporal punishment constitutes a breach of Article 3 of
the Convention and, consequently, its infliction on the applicant was
in violation of this provision of the Convention.'122
The significance of the Tyrer case was recognised by the Isle of Man Court
of Appeal in Teary (Sergeant of Police) v Q'Callaghan. 123 O'Callaghan (16
years old) had been sentenced to four strokes of the cane. Despite the
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sentence basing its decision on the grounds that the courts should have
regard to international obllqatlons.l"
Though there have not been many international decisions to test the
question whether corporal punishment amounts to torture, logically there is
no reason why it should not. Judging by the provisions of the UN Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and the UN Standard
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice and if Tyrer's case
is anything to go by, clearly international human rights law prohibits corporal
punishment.
2.4.3.5 Prison conditions and treatment of prisoners
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not specifically provide for
prescribed conditions of detention. However, Article 10(1) of the
International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:
'All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity
and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.'
This provision has its counterpart in the American Convention on Human
Rights and the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights. The
European Convention does not have this specific provision. As the main
specialized UN instrument dealing with this matter, the Standard Minimum
Rules. for the Treatment of Prisoners provides an unambiguous detailed
guide for the required conditions and practice.!" The intentions of the UN
Standard Minimum Rules are reflected in a host of other instruments ,
including the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, the UN
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, the Body






or Imprisonment and the Revised European Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners.
It is possible to imagine prison treatment and conditions being so appalling
as to amount to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. A perfect
example is provided by the Greek case126 where the European Commission
on Human Rights held that the conditions of detention and the
circumstances in which persons were detained in the cells, were contrary to
Article 3 of the Convention."? In the Northen Ireland case,128 the European
Court of Human Rights held that the five interrogation techniques used by
British security forces in Northern Ireland amounted to inhuman and
degrading treatment, though not to torture as the commission had
concluded.
The Human Rights Committee of the United Nations has addressed the
question of prison conditions and treatment of prisoners on several
occasions. In Buffo v Uragua/29 the complainant claimed to have been held
incommunicado, blindfolded, with his hands bound, his only food a cup of
soup in the morning and another at night, and relatives were not allowed to
bring him food or medicine. The Committee found that these conditions
violated Articles 7 and 10(1) of the Covenant. Similarly in Vasilski v
Uragua/
30
the Committee found that Articles 7 and 10(1) of the Covenant
had been violated because the complainant had 'not been treated in prison
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Conditions of imprisonment were the subject of two communications
submitted to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in the
Orlon and Vera Chirwa case.132 Two persons by the names of Orton and
Vera Chirwa were sentenced to death in Hastings Bands's Malawi. Their
sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. They claimed that various
aspects of their imprisonment contravened Article 5 of the African Charter
(protecting the right to inherent dignity in a human being and prohibiting
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment). These
were conditions of overcrowding, acts of beating, excessive solitary
confinement, shackling within a cell, poor quality of food and denial of
access to medical care. The Commission held that these conditions
contravened Article 5 of the Charter. The African Commission also held in
Commission Nationale des Oroits de L'Homme v Chad133 that suspending
prisoners by their feet, violent beatings, deprivation of food and water, and
sexual assault while in custody amounted to 'torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment and treatment' and contravened Article 5 of the
African Charter.
One aspect of prison treatment that needs to be looked at rather closely is
solitary confinement. A prisoner may be withdrawn from the ordinary prison
community into solitary confinement under the following circumstances:
a) As a disciplinary penalty, which is imposed for a limited period after a
hearing following a distinct disciplinary offence;
b) ·· In the interest "of preserving order and discipline where the officials
are confronted with a recalcitrant prisoner; and
c) In the interest of the prisoner's own safety and protection.
It would appear that solitary confinement is not absolutely prohibited. Rule
31 of the UN Standard Minimum Rules only prohibits 'punishment by placing
132
133
Communications 64/92, 68/92, 78/92 (loined) ,
Communication 74/92.
88
in a dark cel/134 and all cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments'. Rule 32
acknowledges that 'punishment by close confinement' may be inflicted if a
medical officer has examined the prisoner and certified in writing that he is fit
to sustain it. Rule 38(1) of the Revised European Minimum Rules provides
that 'punishment by disciplinary confinement' which might have an adverse
effect on the physical or mental health of the prisoner shall only be imposed
if authorised by a medical officer.
The Human Rights Committee of the UN has condemned solitary
confinement together with other adverse prison conditions (including a spare
diet) as being in violation of Articles 7 and 10(1) of the ICCPR.135 The
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment has expressed concern about solitary
continement.l" The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stated in
Rodriquez v Hondures'" that:
'the mere subjection of an individual to prolonged isolation and
deprivation or communication is in itself cruel and inhuman treatment
which harms the psychological and moral integrity of the person, and
violates the right of every detainee under Article 5(1) and 5(2) of the
Convention. ,138
It can be seen, therefore, that solitary confinement is not per se a violation of
human rights, but the presence of other factors such as prolonged period,
spare diet and being kept incommunicado can cause solitary confinement to
amount to cruel and inhuman treatment. In an effort to alleviate prison
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the Treatment of Prisoners has expressed the desirability of eliminating
solitary confinement by providing that:
'Efforts addressed to the abolition of solitary confinement as a
punishment or to the restriction of its use, should be undertaken and
encouraged. ,139
2.4.3.6 The Right to a Fair Hearing
All international human rights instruments (universal and regional) contain in
one form or another provision on the right to a fair public hearing. 140 In fact
this right is so fundamental that all over the world, wherever 'written'
constitutions exist, this right has been constltutlonallzed.!" As far as
prisoners are concerned complaints based on the right to a fair hearing
usually fall into two categories: (1) Access to courts and (2) Disciplinary
hearings (decisions taken by prison bodies against prisoners for their
conduct).
2.4.3.6.1 Access to Court
In Go/der v United Kingdom142 the UK contended, among other things, that
the right of access to court under Article 6(1) was not unlimited in the case of
convicted prisoners, but was subject to reasonable restraint in the interest of
prison order and discipline. Both the Commission and the Court held the
view that Article 6(1) not only contains certain guarantees for the course of
judicial proceedings, but also grants a right to such proceedings. The Court
observed further that the right to submit a civil claim to a judge and the rule
of international law forbidding the denial of justice were universally
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The European Court of Human Rights has addressed this aspect on many
recent occasions including Saunders v United Kingdom143 (dealing with the
right of an individual not to incriminate himself) and Van Mechelen and
Others v Netherlands. 144 In the latter case the Court held that in accordance
with Articles 6(1) and 6(3)(d) of the Convention, evidence against an
accused should be produced at a public hearing in the presence of that
party, who should be given an opportunity to challenge and question
witnesses giving evidence against him. In Andronicon v Cyprus145 the Court
held that while Article 6(1) of the Convention guaranteed litigants an
effective right of access to court, it did not stipulate the means by which the
state should achieve that end, beyond requiring the state to make provision
for effective access that was not at variance with Article 6(1).
2.4.3.6.2. Disciplinary hearings
In Engel and Others v The Netherlands146 the European Court held that it is
open to states to maintain a distinction between disciplinary proceedings
and criminal proceedings but states could not circumvent the fundamental
obligation to grant a fair trial of a criminal charge by the expediency of
classifying it as criminal. In Campbell and Falls v United Kingdom147 this
issue was considered in terms of prison discipline. The applicants were
involved in a protest which had led to a violent disturbance. They were
charged with mutiny and incitement to mutiny. Their penalties included
forfeiture of the potential remission of sentence otherwise available to them.
The Court attempted to separate disciplinary action from 'criminal charges'
and held that 'by causing detention to continue for substantially longer than
would otherwise have been the case, the sanction came close to deprivation
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imposition of a measure of such gravity should be accompanied by
guarantees of Article 6 ,148 .
2.4.3.7 Correspondence and private communication
Provision is made under the ICCPR for the right not to be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, · familY,home or
correspondence.l" This right is also echoed in the European Convention 150
and the American Convention."? The African Charter merely states that
every individual has the right to receive intormation.!" As to how such a
right is applicable to prisoners, only the European Convention gives some
clarity by setting express limitations and restrictions on the exercise of the
right (under Article 8(2)). Under the UN Standard Minimum Rules prisoners
are allowed 'under necessary supervision' to communicate with their
families and reputable friends at regular intervals, both by correspondence
and by receiving visits.153 The Revised European Standard Minimum Rules
also allow the same right 'subject to the needs of treatment, security and
good order' .154
In recent years the undoubted effect of the rulings of the European Court
and opinions of the Commission has been to extend prisoners' rights over
their legal correspondence.l'" In Schonenberger v Switzerland56 the Court
found a violation of Article 8 where the prosecutor refused to deliver to a
prisoner held in detention on remand, a letter in which a lawyer offered his
services and advised the prisoner of his rights to refuse to answer questions.
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between prisoners and their legal advisors in Campbell v United Kingdom.157
In that case it was held that unless the prison authorities could point to a
reasonable cause for believing that the letter's contents would endanger
prison security, the safety of others or be otherwise of a criminal nature,
there could be no pressing social need for the opening and reading of mail.
One commentator has recommended that as a guiding principle all rules,
standing orders and circular instructions relating to correspondence with a
fundamental tenet of the rule of law, be made available to prisoners and
public alike.158 Where interference with mail does occur, the prisoner should
be informed in writing in advance, or where security considerations dictate
otherwise, as soon as is practicable, of the fact and grounds for
interference.159
2.4.3.8 Forced and compulsory labour
The UN Standard Minimum Rules prescribe that prison labour must not be of
an afflictive nature and prisoners should not be required to do any especially
dangerous or unhealthy work. Otherwise sufficient work of a useful nature
should be provided to keep prisoners actively employed for a normal working
day.160 The same sentiments are expressed by the Revised European
Standard Minimum Rules.161
Complaints of detainees against the obligation to perform work in prison are
normally brought by invoking Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (prohibiting slavery and servitude). This prohibition is even more
specific under the ICCPR where Article 8(3)(a) provides that no one shall be
required to perform forced or compulsory labour. A replica of the prohibition
exists in the European Convention (Article 4 (2». So does it in the
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forms of exploitation and degradation of man ...,162 One must hasten to add
however, that the ICCPR, the European Convention and the American
Convention expressly limit and restrict the right by excluding work required
to be done in the ordinary cause of detention. Accordingly the Human
Rights Committee of the UN and the European Commission have always
taken the position that the terms 'slavery and servitude' are inapplicable to
the prison situation; and as long as prison labour meets the requirements of
the Standard Minimum Rules it will be acceptable.
2.5 CONCLUSION
International law plays an important role in the protection of prisoners' rights.
This role has to be understood in the light of the problems inherent in the
enforcement of human rights standards through international mechanisms.
A great deal usually depends on the different states and the mechanisms
they apply in incorporating international legal standards into their various
domestic legal systems. For those states in which international norms
automatically form part of domestic law, the United Nations treaties and
conventions, regional conventions, decisions and reports of the relevant
courts and commissions have provided a strong basis for the protection of
prisoners' rights. Even for those states that do not automatically incorporate
international norms in domestic legal systems, the effect of customary
international law and the desire to belong to the community of civilized
nations play their part in influencing domestic constitutional human rights
provisions.
The UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners has gained
remarkable importance in recent years. The same can be said of the Body
of Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners. Several other instruments are
off-shoots of these two. As international human rights norms evolve, so too
do human rights applicable to prisoners. The reports of the UN Human
162 Article 5
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Rights Committee, the judgments of the European Court and the reports of
the European Commission have, slowly but surely, given effect to changing
attitudes towards detainees and evolving standards of international human
rights law applicable to them. The African system under the African Charter
has been pretty ineffectual, to say the least. How South Africa has taken up




PRISONERS' RIGHTS UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
British colonisation of Southern Africa since the beginning of the nineteenth
century established parliamentary sovereignty as a hallmark of constitutional
development in South Africa.1 For more than a century, therefore,
parliamentary sovereignty was the basic constitutional feature of the legal
framework within which fundamental rights were dealt with. All this was to
change remarkably in the early 1990s. This period was characterised by a
series of events which culminated in a new political order and a new
constitutional dispensation. The high water-mark of these developments
was the enactment of the interim Constltution", which was largely a result of
a negotiated settlement between political parties and organisations intent on
facilitating a peaceful transition from apartheid to a new democratic order.
The interim Constitution was adopted by parliament in December 1993 and it
came into force in April 1994. One of the most outstanding features of this
constitution was that it contained a Bill of Rights. Another important feature
was that it provided for the drafting and adoption of a new and 'final'
Constitution.
According to section 68(2) (of the interim Constitution) the new and 'final'
Constitution was to be drafted by the Constitutional Assembly which was
composed of the National Assembly and the Senate sitting jointly for that
purpose. In drafting the new Constitution the Constitutional Assembly was
required by section 71 (1) to comply with certain Constitutional Principles
contained in Schedule 4, otherwise it would not be certified by the
Constitutional Court. The new and 'final' Constitution was eventually
2
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certified by the Constitutional Court in November 1996 and it came into
operation in February 1997. This new Constitution" also contains a Bill of
Rights substantially carried over from its predecessor. It has been pointed
out that in order to give effect to the Bill of Rights, and in particular its
provisions with regard to prisoners, the Correctional Services Act4 was
subsequently enacted," Chapter III of the Act provides for the custody of all
prisoners under conditions of human dignity. This is in line with the opening
section of the Constitution which lists 'human dignity' as one of the pre-
eminent values on which the Republic of South Africa is founded. It is also
in line with section 10 of the Constitution which guarantees everyone the
right to have their dignity respected and protected. In particular it is in line
with section 35(2)(d) which entitles prisoners to conditions of detention that
are consistent with human dignity. These conditions are given effect and
elaborated on by various sections of the Correctional Services Act. In
particular section 7(1) of the Act reiterates the prescribed requirements of
prison accommodation to include adequate floor space, cubic capacity,
lighting, ventilation, sanitary installations and general health conditions.
Section 7(2) provides for the separation of sentenced from unsentenced
prisoners, male prisoners from female prisoners, children from adult
prisoners and any other specified category that may require separation.
Section 8 of the Act provides for proper nutrition which includes 'adequate
diet to promote good health'. It also provides that nutritional requirements of
children, pregnant women and such like categories, should be put into
account. Provision is further made under the section for the proper
preparation of the food, serving it at regular intervals and the availability of
clean drinking water.
Under section 11 of the Act, prisoners must be given an opportunity to
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least one hour of exercise daily, in the open air, weather permitting. Section
12 lays down guidelines for the provision of health care services. It entitles
prisoners to adequate medical care, at state expense and allows prisoners to
be visited and examined by medical practitioners of their choice.
Sections 6(3) and 17 of the Correctional Services Act elaborate on and give
effect to the constitutional right of prisoners to legal representation . Under
section 6(3), on admission to prison, a detainee should be informed that he
or she has a right to choose and consult with a legal practitioner, or to have
one assigned by the state. Section 17 takes the right further by elaborating
on how and where the legal consultations may take place. In particular
section 17(4) provides that prisoners must be provided with adequate
opportunities and facilities to prepare their defence. This echoes one of the
requirements for the right to a fair trial espoused in section 35(3)(b) of the
Constitution.
In giving further effect to the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, the
Correctional Services Act establishes certain institutional mechanisms that
will enhance the realization of prisoners' rights. First among these is a new
system of Parole Boards." Section 74 empowers the Minister of
Correctional Services to appoint Correctional Supervision and Parole
Boards whose functions include; placing prisoners under correctional
supervision, granting parole and granting remission of sentence. Section 76
establishes a Correctional Supervision and Parole Review Board whose duty
is to review the decisions of the Correctional Supervision and Parole Boards.
An office of the Judicial Inspectorate of prisons is established under section
85 of the Act. Headed by the Inspecting Judge the object of the Judicial
Inspectorate is to facilitate the inspection of prisons and to 'report on the
treatment of prisoners in prison and on conditions and any corrupt or
6
See Chapter VII of the Act.
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dishonest practices in prison'." The Inspecting Judge is also empowered to
receive and deal with complaints, conduct investigations and submit reports
to the minister. The Judicial Inspectorate has already been set up in Cape
Town and is currently headed by Justice JJ Fagan. Also among the
functions of the Inspecting Judge is the duty to appoint Independent Prison
Visitors, another important institutional functionary. Independent Prison
Visitors are charged with the duty of dealing with the complaints of prisoners
by paying regular visits, interviewing prisoners in private, recording their
complaints and discussing them with the Head of Prison or any other
relevant official, with a view to resolving them internally."
3.2 SECTION 35 OF THE CONSTITUTION
In the preamble to the Constitution there is a commitment to the
improvement of the quality of life of all cittzens? Chapter 2 of the
Constitution is headed 'The Bill of Rights,.10 Section 7(1) provides that the
Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa, it enshrines the
rights of all peopte" in the country and affirms the democratic values of
human dignity, equality and freedom. The phrases 'all citizens' and 'all
people' automatically include prisoners. Prisoners therefore are protected
with the rest of the population by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
In addition to this general protection, prisoners enjoy specific rights laid
down in section 35 of the Constitution, which provides for the rights of
arrested, detained and accused persons. To be placed under arrest is
defined by the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English as
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detained (especially by the authorities, as one who is suspected of wrong-
doing)' .13 An accused is defined as a 'person charged in a criminal case' .14
In view of the definition of 'prisoner' given earlier", arrested, detained and
accused persons automatically fall within the meaning of the term 'prisoners'.
That is not to say that there is no distinction between the three categories of
persons. Yes there is. That is why the rights accorded to them actually
differ. For purposes of distinction it can be said that in constitutional terms a
suspect becomes an 'arrested person' when he or she is questioned,
apprehended or otherwise detained." Detention on the other hand refers to
coercive physical interference with a person's liberty resulting in the person
being physically restrained for a significant period of time." An accused
person is someone who has been charqed."
Ordinarily a person is first 'arrested' then 'detained' and finally 'accused'.
This means that detention comes after arrest which is then followed by a
formal charge. According to Viljoen, in effect 'arrest' must by its very nature
entail 'detention'." It has also been argued that the rights contained in
section 35(1), (2) and (3) 'relating respectively to arrested, detained and
accused persons are not rigidly compartmentalised, but are inter-related and
must be interpreted and applied contextually'." For that reason all the three
categories of persons will be considered as prisoners.
3.2.1. The rights of arrested persons (section 35(1»
Firstof all section 35(1)(a) stipulates that arrested persons have the right to
remain silent. This right has its basis in the principle that 'the burden is on
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doubt'." It is also related to the principle that one is presumed innocent until
proven guilty. It is the task of the prosecution to prove this guilt and the
accused is under no obligation to assist the prosecution in executing this
task. It was stated in S v Agnevt2 that the right to silence begins at the
moment of arrest. In that case it was held that the accused's right to silence
was breached when he was made to make a statement to a magistrate
before his attorney arrived.
Section 35(1 )(b) requires that arrested persons be promptly informed of the
right to remain silent and the consequences of not doing so. According to S
v Nombewu", the 'chief consequence' of which the arrested person must be
informed is that statements made may be used in evidence. The question is;
how prompt is 'promptly'? It is generally accepted that promptly means
promptly enough for the arrested person to make an informed decision
whether or not to disclose information that may be used by the prosecution.
According to du Plessis and Carder 'promptly' does not 'necessarily mean
immediately' or 'there and then', but rather as 'expeditiously as possible in
the circumstances'.24
Under section 35(1 )(c) the right of an arrested person not to be compelled to
make any confession or admission which could be used in evidence against
him or her, is guaranteed. This right has its origin in the Judges' Rules
inherited from English Law.25 The basis of the right is that an arrested
person should not be compelled to bear witness against himself/herself. In
,-
the first place a person who has just been arrested is usually in an unstable
emotional state. Any methods which involve bringing pressure to bear on
such a person will not only amount to undue influence but may also put the
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of the right not to be compelled to make any confession or admission was
illustrated in S v Zume" where the Constitutional Court held that:
I ••• the common-law rule in regard to the burden of proving that
a confession was voluntary has been not a fortuitous but an
integral and essential part of the right to remain silent after
arrest, the right not to be compelled to make a confession, and
the right not to be a compellable witness against oneselt.:"
This common-law rule, the Court said, was inherent in the right specifically
entrenched in section 25(2) of the Constitution." It has also been pointed
out that compliance with this right 'has now been made into a condition for
the constitutionality of an arrest'.29 This means that the use of such
confession as evidence would not only be inadmissible, but the arrest itself
could be challenged.
Section 35(1)(d) provides for the right of an arrested person to be brought
before a court as soon as reasonably possible. This constitutional right
should be read in conjunction with section 50 of the Criminal Procedure Aceo
which requires the arresting authority to bring the arrested person before a
court of law within forty-eight hours. According to Viljoen, the forty-eight
hours requirement should be seen as 'the outer limit and not the standard'."
This means the right could still be violated even if the arrested person was
brought before a court within the forty-eight hours. This will be so if he/she
could have been brought sooner."
According to section 35(1 )(e), at the first court appearance an arrested
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or be released. It has been argued that since any further detention can only
be ordered by the court, it is the duty of the presiding officer to provide the
reason for such further detention, failure of which would render it unlawful."
The reason for further detention would in turn require that the prosecution
inform the arrested person of the allegations being investigated.
Under section 35(1)(f) an arrested person has the right to be released from
detention if the interests of justice permit and subject to certain conditions.
Technically speaking this provision translates into the right to bail. The right
is in a way related to the principle of being presumed innocent until proven
guilty. There are two important aspects pertaining to this right. First, bail
will only be granted 'in the interests of justice'. This implies that the onus is
on the prosecution to prove that it would not be in the interests of justice to
grant the arrested person bail. However, according to section 60(11) of the
Criminal Procedure Act,34, in respect of certain serious offences 'the accused
has the responsibility to satisfy the court that exceptional circumstances
exist in the interests of justice that permit his or her release,.35 According to
section 60(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act,36 bail may be denied in the
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(v) the likelihood that the release will disturb the public order or
undermine the public peace or security. This, according to section
60(8A), will be determined by taking the following factors into account:
(a) the nature of the offence and the circumstances under which it
was committed and the likelihood of inducing shock and
outrage in the community;
(b) whether such shock and outrage might lead to public disorder;
(c) the safety of the accused;
(d) the likelihood of jeopardising or undermining the sense of
peace and security of the community;
(e) the likelihood of undermining or jeopardising the public
confidence in the criminal justice system; and
(f) any other factor which in the opinion of the court should be
taken into account.
The other aspect pertaining to the right to bail (under section 35 (1) (f) of the
Constitution) is that bail will be granted 'subject to certain conditions'.
According to section 12 of the Criminal Procedure Ace?, such conditions
should, in the court's opinion be in the interests of justice. Section 13 of
the Act however provides that the court may order that the person being
released on bail deposit a sum of money with the court or furnish a
guarantee with or without sureties, to that effect. Section 62 of the Act
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(iv) ensuring that the proper administration of justice is not placed in
jeopardy; and
(v) placing the accused under the supervision of a probation officer or a
correctional official.
The Criminal Procedure Act38 has undergone several amendments
pertaining to bail, some of which have been challenged on constitutional
grounds. These challenges have finally been resolved by the decision in S v
Dlaminp s which declared most of the controversial amendments to be
constitutional. In the main, the Constitutional Court held that the overriding
consideration remains the 'interests of justice' which is generally a value
judgment based on an overall evaluation of all the interests involved."
3.2.2. The rights of detained persons (section 35(2»
3.2.2.1 The right to be informed of the reasons for detention
This right has to be read together with section 39(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Act41 which provides that 'the person effecting an arrest shall, at
the time of effecting the arrest or immediately after effecting the arrest,
inform the arrested person of the cause of the arrest'. The main difference
between this statutory provision and the constitutional right is that section
32(2) makes it mandatory for an arrested and detained person to be
informed of the cause of arrest or detention whereas section 35(2)(a) confers
upon the arrested and detained person a right to be informed promptly."
This right is important because a detained person is entitled to know the
legal basis for his detention. This should be seen in the light of section
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detention. One can only be able to challenge the lawfulness of one's
detention if one knows the legal basis and reasons for such detention.
It should be noted that this right is not an innovation of the Bill of Rights. It
was held as far back as 1959 in Brand v Minister of Justice43 that a detained
person 'should in substance be apprised of why his liberty is being
restrained'." In Kader v Minister of Law and Order and Another45 it was
held that 'the gravamen of the conduct complained of, as also the particular
offence or subsection which the arrestor has in mind, should be brought
home to the arrestee in order to apprise him of the substance of the grounds
for his arrest'.46
3.2.2.2 The right to legal representation
The right to legal representation is incorporated in sections 35(2)(b) and (c).
It contains three elements. First, a detained person has the right to consult
with a legal practitioner of his or her choice. Secondly, if substantial
injustice would otherwise arise, he or she has the right to be provided with a
legal practitioner by the state at its expense. Thirdly, he or she has the right
to be informed of the above rights. The detainee's right to legal
representation should be read together with the rights under section 35(2)(d)
and (e), namely, the right to challenge the lawfulness of the detention and
the right to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity.
This is because detainees may need legal representation to enforce these
rights. It is submitted that legal representation is also necessary for the
enforcement of the rights under sections 35(1) and 35(3), namely, the rights
of arrested persons and the right to a fair trial. It should be noted however
that legal representation is only in respect to matters related to the
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Procedure Amendment Act47 which provides, among other things, that every
accused person must be informed of this right. It requires that the accused
be told, at the time of arrest or initial court appearance, that he may be
represented at his own expense by a legal adviser of his choice, or if he
cannot afford, he may apply for legal aid,"
A number of cases relating to this right have come before the courts. In S v
Mfene49 it was held that the right must be explained to indigent persons who
are detained in connection with a charge which might lead to imprisonment.
In S v Mlhakaza50 it was held that a suspect was entitled to insist on the
assistance of a legal practitioner during an identification parade, unless the
state satisfied the Court that there were good reasons why such assistance
was unobtainable and that the accused's right to a fair trial was not
prejudiced by it.
There are controversial questions raised by this right. First of all, who is to
decide whether and when 'substantial injustice' is likely to arise? On what
basis will such a decision be made? To what extent can the state afford to
provide free legal presentation? How should eligibility be determined? The
case of Msila v Government of South Africa51 gives some guidance on some
of those issues. It was held in that case that 'the decision as to whether an
accused was entitled to representation was pre-eminently a decision for the
judicial officer trying the case'.52 This was because the trial court was best
placed to decide 'whether or not substantial injustice would result in the
absence of state-funded legal representation'. 53 As for provision of free legal
representation, the Legal Aid Board should be best placed to play a
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serious financial problems and budgetary constraints to the extent of not
being able to function properly. Without a properly funded Legal Aid Board
or an alternative independent body to carry out this responsibility, the right
will remain meaningless and inapplicable.
3.2.2.3 The right to challenge the lawfulness of the detention
The right to challenge the lawfulness of one's detention is not new. It is an
old common law right. What is new about it is the right to do so 'in person',
as opposed to the common law position where some interested party could
approach the court on behalf of the detainee. According to Cachalia, 'the
inclusion of the right to do this in person gives greater efficacy to the right
and represents a departure from the past'." Another important aspect of
this right is that the challenge should be before a court of law. The
implication here is that the detainee can only be released through an order
of court, with or without bail. It is however opined by Viljoen that 'if a
detainee has not been charged with an offence, the appropriate remedy is
release in terms if section 35(2)(d), and not release on bail,.55 It was so held
in S v Mbele56 that:
'The remedy of a detained person who has not been charged, and
against whom no allegation has been made that he has committed
an offence, is not to seek his release on bail: it is to move the
Court to protect his liberty by means of the common law remedy of
'interdictum de homine Iibero exhibendi', a common law remedy
which has now been entrenched by section 25(1) of the interim
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As has been mentioned," the right to challenge one's detention under
section 35(2)(d) is related to the right to be informed of the reasons for
detention under section 35(2)(a). It is interesting to note that, under section
35(2)(d), no provision is made for a detainee to challenge the conditions of
his or her detention. Instead the detainee is granted that right under a
separate section (section 35(2)(e)) which is now turned to.
3.2.2.4. The right to conditions of detention that are consistent with
human dignity
A strict interpretation of this right will make it the most violated right under
section 35. This is because, as was seen in Chapter 1,59 the conditions in
many South African prisons are far from 'consistent with human dignity'. In
particular the serious problem of overcrowding flies into the face of the right
to adequate accommodation envisaged by section 35(2)(e). In addition to
adequate accommodation, the subsection lists other specific requirements
that should be included in the conditions consistent with human dignity.
They are; exercise, adequate nutrition, reading material and medical
treatment.
There are a few,controversial aspects regarding this right. First, does it
apply equally to sentenced and unsentenced prisoners? It could be argued
that unsentenced prisoners should be more entitled to this right than
sentenced prisoners because the former category is presumed innocent until
proven guilty. Their detention should on no account be viewed as
punishment, as they may well turn out to be innocent. Secondly, what is the
yardstick to determine conditions consistent with human dignity? It is
submitted that this right should be understood against the background of
section 10 of the Constitution which provides that everyone has inherent




See Chapter 1 - Introduction.
109
which was described by the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane 60 as the
foundation of other rights, is indeed reflected in several other sections of the
Constitution including sections 1(a), 7(1), 36(1) and 39(1 )(a). The only
limitation within the provision that gives an indication of the measure of the
conditions is the use of the words 'including at least'. Otherwise detainees
are entitled to live in conditions that compare favourably with those under
which people live outside of prison. In fact according to Van Biljon v Minister
of Correctional Services'" the fact that many people live in absolute squalor
does not permit the state to detain them under similar conditions. In that
case, two HIV-positive inmates were granted a declaratory order entitling
them to anti-retroviral treatment at state expense. This, according to the
judge, fell within the ambit of the right of detainees to the provision, at state
expense, of adequate ... medical treatment as required by section 35(2)(e).
The other issue that arises is: what should be regarded as 'adequate' in
terms of section 35(2)(e)? According to Van Biljon 'section 35(2)(e) of the
Constitution does not provide for "optimal medical treatment" or "the best
available medical treatment", but only for "adequate medical treatment"."
The judge makes it clear that:
'In determining what is "adequate", regard must be had to, inter
alia, what the state can afford.'63
This seems to clarify the position in regard to 'adequate medical treatment'.
The position is less clear however when considering adequate
accommodation, nutrition and reading material. Does 'adequate nutrition' for
example mean three square meals a day? Do adequate reading materials
include daily newspapers and magazines? If the recent decision in Strydom
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to much more than prison basic facilities. In that case, it was held that
certain maximum security prisoners had a right to plug points in their cells so
that they could enjoy the privileges for which access to electricity is
indispensable, such as television sets. What is adequate therefore seems to
vary from situation to situation. Devenish accordingly opines that what is
adequate should 'depend on the circumstances involved in each case'."
3.2.2.5 The right to communicate and to be visited
This right should be read together with sections 35 2(b) and (c) which
provide for the right to consult a legal practitioner. It should also be
understood against the general background of section 16 of the Constitution
which provides for freedom of expression. There are two dimensions to
section 35(2)(f). The first is the right to communicate and the second is the
right to be visited. The right to communicate entails that facilities should be
made available for prisoners to make and receive telephone calls, to write,
post and receive letters.
The second aspect is the right to be visited. The use of the words 'spouse
or partner' in section 35(2)(f)(i) clearly indicates that the right extends
beyond married couples to cohabitants. Recent developments in the area of
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation indicate that
gay and lesbian partners are also included under the scope of this right.66 It
is not clear who should be included in the 'next of kin' category under
section 35(2)(f)(ii). Viljoen opines that the interpretation should be
broadened to include members of the 'extended family', prevalent in
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The right to be visited by a religious counsellor and the right to be visited by
a medical practitioner should be seen as supplements to the detainee's
freedom of religion (section 15(1)) and the right of access to health care
services (section 27(1)(a)) respectively. It should be noted that the four
categories of persons mentioned in section 35(2)(f) are not mutually
exclusive of each other. In other words a visit or visits from one of the
categories does not exclude a visit or visits from the other categories.
According to Devenish:
'The four categories are linked by the co-ordinating conjunctive
"and" and not the disjunctive "or", thereby indicating that the
exercise of the right by one category is not exclusive of the
others.,68
3.2.3 The right of an accused person to a fair trial (section 35(3»
Section 35(3) contains a list of fifteen specific guarantees that are
incorporated in the right to a fair trial. It is submitted that the use of the
words 'which includes' implies that these guarantees should not be viewed
as a closed list. Indeed it was held in S v Zume" that:
'The right to a fair trial conferred by that provision is broader
than the list of specific rights set out in para (a) to G) of the
subsectlon'" (referring to section 25(3) of the interim
Constitution).
The Court further held that section 25(3) required criminal trials to be
conducted in accordance with 'notions of basic fairness and justice'. This
was confirmed in several other subsequent cases including S v
Ramuongiwa
71
where the court held that an accused was not only entitled to
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principles of procedure which the law requires, but that '[a]bstract notions of
fairness and justice are now the acid test'." Although these and other
decisions were made in regard to the interim Constitution (section 25 (3)),
they remain valid and applicable in interpreting section 35(3) of the 1996
Constitution.
The first item on the list under section 35(3) is the right of the accused
person to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it. The
issue that immediately arises here is; what amounts to 'sufficient detail'?
According to S v Lavhengwa73 it basically means two things:
(i) The accused must know the necessary particulars of the charge he
has to meet; and
(ii) the charge itself must be clear and unambiguous.
Referring to undefended accused persons it was also held in S v Simxandi
and Ofhers74 that:
'At least, the presiding officer should explain to the undefended
accused the essential allegations against him or her and the
nature of the evidence that will be required in order to refute
those allegations.,75
The right of the accused to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail
has often been considered against the background of the right of access to
information. This has been particularly so in relation to access to police
dockets. In that regard, it was surprisingly held in S v Fem" that 'for reasons
of good administration of justice, proper investigation, detection and
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accused access to the police docket." Many subsequent cases however,
have disagreed with the decision in S v Fani. In Khala v Minister of Safety
and Securitl8 the court held that the accused was entitled to the information
in the docket for the exercise or protection of his rights. It was also held in
S v Jemes" that:
'... information in the possession of the State and which the State
intends to use against an accused person must be disclosed to
him to enable him to protect his rights and to raise a defence to
the charges brought against him.'80
This position was also taken in a number of other decisions including
Shabalala v Attorney-General of Transvaaf1 and Nortje v Attorney-General
of the Cape.82
The other item included under the right to a fair trial is the right of the
accused person to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence. It
is submitted that this right has to be weighed against section 35(3)(d) which
provides for the right of accused persons to have their trial begin and
conclude without unreasonable delay. So, while it is in the interests of the
accused to be allowed sufficient time, it is also in his or; her interests that
there be no unreasonable delay to the trial.
One question that arises is what constitutes 'adequate time and facilities'.
Devenish has opined that:
'what constitutes adequate time will depend on the circumstances
of each case, such as, for instance, the complexity of the matter
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As for adequate facilities, guidance may be taken from S v Nkabinde. 84
Accentuating the word 'facilities', the court held that in circumstances where
the only facilities made available to the accused to prepare his defence
'consisted of a telephone line which was compromised, and a consulting
area which was likewise compromised', the constitutional right in question
was violated." It can be inferred here that what amounts to adequate
facilities would also have to depend on the merits and circumstances of each
case.
Under section 35(3)(c) an accused person is entitled to a public trial before
an ordinary court. This right is not an innovation of the Bill of Rights. It was
held as far back as 1931 in R v Radbrooke86 that:
'It is a wholesome rule that judicial proceedings in criminal cases
should be conducted in public and that principle is recognised in
s 220(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of
1917...'.87
This principle was followed in S v Sexwa/e.88
The right to a public trial must be understood against the background of
section 152 of the Criminal Procedure Act,89 which provides that criminal
proceedings should take place in open court. Exceptions to this general
rule are set out in sections 153, 154 and 335A of the Act, indicating that the
right to a public trial is not an absolute right.
There are two aspects of this right that need explanation. What amounts to
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opposed to 'in camera' or 'behind closed doors'. This is meant to ensure
legitimacy, openness and transparency. Indeed it was held in Klink v
Regional Court Magistrate90 that:
'the requirement that the trial must be public amounts to the
constitutionalisation of a long-recognised principle of
transparency in criminal proceedings. The purpose ... is ·to
enable the public to be fully informed ... so that it may be
properly able to evaluate the judgment ..:91
Ordinary court, according to De Waal 'refers to a court which has all the
powers and facilities to ensure compliance with the fair trial rights.,92 This
interpretation is in line with the requirements of independence and
impartiality of the judiciary provided for under section 165(2) of the
Constitution. An 'ordinary' court is therefore not one that is specially set up
for a particular occasion, nor one that 'is representative of the society from
which an accused comes'." An ordinary court is 'one that has the character
and powers to ensure that a fair trial takes place according to both the letter
and the spirit of the Constitution'.94
Section 35(3)(d) provides for the right of accused persons to have their trial
•begin and conclude without unreasonable delay. The question is: what
constitutes unreasonable delay? While some have argued that what
constitutes unreasonable delay will depend on the particular circumstances
of each case," the court in Coetzee v Attorney-General, Kwazulu-Natal 96
identified a number of factors to be considered in determining whether the
delay was unreasonable. According to that case, a court had to have regard
to all the factors which contributed to the delay, and in particular to: (1) the
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of the trial; (2) the reasons for the delay, and (3) any prejudice which the
accused suffered or was likely to have suffered as the result of the delay.
These factors were approved by the court in Feedmill Development v
Attorney-General, KwaZulu-Nata/.97 According to Sanderson v Attorney-
General, KwaZulu-Nata/,98 the avoidance of unreasonable delay seeks to
protect three interests of the accused, namely the right to security of the
person, the right to liberty and the right to a fair trial. In determining what
constitutes unreasonable delay, the court held, regard must be had to these
interests.
Provisions is made under section 35(3)(e) for the right of an accused person
to be present when being tried. This right is in line with section 158 of the
Criminal Procedure Act99 which provides that all criminal proceedings shall
take place in the presence of the accused. Obviously, there are situations
where the presence of the accused may be impracticable or impossible.
Such situations are taken care of by sections 159 and 160 of the Criminal
Procedure Act.
Section 35(3)(f) and (g) provide for the right to legal representation. Under
section 35(3)(f) an accused person has the right to choose, and to be
represented by a legal practitioner, and to be informed of this right promptly.
Under section 35(3)(g) the accused person is entitled to a legal practitioner
assigned to him or her by the state and at state expense, if substantial
injustice would otherwise result. He or she is also entitled to be informed of
this right promptly. These rights have already been discussed above in
relation to detained persons.'?" What was said in that regard is also true for
accused persons. A few observations however, particularly pertinent to
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Even long before the present Constitution was conceived, the right to legal
representation had been well-established in South African law. In 1988 the
Natal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court in S v Khanyile and
Another101 laid down the following criteria for determining whether
substantial injustice would result from refusal to provide legal representation
to an accused person:
1) the inherent simplicity or complexity of the case, as far as both the law
and the facts go;
2) the personal circumstances of the accused, such as how mature,
sophisticated, intelligent and articulate he looks and sounds; and
3) the gravity of the case and the possible consequences of a
conviction.
These criteria were approvingly referred to by the Constitutional Court in S v
vermees/" and indirectly adopted by the High Court in Legal Aid Board v
Msila103 where it was stated that the question whether substantial injustice
will result if an accused person is not afforded legal representation at state
expense '...would involve ... the nature of the proceedings in question in all
their ramifications, the potential consequences to the accused person and
his or her ability to represent himself or herself'. 104
Another aspect that deserves to be looked at is the right of an accused
person to be informed promptly of his or her right to legal representation. In
1990 the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court held in S v Mambaso105
that the trial court's failure to inform the accused of his right to counsel did
not itself amount to an irregularity. It would have amounted to an irregularity
only if the appellant had been shown to have been ignorant of the right, the
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Constitution and Bill of Rights. Since then courts have held otherwise. In S
v Gouwe106 it was held that the magistrate's failure to inform the accused of
his right to legal representation amounted to an irregularity resulting in an
unfair trial. This approach was adopted in S v Ramguongiwa107 , S v 0 108
and S v MOOS109. More recently in S v Mbambo110 the court held that the
failure of the trial court to advise the accused that he faced a sentence of
life imprisonment, and its failure to encourage him to exercise his right to
legal representation, constituted irregularities in the proceedings. As far as
the meaning of 'promptly' is concerned, any doubts have been removed by
an amendment to section 73 of the Criminal Procedure Act.111 The
amendment sets out clearly when the accused should be informed of the
right to legal representation. Section 73(2A)(e) in particular stipulates inter
alia that an accused person shall be informed of such right at his or her first
appearance in court.
Another important component of the right to a fair trial is the right of an
accused person to be presumed innocent, to remain silent and not to testify
during the proceedings, as provided for under section 35(3)(h). The first
aspect to consider is the presumption of innocence. Although the
presumption of innocence was a well established legal principle long before
the advent of a Bill of Rights in South Africa, there are numerous instances
when this right was grossly violated. One such occasion was the decision in
S v Shuping112 where the judges stated that:
'If there is no evidence on which a reasonable man might
convict, and there is also no ground to expect sufficient
evidence, the accused ought to be discharged. If there is reason
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defence evidence, the court should not discharge. That is the
standpoint of the Court.'113
Other instances that have violated the presumption of innocence include the
application of the so-called statutory presumptions, some of which have
since been declared unconstitutional. The essence of such presumptions is
that the existence of one fact is presumed from the proof of another. Such
presumptions can be found in section 21(3) of the Sexual Offences Act,114
section 10(1)(a) of the Abuse of Dependence Producing Substances and
Rehabilitation Centres Ace15 and some sections of the Road Traffic Act116
and Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act.117 In S v Shangase and Another,118 the
presumption in section 217(1 )(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act which
provides that a written confession made to or before a magistrate will be
presumed to have been made freely and voluntarily, was held to be
unconstitutional. Another case involving a provision of the Criminal
Procedure Act was S v Zuma.119 Section 217(1 )(b)(ii) of the Act, which
placed a legal burden on an accused to show that a confession before a
magistrate was not freely and voluntarily made, was invalidated. In ScageJl v
Attorney-General, Western Cape,120 the court held that section 6(3) of the
Gambling Ace21 was unconstitutional. The section provided that if certain
gambling items were found on a premises it would be prima facie evidence
that the person in charge, permitted gambling. And in S v Hulwana; S v
Gwadiso
122
it was held that section 21(1 )(a)(i) of the Drugs and Drug
Trafficking Act was unconstitutional. The section involved the presumption
of ~~aling, arising from proof that an accused was found in possession of
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will sooner or later be constitutionally challenged and it is opined that they
will not survive the challenge.
The other aspect to consider is the right of an accused person to remain
silent and to refuse to testify during the proceedings. In a way this right is a
follow-on to section 35(1 )(a) which provides for the right of an arrested
person to remain silent. It is also a reinforcement of section 196(1) (a) of the
Criminal Procedure Act which provides that an accused may not be called as
a witness except upon his own application.
One issue that needs to be considered is; of what evidential value is the .
failure of an accused person to testify in his own defence? This question
was raised in S v Sidziya,123 Scholtz v S124 and S v Brown.125 In Brown's
case it was held that an accused person's failure to testify could not have
any evidential value, but that ordinary logic dictated that, in certain
circumstances, failure to testify would entail adverse consequences for the
accused. Accordingly, Viljoen concludes that:
'Failure to testify is not a piece of positive evidence. Silence
may strengthen an uncontroverted "prima facie" case, but does
not constitute indirect compulsion to testify:126
Under section 35(3)(i) an accused person has the right to adduce and
challenge evidence. It is submitted that this right reinforces the right to legal
representation because many unrepresented accused persons are not
ordinarily expected to posses the necessary skills to cross-examine
witnesses. Accordingly, where an accused is represented by a legal
practitioner the right is more easily enforceable. Where the accused is





1995 (12) 8CLR 1626 (Tk).
1996 (11) 8CLR 1504 (CN).
1996 (2) SACR 49 NC.
See Viljoen (note 19 above) at 58 - 77.
121
material issue, the presiding officer may be required to question the witness
as was held in S v Simxandi.127
The right to adduce and challenge evidence has come before the courts on
a number of occasions. One such occasion was the controversial decision
in S v Shuma128 where the court denied the applicant a separation of trials in
order to make the eo-accused a compellable witness. The court held that
the existing law on criminal procedure by and large balanced the interests of
the accused and the state and for the court to find that such procedures
were unconstitutional would be a major step. On the facts of the particular
case, the court said, there could be no infringement of an accused's
constitutional rights under section 25(3)(d) (the Interim Constitution's
equivalent of section 35(3)(i) of the 1996 Constitution) sufficiently compelling
the court to act against the interests of society as represented by the
state.?" Devenish opines that this decision 'is not in accordance with "the
spirit, purport and objects" of chapter 2 of the 1996 Constltutlorr.l"
Other decisions on the issue have been less controversial and have by and
large recognised and protected the right. In S v Younas131 a refusal by the
magistrate for a postponement in order to call defence witnesses was held to
be a violation of the accused's constitutional right. In S v Mbeje132 the failure
of the magistrate to invite the accused to address the court on the merits of
the case against him at the close of the prosecution's case was held to
violate the accused's right to a fair trial.
Section 35(3)0) provides for the right of an accused person not to be
compelled to give self-incriminating evidence. This right is clearly an
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confession or admission that could be used in evidence against them.133 A
narrow interpretation of this right would seem to indicate that it protects an
accused person against self-incriminating evidence adduced during the trial.
The courts however have given the right a much wider interpretation to
include self-incriminating evidence obtained before the trial. In S v
Gqozo(2)134 the court held that the right would be violated if the state were
permitted to tender as evidence at a criminal trial the record of earlier
proceedings at which the accused had testified as an ordinary witness. The
case of Ferriera v Levin NO,135 also illustrates the Constitutional Court's
approach towards the right against self-incrimination. In that case the court
invalidated a part of section 417(2)(b) of the Companies Ace36 which allowed
incriminating evidence obtained under compulsion in an earlier enquiry to be
used against the accused in subsequent criminal proceedings. The court
held that the rule against self-incrimination is not simply a rule of evidence
but a constitutional right.137
According to section 35(3)(k) an accused person has a right to be tried in a
language that he or she understands or, if that is not practicable, to have the
proceedings interpreted in that language. It is submitted that this right
reinforces, and should be understood against the background of section 6 of
the Constitution which provides for eleven official languages for the Republic
of South Africa. According to S v Matome/a138 any of the eleven official
languages may be used to try the accused. The question that arises here is;
to what extent should the wishes of the accused in terms of language
preference, be accommodated? Secondly, how practicable is it for the
courts to observe the protection of this right? The problems of practicability
and choice of language manifested themselves in S v Ngubane139 where the
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who was Zulu speaking. The conviction was set aside on the grounds that
the accused's right to be tried in a language he understood or have the
proceedings interpreted to him, had been violated. On the question of
choice, the matter has been settled in Mthethwa v De Bruin N0140 where the
court emphasised that the right does not entail being tried in the language of
the accused's choice, it merely guarantees a right to be tried in a language
which the accused understands.
Section 35(3)(1) protects an accused person from being convicted for an act
or omission that was not an offence under either national or international law
at the time it was committed or omitted. This right reflects and reinforces the
well-known principle of legality, otherwise known as 'nullum crimen sine lege'
(without a law no charge is possible). As Hosten et al explain, the most
important rules embodied in that principle are, inter alia, that an accused
may only be convicted of a crime if the act committed is recognised by law
as a crime, that crimes may not be created with retrospective effect and that
the definition of crimes may not be extended by analoqy.!"
In South African courts the principle of not trying a person for an act that was
not an offence when it was committed, goes as far back as the beginning of
the 20th century. In 1911 in the case of R v Robinson142 and in 1915 in the
case of R v M143 the courts held that they did not possess the power to
create offences on the ground that the conduct in question was contrary to
good morals .l" Subsequent cases have acknowledged and accepted this
principle. The reference to offences under international law in the provision
is hardly surprising. It is in line with section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution
which requires a court to consider international law when interpreting the Bill
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interpretation of legislation that is consistent with international law over any
alternative interpretation that is not.
In terms of section 35(3)(m) an accused person has a right not to be tried for
an offence in respect of an act or omission for which that person has
previously been either acquitted or convicted. This right which is also known
as the double jeopardy rule corresponds with sections 106(1)(c) and (d) of
the Criminal Procedure Act. The basis of this rule is that no person may be
put 'in peril' twice for the same offence. It involves two well known maxims;
autrefois convict (meaning the accused has already been convicted of the
same offence) and autrefois acquit (meaning the accused has already been
acquitted of the same offence).
According to Hosten, the underlying reason in respect of autrofois convict is
the idea that once the accused has been sentenced and punished he has
paid his debt to soclety.':" It is argued however that the reason in respect of
autrofois .acquit is not quite as apparent because the mere fact that an
accused has been acquitted is not proof of his innocence. New evidence
may later come to light which conclusively proves his guilt. This argument
did not seem to find much support with the High Court in Mclntyre v
Pietersen.
146
In that case the applicants were acquitted on a charge of
assault but were later charged with murder after the victim died. As the
charge of murder arose from the same incident, their plea of autrofois
convict was successful. It is submitted that this decision carries the rule
rather too far. It is argued that where the death of a victim follows an
acquittal or conviction on a charge of assault the accused may be charged
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Section 35(3)(n) gives an accused person the right to the benefit of the least
severe of the prescribed punishments if the prescribed punishment for the
offence has been changed between the time the offence was committed and
the time of sentencing. This provision is a source of confusion as it does not
clarify what is meant by 'prescribed punishment' and how and when it may
be changed. In 1998 for example, the sentencing powers of the Magistrates'
Courts were increased from 12 months to three years and those of the
Regional Courts from 10 to 15 years.!" The High Court held in S v
Mbuyane148 that this did not change the 'prescribed punishment' for any
particular crime. If this decision is anything to go by, then the scope of this
particular right is severely limited since most common law offences would
effectively be ruled OUt. 149 It is submitted that the interpretation of the law in
that case did not 'promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights'
as required by section 39(2) of the Constitution.
Under section 35(3)(0) an accused person is granted a right of appeal to, or
review by, a higher court. This legal right precedes the advent of the Bill of
Rights in South African legal history. Before and after its
constitutionalisation, the right gave rise to considerable confusion
particularly regarding the differences in appeal procedures between the
different levels of courts. This confusion was finally put to rest by the
Criminal Procedure Amendment Ace50 which sets out a clearer and more
uniform procedure for appealing. Many court decisions have consequently
been overtaken by the amendment. These include R v Rens151 in which the
Constitutional Court dealt with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act
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the conviction or sentence. Also included is S v Ntuli152 in which the
Constitutional Court dealt with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act
which prevented prisoners from personally prosecuting their appeals without
first obtaining a judges's certificate.
More recently the Constitutional Court dealt with the right to appeal in
Mphahlele v First National Bank of South Africa153 and held that where an
applicant to the Supreme Court of Appeal has been given reasons for the
adverse decision in the court of first instance and has been informed that
there are no prospects of a different order being granted on appeal, the
procedure is not in any way inconsistent with an open and democratic
society and is not in breach of the Constitution. Although this decision was
in respect of a civil matter, it is submitted that the same approach may well
be taken in criminal matters.
3.2.4 Giving of information and exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence
Section 35(4) provides that whenever it is required that information be given
to a person (regarding any of the rights listed in the whole of section 35),
that information must be given in a language that the person understands.
This provision should be seen in the light of section 35(3)(k) which provides
that every accused person has a right to be tried in an language he or she
understands or, if that is not practicable to have the proceedings interpreted
in that language. As was said regarding that right, the question that also
arises here is whether the information should be given in the language of
that person's choice or in his or her native language (if he or she is not
South African). This question was resolved in Naidenov v Minister of Home
Affairs
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'the relevant section in the Constitution does not require that he
should be informed in the native language. It must be in a
language which he unoerstands.P"
In that case a Bulgarian was challenging his detention in South Africa on the
ground that the reasons for his detention had not been given in his native
Bulgarian language.156
Section 35(5) concludes the rights of arrested, detained and accused
persons by providing that evidence obtained in a manner that violates any
right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence
would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration
of justice. This provision is purely an innovation of the 1996 Constitution.
Over the decades the position in South Africa regarding this matter was
governed partly by the Criminal Procedure Act and partly by common law.
Accordingly in 1927 in R v Mabuya157 the Cape Provincial Division accepted
evidence . obtained as a result of an alleged unlawful police search of a
private dwelling. In 1940 in R v Uys and Uys158 the Transvaal Provincial
Division accepted evidence in form of documents discovered as a result of
an alleged illegal search. And in Kuruma, Son of Kainu V R159 it was held
that if the evidence is relevant the court should not concern itself with how it
was obtained.
Although the Interim Constitution did not expressly provide for admissibility
(or inadmissibility) of evidence obtained illegally, the courts started to
change their approach and 'recognise that they had a general discretion to
exclude unlawfully-obtained evidence.'160 This change in approach is
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Ferreira v Levin N0162 and S v Mathebula.163 The position was therefore
only concretized by the 1996 Constitution through section 35(5).
Accordingly any evidence obtained in a manner that violates a right in the
Bill of Rights should be excluded if admission of such evidence would render
the trial unfair or would be detrimental to the administration of justice. And
so it was held in S v Naidoo164 that section 35(5) of the final Constitution had
the effect that it was no longer open to courts to approach the question of
admissibility of evidence unlawfully obtained in violation of a fundamental
right on the basis of the wide discretion that had been exercised in earlier
cases.165 The admission of evidence obtained by means of an invasion of
the right to privacy, the court said, would render the trial unfair. S v
Madiba166 seems to have taken a slightly different view by holding that
section 35(5) was aimed at ensuring fairness to both sides and not only at
fairness or advantage to the accused. According to the judge in the case:
"A trial in which a jUdge is bound by the absence of any discretion
to close the door on evidence on the basis that it was procured in
circumstances constituting a relatively unimportant infringement
of a fundamental right may plainly be as unfair as a trial in which
he admits evidence procured in deliberate disregard of an
important right. It seems to me that the section was plainly
aimed at imposing a duty on the court, in the course of a trial, to
make a decision which is fair to both sides and not aimed only at
considerations of fairness or advantage to the accused.,167
It is submitted that this decision misinterprets section 35(5) of the
Constitution by reverting to the wide discretion exercised by the courts
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'relatively unimportant' is to completely misunderstand the 'spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights'.168
3.3 OTHER RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In addition to the rights of arrested, detained and accused persons listed in
section 35 of the Constitution, there are a number of other provisions in the
Bill of Rights that have an impact on prisoners and prisoners' rights. The
following is a brief discussion of each of these provisions.
3.3.1 Equality
Section 9(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone is equal before the
law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. Under
section 9(3) and (4) unfair discrimination (direct or indirect) on the basis of
certain grounds is outlawed. These grounds include; race, gender, sex,
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation,
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. The
effect of this is that all prisoners are entitled to equality and non-
discrimination .
It has to be noted, that traditionally, prisons in South Africa, like all other
social services, were divided along racial lines. Due to apartheid policies,
prisons built for white prisoners were of a better standard than those for
black prisoners. Although there have been efforts to integrate prisons, the
marked differences in quality between certain prisons and the difference in
treatment of prisoners due to their colour could under the Constitution be
challenged as an infringement of prisoners' rights to equality.
Another issue regarding equality between prisoners is the equal treatment of
male and female prisoners. This issue came before the Constitutional Court
168
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in the celebrated case of President of the Republic of South Africa v
HugO. 169 In 1994 the President granted a special remission of sentence to
all mothers in prison at the time who had children under the age of 12 years.
The respondent, a prisoner, who was the father of a child under twelve,
challenged the presidential order arguing that it unfairly discriminated
against him on the grounds of sex or gender. The majority of the court held
that although this was discrimination, it was not unfair. In a dissenting
judgment, Mokgoro J held that the measure amounted to unfair
discrimination, but justified it under the limitation clause. This case
illustrates two important points. First, that a distinction has to be made
between fair and unfair discrimination. Only unfair discrimination is
outlawed. Secondly, prisoners' rights, indeed all rights, are not absolute.
They are subject to certain ltmttatlons."?
3.3.2 Human dignity
Section 10 of the Constitution provides that everyone has inherent dignity
and the right to have their dignity respected and protected. As far as
prisoners are concerned, this provision should be read together with section
35(2)(e) which entitles all prisoners to conditions of detention that are
consistent with human dignity. It should also be seen against the
background of section 12(1)(d) and (e) which prohibit torture and being
treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading manner.
It has been argued that human dignity 'is central to the philosophy of
constitutionalism on which the new constitutional dispensation is based' .171
This is illustrated by the way the concept is reflected and expressed in
several other sections of the Constitution. Section 1(a) provides that human
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Section 7(1) provides that human dignity is one of the democratic values
affirmed by the Bill of Rights. Section 36 (1) requires any limitation to the
rights in the Bill of Rights to be based, inter alia, on human dignity. And
section 39 requires that in interpreting the Bill of Rights, one of the values to
be promoted is human dignity.
The Constitutional Court has on a number of occasions addressed the issue
of human dignity with specific reference to imprisonment and punishment.
One of the grounds on which the court invalidated the death penalty in S v
Makwanyane172 was that it contravened the right to human dignity. The
Court also held that the right to dignity is one of the factors to be taken into
account in determining whether a punishment is cruel, inhuman or
degrading . On the question of imprisonment, the Court recognised that
although imprisonment inevitably impairs a person's dignity, the state
inevitably has the powers to impose this form of punishment as part of the
criminal justice system. The Court hastened to add, however, that
imprisonment does not deprive prisoners of their rights. These rights can
only be limited in terms of the limitation clause. In S v Williams173 the
Constitutional Court held that juvenile whippings violated the right to human
dignity and amounted to cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. In
response to this decision, parliament has since enacted the Abolition of
Corporal Punishment Ace74 which outlaws all forms of corporal punishment.
3.3.3 The right to life
The right to life is guaranteed under section 11 of the Constitution. The first
issue to be addressed as far as prisoners are concerned is the death
penalty. In a landmark decision, the Constitutional Court unanimously and
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found that in addition to violating several other sections of the Bill of Rights,
capital punishment was inconsistent with the right to life. Although the issue
remains a source of controversy and heated debate, with many calls for the
review of the death penalty, the legal (and political) position remains that the
death penalty has been effectively outlawed.
Another aspect regarding the right to life is the state's responsibility to
protect the lives of all prisoners held in its prisons. It is submitted that a
creative interpretation of section 11 requires the Department of Correctional
Services to protect prisoners and ensure that their lives are not endangered
either by themselves or other prisoners. Read together with section 7(2) of
the Constitution which provides that the state must respect, promote and
fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights, section 11 places a duty on the state to
protect the lives of all its citizens. This means that the state should be taken
to task for the frequent deaths common in South African jails.
3.3.4 Freedom and security of the person
Apart from being closely related to section 35 of the Constitution which
provides for the rights of arrested, detained and accused persons, section
12(1) is of profound relevance and significance regarding prisoners' rights.
It provides for the right to freedom and security of the person which includes
the right not to be arbitrarily arrested, not to be detained without trial, not to
be subjected to violence, not to be tortured and not to be treated or punished
in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. The prohibition of detention without
trial is a constitutional safeguard against abuse of state power reminiscent of
past regimes. It represents a symbolic commitment that such abuses should
not be repeated.?" In Nel v Le Roux No177 the Constitutional Court was
called upon to pronounce on, inter alia, whether section 205 of the Criminal
Procedure Act violated the right not to be detained without trial. The section
176
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requires any person who is likely to give material or relevant information
relating to an offence, to be subpoenaed for questioning. If he or she
refuses to answer the question without just excuse he or she will be liable to
two years imprisonment. The Court held that the provision was not
unconstitutional because it met the requirements of procedural fairness and
it was necessary for the maintenance of law and order.
In De Lange v Smuts N0178 the Constitutional Court categorised the right in
section 12(1) into two different aspects; the substantive aspect and the
procedural aspect. According to Ackermann J:
'... section12(1), in entrenching the right to freedom and security
of the person, entrenches two different aspects of the right ...
The one ... (that) may ... be described as the substantive aspect
of the protection of freedom .... The other, which may be
described as the procedural aspect of the protection of freedom
is implicit in section 12(1) ...'179
The Court held that the power of presiding officers other than magistrates to
commit recalcitrant witnesses to prison infringed the procedural aspect of
section 12(1) of the Constitution.
The right 'to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private
sources' is of considerable relevance to prisoners. However, the wording of
the right makes it rather contradictory by imposing two conflicting obligations
on the state. De Waal argues that:
'The right to freedom from state violence protects individuals
from police use of an unconstitutional degree of force. At the
same time, the right to freedom from private violence imposes
an obligation on the state to use violent means where necessary
178
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to quell or discourage violent acts by individuals that may
threaten the physical security of other.' 180
In a prison situation, prison officials are expected to refrain from the use of
force on prisoners, but at the same time they are expected to use force
where necessary to protect inmates against violence from fellow inmates.
The right not to be tortured in any way is also of particular importance to
prisoners' rights. The Bill of Rights Report'" documents numerous cases of
allegations of torture by members of the SAPS. One of such allegations was
made by the IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party) that a number of its members had
been tortured by police in KwaZulu-Natal, and called for the suspension of
Captain Mandlenkosi Vilikazi after the death in custody of one of its
supporters, Mr Ngiyane Mhlongo.182 As for the right not to be treated or
punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading manner, regard should be had to
section 10 providing for the right to human dignity and section 35(2)(e)
providing for the right to conditions of detention which are consistent with
human dignity. The implications and consequences in relation to those
rights apply equally to this one.
3.3.5 Slavery, servitude and forced labour
Section 13 of the Constitution provides that no one may be subjected to
slavery, servitude and forced labour. As far as prisoners rights are
concerned, the relevant aspect of the provision is 'forced labour'. Any
controversy that might have arisen in terms of the right regarding the
constitutionality of the work or labour performed by prisoners has been put to
rest by section 40 of the Correctional Services Act.183 First of all, under
section 40(1) of the Act, the work is only intended to keep prisoners active
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choice to elect the type of work he or she prefers to do. And finally , under
section 40(5) a prisoner may never be instructed or compelled to work as a
form of punishment or disciplinary measure.
3.3.6 Privacy
The right to privacy is guaranteed under section 14 of the Constitution. It
ought to be remembered however that imprisonment by its very nature
restricts the enjoyment of this right. That is not to say that on imprisonment
a person completely forfeits his or her right to privacy. There are certain
aspects of a prisoner's life that undoubtedly remain private and therefore
require the protection of the law. In a prison environment the right applies to
searches of prisoners, their cells, censorship of communication and
restriction of contact with visitors.
As far as prisoners are concerned section 14(d) which provides for privacy of
communications should be read together with section 35(2)(f) which provides
for a prisoner's right to communicate and be visited. The implications and
consequences of the latter were discussed earlier.184 It is submitted that in
view of the above two provisions section 185(5) of the Criminal Procedure
Ace85 is a good candidate for constitutional challenge. The section states
that:
'No person, other than an officer in the service of the state ... shall
have access to a person detained ..., except with the consent of and
subject to the conditions determined by the attorney-general or an






See also De Waal et al (note 16 above) at 531.
136
3.3.7 Freedom of association and the right to assemble, demonstrate,
picket and petition
Section 17 of the Constitution provides for the right to assemble, to
demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions. Section 18 guarantees the
right to freedom of association. Many prisoners have exercised their rights
to freedom of association by joining the South African Prisoners
Organisation for Human Rights (SAPOHR). The interesting question is: to
what extent can the enjoyment of this right be realised? Can prisoners freely
conduct the activities and operations of SAPOHR within the prisons? If so,
then prisoners can also enjoy the right to assemble, demonstrate and
petition as provided for under section 18. In any case as expressed by De
Waal:
'the right to assemble is available to "every person". This means
that foreigners, minors, prisoners, students all enjoy the full
protection of the freedom of assembly,.187
It is submitted however that in the case of prisoners this right can always be
limited in terms of section 36 of the Constitution, and the state would not
have much difficulty in justifying the limitations as reasonable and justifiable.
3.3.8. Political rights
_§_~<?~onJ 9 of the Constitution provides for: political rights. The most relevant
aspect of this provision is the right to vote. This right, provided for under
section 19(3)(a), has been a source of controversy and debate. Some have
argued that convicted prisoners, by their illegal actions, have forfeited
numerous fundamental rights, among which is the right to cast a ballot. This
kind of reasoning was however rejected by the Constitutional Court which
held in August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others188 that
187
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prisoners were entitled to vote in the 1999 national elections. In that case
the Constitutional Court made it clear that:
'It is a well-established principle of our common law ... that
prisoners are entitled to all their personal rights and personal
dignity not temporarily taken away by law, or necessarily
inconsistent with the circumstances in which they have been
placed.'189
The Court then concluded that in the absence of any specific legislation
disqualifying prisoners from voting, prisoners had a constitutional right to
vote and neither the Electoral Commission nor the Court had the power to
disenfranchise them. The Electoral Commission was accordingly ordered to
make arrangements for prisoners to register and vote in the elections.
The interesting question raised by this decision is whether prisoners can
exercise their rights to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office
(under section 19(3)(b». This question is answered in part by sections
47(1)(e) and 106(1)(e) which disqualify anyone convicted of an offence and
sentenced to more than 12 months imprisonment without the option of a fine,
from eligibility to membership of the National Assembly or a provincial
legislature. Does that imply that convicted prisoners of lesser sentences can
rightfully exercise their rights under section 19(1)(b) to stand for and hold
public office? Without any specific legislation disqualifying them, there is no
reason not to think so. It is however submitted that the limitation clause
(section 36) can justifiably come into play here.
3.3.9 Children's rights
Section 28 of the Constitution provides for the rights of a child. The
relevance of this section is that, among other things, it provides for the rights
of children in detention. Section 28(1)(g) sets out specific rights over and
189 Para 18.
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above those provided for under sections 12 and 35 (dealing with freedom
and security of the person, and the rights of arrested, detained and accused
persons respectively). These include the right to be detained separately
from adult detainees and the right to be treated in a manner, and kept in
conditions, that take account of the child's age. In addition, section 28(1)(g)
makes it clear that children should not be detained except as a measure of
last resort, and even then for the shortest appropriate period of time.
Furthermore, in addition to the right to legal representation for accused
persons in criminal proceedings (under section 35(3)(g)), section 28(1)(h)
obliges the state to provide legal representation in civil proceedings affecting
a child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result.
The constitutional rights of children under detention have their genesis in the
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice (1985) and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles
Deprived of their Liberty (1991 ).190 They are also reflected in section 19 of
the Correctional Services Ace91 which adds even more rights including
access to educational programmes, social work services, religious care,
recreational programmes and psychological services. Furthermore, where
practicable, children should remain in contact with their families through
additional visits and by other means.
3.3.10. Access to information
Section 32(1) grants every person the right to access to any information held
by the state or by another person insofar as such information is required for
the exercise or protection of any rights. Under section 32(2) national
legislation was to be enacted to give effect to the obligation referred to in
sub-section (1). The Promotion of Access to Information Act192 was








give effect to the constitutional rights of access to any information held by
the state and any information that is held by another person and that is
required for the exercise or protection of any rights'. The relevance of the
right of access to information is that prison authorities, parole boards and
other penal administrative bodies may take decisions that affect the rights of
prisoners. It can therefore be argued that a prisoner would be entitled to
demand any information regarding any decision that may have a negative
effect on his or her rights.
The right of access to information regarding police dockets has already been
discussed in connection with the right to be informed of the charge with
sufficient details to answer it.193 The Constitutional Court's position was
articulated in Shabalala v Attorney-General of the Trensveef" which held
that the real enquiry was whether the applicants were entitled to succeed in
their application on the basis of a right to a fair trial. The implication here is
that if the denial of access to the docket is likely to result in an unfair trial,
then it would be unconstitutional. This approach was also adopted in S v
Makiti195 and Park-Ross v Director: Office of Serious Economic Offences.196
3.3.11 Just administrative action
Section 33(1) provides for the right to administrative action that is lawful,
reasonable and procedurally fair. Under section 33(2), everyone whose
rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to
be given written reasons. Section 33(3) provides that national legislation
must be enacted to give effect to these rights. The said legislation was
recently enacted in the form of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act197
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'Administrative action which materially and adversely affects
the rights of any persons or legitimate expectations must be
procedurally fair.,19B
The Act also lays down the right to reasons in clear and detailed terms.199
The right to administrative justice is quite relevant to prisoners because the
nature of the prison institution is such that disciplinary hearings are likely to
take place from time to time. Prison authorities are required to conduct
these hearings in a manner that will not violate the prisoner's right to a just
administrative action.
3.3.12 The limitation clause
The opening section of the Bill of Rights specifies that all rights contained in
it are subject to the limitations in section 36, or elsewhere in the chapter.2oo
Section 36 provides in detail that:
'The rights contained in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in
terms of laws of general application to the extent that the
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking
into account all relevant factors ...'
The factors are then listed. One of them is the nature of the right. It is
submitted that the nature of prisoners' rights particularly under section 35 is
such that they are more vulnerable to the limitation clause then all other
rights. If a person is arrested after committing a crime for example, his or
her rights as a free person are immediately compromised to some extent.
The question will always be; to what extent should the limitation clause
operate? The answer, it is submitted, is that each case should be
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3.3.13 Legal standing and enforcement of rights
In South Africa, the locus standi rule has traditionally required that for a
person to have standing to approach the court for relief, he or she had to
show that he or she had some personal interest in the matter. The Bill of
Rights has changed this approach and section 38 now lays down a list of
people who have the right to approach a competent court alleging an
infringement of any right in the Bill of Rights. These include:
'(a) anyone acting in their own interest;
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act
in their own name;
(c) anyone acting as a member of a group or class of
persons;
(d) anyone acting in the public interest;
(e) an association acting in the interest of its rnembers.F"
This provision has effectively broadened the approach to standing and the
Constitutional Court took the opportunity in Ferreira v Levin N0202 to
acknowledge this. The Court was of the view that adopting a broader
approach to standing would not only uphold the Constitution but would also
serve to ensure that constitutional rights enjoy the full measure of the
protection to which they are entitled.
Of particular relevance to prisoners' rights is section 38 (b) under which a
person may act on behalf of another person who cannot act in his or her own
name. Many people in detention would, for some reason or other, be unable
to approach the court themselves. The provision enables another person to
approach the court on their behalf so that their rights can be enforced.
201
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3.3.14 Interpretation of the Bill of Rights
Interpretation of the Bill of Rights is provided for under section 39 of the
Constitution. In view of the objectives of this study,203 the interpretation
provision takes on added significance. Section 39(1) obliges any court
interpreting the Bill of Rights to promote the values that underlie an open
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.
International law must be considered while foreign law may also be
considered. In S v Makwanyane204 the Constitutional Court endorsed the
use of public international law and foreign law in the interpretation of the Bill
of Rights. The Court made specific reference to the jurisprudence of the
United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights.
In the context of prisoners' rights, section 39 is of great importance in the
sense that there is a wide range of international jurisprudence to draw upon.
In that respect it should be noted that by the use of the word 'must' which is
imperative, the court is obliged by section 39(1) to apply international law.
On the other hand the use of the discretionary 'may' only requires the court
to apply foreign law as and when it sees fit. Another important aspect is that
according to S v Makwanyane205 the court is not required to use only binding
international law. Both binding and non-binding international law may be
applied in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. The relevance of this is that
the fact that South Africa is not party to many international human rights
instruments (including those on prisoners' rights) does not preclude the









Recent constitutional developments in South Africa have brought a new
dimension to the protection and realization of prisoners' rights. It is clear
that many sections of the Bill of Rights have the potential to protect and
widen the scope of the rights of prisoners. Section 35 in particular goes a
long way in attempting to lay down specific rights for the protection of those
who may sadly find themselves on the wrong side of the law, resulting in
their incarceration. The courts, especially the Constitutional Court, have
risen to the challenge in attempting to give some effect, interpretation and
meaning to the rights of prisoners brought about by this new constitutional
order. So too has the legislature. By enacting the new Correctional
Services Act, a legislative mechanism has been put in place, at least on
paper, for the implementation of the constitutional rights of prisoners. To
what extent this constitutional and legislative protection translates into reality
is an issue that will be determined at a later stage of this study.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PRISONERS' RIGHTS IN SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES
4.1 INTRODUCTION
A study of the constitutional rights of prisoners in South Africa would be
incomplete without a comparative survey of a few other African countries.
The need for this comparative approach becomes even more imperative
when regard is had to the main objective of the study, which is to determine
the extent to which South Africa meets international norms and standards
insofar as prisoners' rights are concerned. This chapter therefore looks at
the constitutional rights of prisoners in a few (mainly neighbouring) African
countries with a view of creating a comparative picture and determining how
South Africa stands in the regional context.
The countries chosen for this study are Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia and
Uganda. The reasons for the choices vary from country to country but
generally include proximity (for most), constitutional similarities, historical
relationships and political considerations. It should be noted that South
Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Uganda share a common British colonial
heritage, while Namibia has a historical colonial relationship with South
Africa.
4.2 ZIMBABWE
4.2.1 Prisoners' Rights under the Constitution of Zimbabwe
The Republic of Zimbabwe came into existence on 18 April 1980 as the
successor state of what was known as Rhodesia. The independence
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Constitution of Zimbabwe was published as a schedule to the Zimbabwe
Constitution Order 1979,1 and it took effect on the day the country became
independent. The Constitution has undergone several amendments although
attempts to repeal it and replace it with a new one have so far failed. The
latest efforts to adopt a new Constitution were rejected by the majority of the
population in the country's first post-independence referendum held in
February 2000.2
Chapter 3 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe is headed 'The Declaration of
Rights.' The opening section of the chapter provides that; 'every person in
Zimbabwe is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the
individual." Although the section goes on to provide for limitations to the
enjoyment of the said fundamental rights, it is right to presume that 'all
persons' includes prisoners.
Section 13 provides for the protection of the right to personal liberty. Under
section 13(1), '[n]o person shall be deprived of his personal liberty save as
may be authorised by law ...'. Section 13(2) then specifies the cases where a
person may be deprived of his liberty. It is submitted that the list of such
limitations is so long as to make the right meaningless. It includes for
example the execution of an order of court to secure the fulfilment of an
obligation imposed on a person by law." It also includes a situation where a
person is reasonably suspected of having committed, or is about to commit, a
criminal offence." Another such limitation is 'for the purpose of preventing
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Section 13 also provides for the rights of arrested and detained persons.
Section 13(3) in particular provides that:
'Any person who is arrested or detained shall be informed as
soon as reasonably practicable in a language that he
understands, of the reasons for his arrest or detention and
shall be permitted at his own expense to obtain and instruct
without delay a legal representative of his own choice and
hold communications with him.'
Provision is made under section 13(3)(b) that an arrested or detained person
should be brought before a court without undue delay and should be tried
within a reasonable time. If not, he should be released either unconditionally
or upon reasonable conditions. Such conditions may include those
reasonably necessary to ensure that the person will appear at a later date for
trial.
Section 13(5) provides that any person who is unlawfully arrested or detained
is entitled to compensation from the person who arrests or detains him/her,
or from the person or authority on whose behalf the arrest or detention was
made. This would have been a very good and innovative constitutional right
were it not for the limitations attached to it. Judicial officers acting in their
judicial capacity, and people assisting them, acting reasonably and in good
faith are excluded from liability for such compensation." It is submitted that
this makes the right meaningless and ineffectual.
Section 14 is also relevant for prisoners' rights in Zimbabwe. It provides for
protection from slavery and forced labour. The limitations to this right also
make it untenable. Under section 14(2), 'forced labour' excludes any labour
required in consequence of a sentence or order of court. It also excludes
7 Section 13(5)(a) and (b).
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labour required of any person while he is lawfully detained insofar as such
labour is reasonably necessary in the interests of hygiene or for the
maintenance or management of the place of detention. This effectively
means that courts may sentence prisoners to forced labour and that
prisoners may be forced to work while in detention.
Section 15 of the Zimbabwean Constitution which provides for protection
from inhuman treatment has very important ramifications for prisoners' rights.
It prohibits 'torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or other such
treatment'. The enjoyment of this right however is also restricted by a string
of limitations. In the first place any 'reasonably justifiable' treatment of a
lawfully detained person in preventing him or her from escaping from custody
does not contravene this right. Secondly, 'moderate corporal punishment' is
allowed inappropriate circumstances and in execution of a judgment or order
of a court. Thirdly, the execution of a person sentenced to death by a
competent court does not contravene the right.8 Finally, the delay in the
execution of a person sentenced to death does not also amount to inhuman
treatment.
9
It is submitted that these wide ranging limitations are so
restrictive that the enjoyment of the right is practically impossible.
Another provision which is relevant to prisoners' rights in Zimbabwe is
section 18 headed 'provisions to secure protection of law'. Under section
18(2) the right to a fair hearing is guaranteed. Section 18(3) provides as
follows:
'Every person who is charged with a criminal offence _
(a) shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved






(b) shall be informed as soon as reasonably
practicable, in a language he understands ... the
nature of the offence ...
(c) shall be given adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of his defence
(d) shall be permitted to defend himself in person or, ...
at his own expense by a legal representative of his
choice
(e) shall be afforded facilities to examine ... witnesses
called by the prosecution ... and
(f) shall be permitted to have ... the assistance of an
interpreter if he cannot understand the language
used at the triaL'
Section 18(5) protects an accused person from being convicted for an act or
omission which did not constitute an offence at the time it was committed.
The same section protects an accused person from a penalty that is severer
than the maximum that might have been imposed at the time the offence was
committed. In terms of section 18(6) an accused person may not be tried for
an offence in respect of which he or she has been convicted or acquitted,
and under section 18(7) an accused may not be tried for an offence for which
he or she has been pardoned. Section 18(8) protects an accused person
from being compelled to give evidence at the trial. Finally, section 18(10)
provides for the right to a public trial. But as with the other rights in the
Zimbabwean Constitution a detailed list of limitations to the rights
enumerated above is set out in sections 18(11) to 18(15). These limitations,
it is again submitted, have the unfortunate effect of rendering the rights
meaningless, particularly in the context of prisoners.
It is clear that there is a great difference between· the rights of prisoners
under the South African Bill of Rights and those of prisoners under the
Constitution of Zimbabwe. First of all there are a number of rights in the
South African Bill of Rights that are noticeably absent in the Zimbabwean
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counterpart. The right to remain silent and to be so informed is one such a
right. So is the right to be informed of the consequences of not remaining
silent. Also absent in the Zimbabwe Constitution is the right of an arrested
person not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that may be
used against him or her. No provision is made for the right of a detained
person to challenge the lawfulness of the detention. No provision is made for
the right of a detained person to communicate and be visited. Of greater
relevance is the fact that there is no provision for the right to conditions of
detention that are consistent with human dignity.
As far as the right to a fair trial is concerned, the Zimbabwean Constitution
does not, like its South African counterpart, provide for the right of an
accused person not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence
during the trial. Another important difference lies in the right to legal
representation. Under the South African Constitution a detained or accused
person has the right to be assigned a legal practitioner, at state expense, if
substantial injustice would otherwise result. The person also has the right to
be so informed. Under the Zimbabwean Constitution an arrested or detained
person merely has a right to 'be permitted at his own expense to obtain and
instruct ... a legal representative of his own choice ...10 A person charged
with a criminal offence is 'permitted to defend himself in person or, ... at his
own expense by a legal representative of his choice'."
The most remarkable difference between the two constitutions in the context
of prisoners' rights is the mode or the way in which the rights are limited and
the extent of the limitations. It is true that not all rights are absolute. All
constitutions therefore contain limitation provisions. Contemporary






clause. This is the trend followed by South Africa in the form of section 36 of
its constitution. The Zimbabwean Constitution on the other hand does not
have such a general limitation clause but contains specific limitation
provisions attached to most of the rights. The advantage of a general
limitation clause is that it 'sets out specific criteria for the restriction of the
fundamental rights ...'12 Under the South African Bill of Rights such criteria
require that the limitation should be a law of general application which is
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society. Specific
limitation provisions attached to the rights have the effect of over-restricting
such rights. This is the case with the provisions of the Zimbabwean
Constitution, particularly those relating to prisoners.
Finally, another important difference relates to corporal punishment and the
death penalty. While in South Africa the two are outlawed, in Zimbabwe they
are not. Corporal punishment is permissible 'in appropriate circumstances'"
and '[t]he execution of a person who has been sentenced to death ...' does
not amount to inhuman treatment," nor does the delay in the execution of
such a sentence."
4.2.2 Prisoners' rights as interpreted by the courts of Zimbabwe
On several occasions the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe has been called upon
to deal with certain aspects of prisoners' rights. In S v Sibende'" the court
--- -~ - - _. _ ~ --------
was faced with the issue of the right to legal representation. It was held that
detained persons have a constitutional right of access to their legal advisors.
Denial of such access means that such persons, if charged with an offence,
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issue was addressed in S v Woods and otners" where the court held that it
could not condone a blatant refusal of access of prisoners to their lawyers.
Such refusal would violate the fundamental right granted by section 13(3) of
the Constitution and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
In S v Masitere18 the court considered whether the imposition of the
punishment of solitary confinement and a spare diet as part of a sentence
was in contravention of section 15 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. The
applicant had been convicted by a provincial magistrate for housebreaking
with intent to steal. Because he had a string of previous convictions for
similar offences, he was sentenced to a term of three years imprisonment
with hard labour. In addition, the magistrate ordered that the first and last
fortnights of the term of imprisonment were to be spent in solitary
confinement and on spare diet. The Supreme Court described such
punishment as reminiscent of the dark ages and expressed the view that
these forms of punishment had not been specifically declared
unconstitutional at an earlier opportunity because the courts did regard them
as having fallen into desuetude." The court took the opportunity to declare
such punishments unconstitutional by virtue of their inhuman and degrading
nature and the element of torture they entailed."
In Conjwayo v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and
Others,21 the applicant challenged the conditions of detention. The prisoner
who was under sentence of death, was confined in a small single cell for a
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and public holidays, without access to natural light and fresh air, and with
only limited ability to exercise his body. He argued that such conditions
infringed his fundamental right under section 15(1) of the Constitution not to
be subjected to inhuman treatment. Accepting that it had a responsibility to
enforce the constitutional rights of all persons, prisoners included, the court
held that indeed such conditions of detention infringed the prisoners'
fundamental rights under section 15(1) of the Constitution. The court said:
'Section 15(1) is a provision that embodies broad and
idealistic notions of dignity, humanity and decency. It
guarantees that punishment or institutionalised treatment of
offenders be exercised within the ambit of civilised
standards.:"
To subject a human being to such conditions, the court further held,
transgressed the boundaries of civilised standards and involved the infliction
of unnecessary suffering. The court ordered that the applicant be allowed to
exercise in the open air, every weekday, for one hour in the morning and one
hour in the afternoon, and on weekends and public holidays for a minimum of
one hour a day.
In Woods and Smith v The Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary
Affairs and Another,23 the court was faced with a similar situation to that in
Conjwayo. The question was whether the Conjwayo judgment was binding
only on the parties to that particular case or whether it was a test case that
could embrace the present applicants. The Court held that the ruling in
Conjwayo applied equally to the present applicants. A similar order was
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In Woods and Others v The Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary
Affairs24 the matter before the court was the right to freedom of expression in
terms of section 20(1) of the Constitution. The prisoners were challenging a
regulation which permitted them to write and receive only one letter every
four weeks. The court held that the regulation was ultra vires section 20 of
the Constitution and therefore invalid. The court used the occasion to
reiterate that by reason of his crime, a prisoner does not shed all basic rights
at the prison gate. 'Rather he retains all the rights of a free citizen save
those withdrawn from him by law, expressly or by implication, or those
inconsistent with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system,' the court sald."
The matter before the court in Chimora v Angwa Furnishers (Private) Ltd and
Others26 revolved around the infringement of the right to personal liberty as a
result of civil imprisonment for non-payment of debts. The right not to be
subjected to degrading treatment was also considered. The court held that
under section 13(2)(c) of the Declaration of Rights a person could be
deprived of his personal liberty in execution of an order of court to secure the
fulfilment of an obligation imposed by law. The imprisonment of a recalcitrant
debtor did not amount to 'degrading' treatment because the debtor had it
within his power to end the period of incarceration by paying the debt.
Accordingly the procedure of civil imprisonment did not contravene section
15(1) of the Declaration of Rights, the court held. It is submitted that this
decision is in stark contrast with the position in South Africa where the
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imprisonment for debt is incompatible with the Constitution. It is further
submitted that in view of adverse economic realities facing many people in
both countries, the South African position is preferable.
'More recently the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe had to consider the right to a
fair trial in Smyth v Ushewokunze and Anothet:" The applicant was arrested
in September 1997 for charges of crimen injuria which occurred in 1992 and
1993 respectively. He alleged that the prosecutor had revealed a desire to
conduct a personal crusade against him and lacked the objectivity to ensure
a fair trial as provided for under section 18(2) of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe. He also complained that the delay in charging him violated
section 18(2), and that he would not be afforded a fair hearing due to the
lapse of five years since the commission of the alleged offences. The court
held that section 18(2) embodied a constitutional value of supreme
importance which required a broad and creative interpretation embracing not
only the impartiality of the court but also the absolute impartiality of the
prosecutor himself, whose function, as an officer of the court, forms an
indispensable part of the judicial process. The application was granted in
this regard but dismissed in regard to the other claims. Regarding the right
to a fair trial within a reasonable time, the court held that the time began to
run when the person was charged. A person was 'charged' when he
received official notification of an allegation that he had committed a criminal
offence. Accordingly the delay in this case was insufficient to trigger the
inquiry mechanism into whether the applicant's rights to a fair hearing had
been infringed.
Some of the more recent pronouncements on prisoners' rights in Zimbabwe
were made by the Supreme Court in Blanchard and Others v Minister of
28
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Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and Others.29 Three United States
citizens were arrested and were to be charged with illegal possession of
arms of war and for violating the Aircraft (Offences) Aceo They claimed to
have been subjected to various forms of inhuman treatment including torture,
assault and other abuse. On the right not to be subjected to torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment, the court said that section 15(1) of the
Zimbabwean Constitution is meant to protect both the dignity and the
physical and mental integrity of the individual, and it is the duty of the state to
afford everyone protection against acts that cause not only physical pain but
also mental suffering. Regarding the conditions of detention the court
stressed that a prisoner retains all the rights of a free citizen except for those
withdrawn by law, expressly or by implication, or those inconsistent with the
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. In respect of
awaiting trial prisoners, the court said, it must never be overlooked that they
are unconvicted and are accordingly presumed to be innocent. The court
ordered that the applicants were to be entitled to use and wear their own
civilian clothing at all times and they were also to be entitled to receive from
sources outside the prison as much food as they required everyday.
The above decisions illustrate the approach taken by the Supreme Court of
Zimbabwe in interpreting the constitutional rights of prisoners in that country.
It can be said that the interpretation has been hampered by the various
limitations imposed by the Constitution on the various rights. Although the
courts upheld and protected the fundamental rights of prisoners, even
sometimes applying international law, the limitations imposed by the
Constitution ensure that such rights can be guaranteed only to a certain
extent. Having said that, it is however evident that the courts have 'not only
met the minimum standards set by international human rights law in relation
29
30
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to prisoners but, indeed, had gone further'.31 It has been argued that by
proscribing solitary confinement, and ordering that prisoners on death row
should have, not one, but two hours access to the sun daily, the Zimbabwean
Supreme Court was not only upholding basic human rights but setting
standards for the legal world as a whole."
4.2.3 Prisoners' rights in Zimbabwe as seen by observers
Generally the area of human rights protection has always been a sore spot in
the social , legal and political development of Zimbabwe. Prisoners' rights
are perceived as no exception to this poor record. The 1998 Human Rights
Report by the US Department of State describes the prison conditions in
Zimbabwe as harsh, characterised by extreme overcrowding, shortages of
clothing and poor sanitary conditions." The same report hastens to add
however, that the government has established a successful community
service sentencing programme to try and alleviate prison overcrowding .
According to the 1999 Human Rights Report, the government's overall
human rights record worsened significantly that year. There were incidents
of police killings and security forces are reported to have tortured, beaten
and otherwise abused persons. Prison conditions are also reported to have
remained harsh, and arbitrary arrest and detention remained problems. In
particular the report documents the arrest, detention and torture of two
journalists of the Standard newspaper, Mark Chavunduka and Ray Choto for
publishing a story alleging that 23 army officers had been arrested in
connection with an attempted military coup. The report states that the two
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torture while in detention. Also documented by the report is the torture and
physical abuse of three American citizens referred to earlier. 34 The three
men claimed that their jailers applied electric shocks to their genitals, beat
their feet with leather straps, submerged their heads under water and were
forced to sleep naked, shackled with leg-irons. The findings of the
physicians who examined the missionaries confirmed their claims. In
September 1999, the three were found guilty of violations of sections of the
LOMA (Law and Order Maintenance Act) and the Aircraft Offences Act and
were given concurrent sentences of 21 months under the LOMA and 6
months under the Aircraft Offences Act.
According to the Amnesty International Annual Report, during 1999 almost
1 000 people were detained without bail, creating dangerous overcrowding in
jails and remand centres. 35 Some detainees, the report says, were beaten
and ill treated in custody. Furthermore, two men - Nyenyai Mudenge and
George Chikwamure - were executed in April 1999 for murder. During the
year more than five people were sentenced to death and at least seven
people had their death sentences confirmed by the Supreme Court."
4.3 NAMIBIA
4.3.1 Prisoners' rights under the Constitution of Namibia
The Constitution of Namibia (formerly known as South-West Africa) was
adopted in February 1990 shortly before the country gained its independence
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seeking to overcome aparthied. One of the features of the new constitution
was that the common law based on Roman Dutch law applied since 1920
was to remain in force. Another important development was the introduction
of a Bill of Rights in the new Constitution.
The Bill of Rights is contained in Chapter 3 which is entitled 'Fundamental
Human Rights and Freedoms'. Article 6 protects the right to life and
categorically outlaws the death penalty by providing that:
'The right to life shall be protected and respected. No law may
prescribe death as a competent sentence. No Court or Tribunal
shall have the power to impose a sentence of death upon any
person. No executions shall take place in Namibia.'38
The right against deprivation of personal liberty is provided for under Article
7 and respect for human dignity under Article 8, which further provides that
'[N]o persons shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment'.39
Rights that are particularly pertinent to prisoners are laid down in Articles 11
and 12. Article 11 specifically provides that no-one may be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention. It has been argued that the inclusion of this
clause is an instance of legislation ex abundanti caulela, since Article 7
already provides for the right against deprivation of personal liberty except in
accordance with procedures established by law.40 This means that not only
arbitrary arrest and detention are proscribed, but any arrest or detention has
to be subject to certain procedures established by law. These include the
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understands, the grounds for such arrest.41 Also included is the right of the
arrested person to be brought before a judicial officer within a reasonable
time and that any further detention must be authorised by a judicial officer."
It is interesting to note that article 11(4) denies these rights to illegal
immigrants although article 11 (5) accords persons who are detained as
illegal immigrants the right to consult with a legal practitioner of their choice.
Article 12 deals with the right to a fair trial. This includes the right of an
accused person 'to a fair and public hearing by an independent, impartial and
competent Court or Tribunal establisheo by law ...,.43 Also included is the
right of an accused person to be tried within a reasonable time or be
released," the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty after having
been given an opportunity to call witnesses and cross-examine state
witnesses." the right to be afforded adequate time and facilities to prepare
his or her defence and the right to be represented by a legal practitioner of
his or her choice." An accused person is also protected from being
compelled to give evidence that may incriminate himself or his spouse."
Under article 12(2) no person shall be liable to be tried for an offence for
which he or she has been convicted or acquitted. Finally, article 12(3)
provides that no person shall be tried or convicted for an act or omission
which did not constitute an offence at the time it was committed.
There are a number of differences between the constitutional rights of
prisoners in Namibia and those of prisoners in South Africa. First of all, the
rights of arrested, detained and accused persons are laid out in more detail
















Constitution affords arrested and accused persons the right to be
represented by legal practitioners of their choice, there ·is no provision for
legal representation, at state expense, for those who are unable to afford it.
Thirdly, there is no provision under the Namibian Constitution for the right of
detainees to communicate and be visited.
A very remarkable difference lies in the failure of the Namibian Constitution
to specifically provide for conditions of detention that are consistent with
human dignity. There is also no specific provision for the right to challenge
the lawfulness of the detention. As far as the right to a fair trial is concerned,
the Namibian Constitution does not provide for the right of an accused
person to be tried in a language he or she understands nor does it provide
for the right of appeal or review.
As for the limitation of rights, both constitutions have a general limitation
clause. The equivalent of the South African limitation clause is Article 22 of
the Namibian Constitution which requires that any limitation to the rights and
freedoms in the Constitution must (i) be a law of general application; (ii) not
negate the essential content of the right or freedom concerned; (iii) specify
the ascertainable extent of such limitation; (iv) not be aimed at a particular
individual and (v) identify the provision on which authority to enact is based.
4.3.2 Prisoners rights as interpreted by the Namibian courts
No sooner had the Constitution of Namibia come into effect than the courts
were called upon to interpret and enforce the rights therein enshrined. In
1990 it was held in S v Willemse48 that where an unrepresented accused
does not understand his or her rights, failure by the court to inform and




trial. The interpretation of the right to a fair trial was taken a step further in S
v Nesser" The High Court of Namibia held that the point of departure in a
criminal case was that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
To do justice to this fundamental right it was a prerequisite that an accused
be put in the position whereby he knows what case he has to face so that he
can fully prepare his defence. The court further said that the right embodied
in Article 12(1)(d) to have the opportunity to call witnesses and cross
examine state witnesses can only be properly exercised if the accused knows
in advance what the case against him is. In terms of the Constitution, the
court further held, the accused was entitled to be provided with all
reasonably practicable time and facilities to ensure that the trial was fair.
'Facilities' included providing an accused with all relevant information in
possession of the state, including copies of witness statements, relevant
evidential documents, as well as an opportunity to view any material video
recordings.
In S v Van den Berg50 the court addressed the right to be presumed innocent
in the context of the right to a fair trial. The following observations were
made by the court: (1) The presumption of innocence had to be defined as
obliging the state generally to prove all elements of the offence beyond
reasonable doubt; (ii) Recognised exceptions to this general rule did,
however, exist in Namibian law; (iii) All laws limiting the fundamental rights to
be presumed innocent had to be of general application, not negate the
essential content of the rights and not be aimed at a particular individual; (v)
Such a law, when it was in the form of a statute and that statute was enacted
after the coming into operation of the constitution, had to specify and identify
the Article in the Constitution in which the authority for the limitation rested.
The court held that the presumption in this case which placed on the accused
49
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the onus to prove an element of the offence, being that the diamonds
bought, sold or possessed were rough uncut diamonds, was unconstitutional.
It was also held that the presumption negated the essential content of the
right to be presumed innocent.
Another case in which a statutory presumption of guilt was struck down was
S v Pinero. 51 The court held that the statutory presumption of guilt in terms of
the Sea Fisheries Act (RSA)52 was in direct conflict with Article 12 of the
Namibian Constitution. The court further held that the requirement imposed
that an accused had to prove that he could not have prevented the offence
was contrary to the spirit of the Constitution as it included every person on
the vessel, even those who did not take part in the crime.
S V Titus53 also dealt with the right to be presumed innocent in the context of
the right to a fair trial. In an appeal against a conviction of theft the appellant
contended that the presumption in section 217(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal
Procedure Act,54 requiring an accused to prove that a confession was not
freely and voluntarily made, placed an onus on the accused to prove his
innocence and was therefore in conflict with the fundamental rights contained
in Articles 12(1)(d) and 12 (1)(f) of the Namibian Constitution. The High
Court found that section 217(1)(b)(ii) did not impose on an accused, the
burden of proving his innocence. The requirements of section 209 of the
Criminal Procedure Act55 that the confession be in a material respect or that
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that the burden of proof remained on the state. The court concluded that the
provisions of section 217(1)(b)(ii) were not unconstitutional.
The Namibian Supreme Court, however, took a different view on this matter
in S v Shikunga.56 The facts were almost similar to those in Titus. It was
contended on behalf of the appellant that the appeal be upheld because the
provisions of section 217(1)(b)(ii) were unconstitutional and that in admitting
the confession a constitutional irregularity had been committed during the
course of the trial. It was contended that this was a fatal irregularity which
should vitiate the conviction. The court found that indeed the provisions of
section 217(1)(b)(ii) were unconstitutional. The court, however, refused to
set aside the conviction on the basis that the conviction did not depend on
the confession, and the guilt of the appellant had been proven by means of
other reliable evidence.
The question of access by the accused to information in the possession of
the state relating to the charges against him or her has been considered in
several cases in Namibia. The guidelines in this regard were laid down by
the Namibian Supreme Court in S v Scholtz57 where it was held that the
general privilege attaching to the contents of a police docket as laid down in
R v Steyn
58
was incompatible with the guarantee of a fair trial contained in
Article 12(1) of the Namibian Constitution. The Supreme Court made a
declaratory order intended to provide guidance in future prosecutions in
which an accused sought to obtain the contents of police dockets relevant to
his or her particular matter. It was declared that in prosecutions before the
High Court an accused person or his or her legal representative should
ordinarily be entitled to the information contained in the police docket relating
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witnesses whom the police had interviewed, whether or not the prosecution
intended to call such witnesses at the trial. Although the declaratory order
referred only to prosecutions in the High Court, the Supreme Court stressed
that nothing contained in the order should be interpreted so as to preclude an
accused person appearing before a different court from contending that the
guidelines which had been set out should also be applicable to proceedings
before other courts. And so it was held in S v Angula and Others; S v
tuces" that the principles applied in S v ScholtlO were also applicable in the
lower courts. The court acknowledged, however, that due to the nature of
the majority of the cases that came before the lower courts, in many
instances disclosure of the witness statements would not be necessary in
order to ensure the fairness of the trial.
Other matters regarding prisoners' rights that have come before the
Namibian courts include the right to be tried within a reasonable time. As
early as 1991 it was held in S v Amujekela61 that allowing an accused to
languish away in custody at the whim of the Prosecutor-General, pending his
authority to proceed with the trial, was contrary to Article 12 of the
Constitution. The right to be tried within a reasonable time was again
addressed by the court in Garces v Fouche and Others.62 The state argued
in this case that the detention of an accused during the forty-eight hour
period following arrest was expressly authorised by section 50(1) of the
Criminal Procedure Act,63 and that no provision existed which enabled a
court to determine a shorter period within which the accused had to be
brought to court. The court rejected this argument and held that section 50(1)
of the Criminal Procedure Act dealt with the maximum and not the minimum
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the Criminal Procedure Act had to be read in light of article 11 of the
Namibian Constitution which was intended to operate solely for the benefit of
arrested persons and not for the benefit of the state. Article 11 (3) of the
Constitution, the court held, did not confer a right on the state to detain a
person for forty eight-hours at its whim if it was reasonably practicable to
bring that person before a court at an earlier point in time.
It is quite clear that the courts of Namibia, especially the Supreme Court,
have spared no effort in giving effect to the constitutional rights of prisoners
in that country. In so doing the judges have had to be imaginative and bold
in their judgments. It ought to be remembered that unlike South Africa,
Namibia does not have a specialised constitutional court. Constitutional and
human rights jurisprudence falls under the jurisdiction of the High Court and
the Supreme Court. It also ought to be remembered that Namibia
incorporated a Bill of Rights in their constitutional system more than four
years before South Africa did. In many respects therefore, South Africa has
gained from the human rights litigation experience of the Namibian courts.
That in part explains the similarity in the approach of the courts of both
countries towards the interpretation of the constitutional rights of prisoners.
4.3.3 Prisoners' rights in Namibia as seen by observers
According to the 1999-2000 Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil
Liberlies
64
respect for human rights generally in Namibia has been among the
best in Africa. This good record, however, has been tainted by isolated but
serious incidents of human rights abuses, some of which involved prisoners'
rights. It was reported by the Namibian National Society for Human Rights
for example, that in August 1999 up to 500 people were arrested after an
64
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attack on an army base and they were 'subjected to acts of torture and other
cruel, inhuman treatment and punishment'." This incident is corroborated by
the 1998 Human Rights Report by the US Department of State which also
confirms that such incidents are fewer outside the Caprivi area." According
to the latter report, there were 25 official complaints reported in 1997 of
people being beaten or otherwise abused by the police during arrest or in
detention. One police officer is reported to have been prosecuted and
convicted of abusing prisoners."
In 1995 the Namibian government created a Ministry of Correctional
Services, charged with administering the country's prisons. Prison conditions
however are reported to be harsh, although the government has been
focusing greater attention on rehabilitation programmes and vocational
training for inmates." The government is also making efforts to separate
youthful offenders from adult criminals, although in many rural areas
juveniles continue to be held with adults. There are several pilot
programmes that provide alternatives to incarceration for juvenile offenders."
On the question of arbitrary arrest and detention, the 1998 Human Rights
Report points out that the rights abused are primarily the right to legal
representation and the right to be tried within a reasonable time." In the
latter case it is reported that some awaiting-trial detainees have been held for
t 71up 0 one year. In the case of the former, many accused persons
















primarily due to resource constraints." The constitutional right to a fair trial
is regarded to be generally well protected by the judiciary. However the
protection of this right is reported to be somewhat limited in practice by long
delays in hearing cases in the regular courts and the uneven application of
constitutional protections in the traditional system." The traditional system is
governed by the Traditional Authorities Act,74 which empowers traditional
courts to deal with minor criminal offences, such as petty theft and infractions
of local customs.
A lack of qualified magistrates, prosecutors and private attorneys has been
reported to result in a serious backlog of criminal cases, which often
translates into delays of up to a year between arrest and trial.75 This
contravenes the constitutional right to a speedy trial. It is also reported that
many of those awaiting trial are treated as convicted prisoners."
A 2000 Amnesty International report" documents a number of human rights
abuses by Namibian authorities in the Namibia/Angola border area. Some of
these human rights violations involve prisoners' rights. According to the
report, the spilling over of the Angolan civil war into Namibia has led to a
marked escalation of human rights abuses in the volatile border areas. In the
context of prisoners, the report claims that people were arrested and
detained without investigating the allegations of crimes and without instituting
criminal proceedings in the normal way. This, according to the report, denies
them their rights, particularly the right to be represented by defence counsel
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it clear that the failure of the Namibian authorities to bring the detainees
promptly before the judicial authorities and to afford them access to lawyers,
violates not only Articles 9 and 14 of the ICCPR and Articles 6 and 7 of the
African Charter but also Articles 7, 11 and 12 of the Namibian Constitution.
Finally, the report documents allegations of numerous beatings, torture and
ill treatment of detainees suspected of involvement in the attack on Katima
Muliro on 2 August 1999.79 This in breach of Article 8(2) of the Namibian
constitution which clearly prohibits torture, and also in breach of provisions of
the UN Convention Against Torture.
From the foregoing observer reports, it can be seen that abuse of prisoners
rights in Namibia is mainly restricted to particular areas and incidents. On
the whole the situation is much better than . it used to be in the past.
According to one commentator, during the dark days of the struggle, prison
authorities in Namibia earned a reputation as one of the worst abusers of
human rights in Southern Africa.80 The commentator quotes a statement of
the Prisons Minister saying that 'Namibian prisons should never again be
thought of as "dungeons and torture chambers"." The statement concludes
by remarking that the level of a nation's civilisation can be seen most clearly
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4.4.1 Prisoners' rights under the Constitution of Zambia
Zambia was a one-party state until 1991 when Kenneth Kaunda's United
National Independence Party (UNIP) was defeated by Frederick Chiluba's
Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD). A new Constitution was
adopted" and it came into force on 30 August 1991. It was amended
substantially in 1996.84 The new amended Constitution took effect on 28 May
1996. Chapter 3 of the Constitution is entitled 'Protection of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms of the Individual'. Article 11 recognizes the
fundamental rights and freedoms of every person in Zambia and emphasises
inter alia, the right to life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of
the law.85 Article 12 provides for protection of the right to life. By providing
that no person shall be deprived of his life intentionally except in execution of
a sentence of a court," the death penalty is maintained. There are further
limitations to the right to life which include the loss of life as a result of the
use of force which is reasonably justifiable in certain circumstances. Notable
among these is where a person dies as a result of the use of force in order to
effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained."
It is submitted that this and several other limitations incorporated in Article 12
effectively render the right to life meaningless particularly with regard to
prisoners.
The right to personal liberty is protected under Article 13. In many respects
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limitations are attached to it. These include, inter alia, the execution of a
sentence or order of court," for the education and welfare of a person," for
the purpose of preventing the spread of an infectious disease." and for the
purpose of preventing the unlawful entry of a person into Zambia." It is
submitted, as it was in the case of Zimbabwe, that the list of limitations is so
long as to make the right practically unavailable. Under Article 13(2) an
arrested or detained person has the right to be informed of the reasons for
his arrest or detention. Under Article 13(3) an arrested or detained person
has the right to be brought before the court without undue delay, and if not
tried within a reasonable time, then be released either unconditionally or
upon reasonable conditions. Article 13(4) entitles any person who is
unlawfully arrested or detained by any other person to compensation from
that other person. It is not clear whether the 'other person' includes the
state.
Article 14 of the Zambian Constitution, which provides for the protection from
slavery and forced labour, is similar to the equivalent provision in the
Zimbabwean Constitution. The expression "forced labour" excludes labour
required in consequence of a sentence or order of court and any labour
required of any person while he is lawfully detained. The difference between
the position on forced labour in Zambia (and Zimbabwe) and in South Africa
is that while the South African Correctional Services Act92 permits prison
work intended to keep prisoners active for a normal working day, it outlaws
any prison work as a form of punishment or disciplinary measure." In the
Constitution, apart from the general limitation clause'" there are no other
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hand, there are several limitations attached to the right, the most relevant of
which is that labour required in consequence of a sentence or order of court
is permissible.
Article 15 provides that '[n]o person shall be subjected to torture, or to
inhuman or degrading punishment or other like punishment.' It is interesting
to note that there are no limitations attached to this right. This is in contrast
to the equivalent provisions in the Zimbabwean and South African
Constitutions . In the case of Zimbabwe the right incorporates several
restrictions while in the case of South Africa, the general limitation clause
may apply to the enjoyment of this right.
The other rights of prisoners are dealt with under Article 26 of the
Constitution which lays down provisions relating to restriction and detention.
Under Article 26(1 )(a) an arrested or detained person should be furnished
with a statement in writing in a language that he/she understands, the
grounds upon which he/she is restricted or detained. This should be done
'as reasonably practicable and in any case not more than fourteen days after
the commencement of his/her detention or restriction'. 95 Within fourteen days
a notification of the restriction or detention should be published in the
Gazette.96 A restricted or detained person may request that his case be
reviewed by an independent and impartial tribunal. 97 If he/she so does, the
restricted or detained person 'shall be afforded reasonable facilities to
consult a legal representative of his/her own choice...'98 At the hearing
he/she may appear in person or be represented by his/her legal counsel."












Many differences are apparent between the rights of prisoners under the
Constitution of Zambia and those under the South Africa Bill of Rights. No
provision is made under the Zambian Constitution for the right of arrested
persons to remain silent and to be so informed. There is also no protection
of arrested persons from being compelled to make admissions or confessions
that could be used in evidence against them. The other main differences lies
in the right to legal representation. Under the South African Bill of Rights an
accused or detained person is not only entitled to legal representation but
has a right to have a legal practitioner assigned to him or her by the state
and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result. The
Zambian Constitution allows legal representation but expressly rules out
such representation at state expense. There is also no provision under the
Zambian Constitution for the right to conditions of detention that are
consistent with human dignity. So too is the right to challenge the lawfulness
of the detention. The right to communicate and be visited is also not
provided for.
As far as the right to a fair trial is concerned there are several similarities and
differences between Zambian provisions100 and their South African
counterparts. 101 Provision is made for presumption of innocence, being
informed in detail of the nature of the charge, being given adequate time and
facilities to , prepare one's defence, the right to examine prosecution
witnesses and the right to the assistance of an interpreter if one cannot
understand the language used at the trial. Some of these rights however are
limited in respect of detainees on trial for offences under the law regulating
their discipline in detention.l'" Provision is also made for legal








enacted by parliament for such purpose.'?' An accused person may also not
be tried for an act or omission which, at the time it was committed, did not
constitute an offence.'?' He or she may not also be tried for an offence for
which he or she has been acquitted or convicted except upon the order of a
superior court in the course of appeal or review proceedinqs.f" No person
may be tried for an offence for which he has been pardoned,'?" and one
cannot be convicted of an offence unless it is defined and its penalty
prescribed by law.107 An accused person may also not be compelled to give
evidence at the trial.10B
Under Article 10 provision is made for all criminal proceedings to be held in
publlc, but Article 11 lays down circumstances under which proceedings may
be held in camera. The main difference between the Zambian constitutional
right to a fair trial and its South African counterpart is the extensive list of
limitations to such a right set out in article 18(12) of the Zambian
Constitution. The South African provision does not have such limitations
apart from the general limitation clause set out in section 36.
4.4.2 Prisoners' rights as interpreted by the Zambian courts
Like Zimbabwe and Namibia, Zambia has no constitutional court. The High
Court has original jurisdiction over matters arising from the contravention of
fundamental rights in Chapter 3 of the Zambian Constltution.l'" The
Supreme Court exercises appellate jurisdiction over such rnatters.!" Both


















rights provisions in the specific context of prisoners. Even long before the
new Constitution came into being the High Court had ruled in Simaata and
Simaata v The Attorney-Genera/111 that section 53(1) of the Corrupt Practices
Act112 was unconstitutional in that it took away an accused's constitutional
right not to be compelled to give evidence at his/her trial. Much later in the
case of Fred M'membe and Bright Mwape v The Speaker of the National
Assembly and the Commissioner of Prisons and the Attorney-General 13 the
two appellants requested the court to order their release from prison where
parliament had committed them for an indefinite period for alleged contempt
of parliament. They had written newspaper articles opposing the protest by
some members of parliament against a Supreme Court judgment. The
articles were alleged to breach the privileges and immunities of the House.
The questions to be considered by the High Court were whether the National
Assembly could commit a person to prison and whether the proper procedure
had been followed in sending the applicants to prison. The Court observed
that although parliament is not a court, it has power to punish for contempt,
which power is inherent in the nature of its status in order to protect its
dignity and honour. According to the court, that power includes the common
law power to imprison, and not only to reprimand. It was held, however, that
because the remand was indefinite, it was incompatible with the spirit of the
country's legal system. The court found that the disciplinary procedures
were unorthodox and ordered the release of the prisoners.
In Patel v The Attorney-Genera/114 the issue before the court was the right to
bail under section 13(3) of the Constitution. The court held that the proper










the applicant will appear to take his tnal.!" In applying this test the Court
takes into account the following considerations:
(1) The nature of the accusation against the applicant and the severety of
the punishment which may be imposed;
(ii) The nature of the evidence in support of the charge;
(iii) The independence of the sureties if bail is granted;
(iv) The prejudice to the applicant if he is not admitted to bail; and
(iv) The prejudice to the state if bail is granted.
The court added that over and above the foregoing considerations, special
circumstances peculiar to the applicant may also be taken into account. Bail
was granted.
In Banda v The Chief Immigration Officer and The Attorney Genera/116 the
Supreme Court of Zambia considered, inter alia, the right to personal liberty
under article 13 of the Constitution. The court held that since the appellant
was not a Zambian national as he claimed, but a Malawian, his right to
personal liberty had not been infringed and the deportation order against him
was valid.
There are not many reported cases involving prisoners' rights in Zambia.






protected and observed. Unfortunately the contrary is true as is explained
here below.
4.4.3 Prisoners' rights in Zambia as seen by observers
Zambia is one of those countries in Africa with dismal human rights records.
This poor human rights record has been exacerbated and aggravated by the
political situation which is characterised by turmoil and instability. An
attempted coup in 1997 led to the detention of more than 100 people.
According to an Amnesty International report, those people were held in
conditions amounting to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; at least
one detainee died in custody.!" The report indicates that torture and ill-
treatment of detainees by police officers were widespread. Although some
police officers were prosecuted for torture, in scores of cases those
responsible were not brought to justice. According to the report, between
December 1997 and May 1998, the Permanent Human Rights Commission
received information about 73 cases of torture, ill-treatment and unlawful
detention, including 17 deaths apparently at the hands of the pollce.!"
It is estimated that in 1998 about 20 people were sentenced to death. At the
end of the year more than 150 prisoners remained on death row.l" By the
end of 1999, this figure is reported to have risen to 240, the last execution of
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On the question of prison conditions a 1997 human rights report intimates
that the conditions were so harsh that they posed a serious threat to
prisoners' Iives.121 According to official statistics at the time, prisons
designed to hold 6,000 prisoners held over 12,000. This severe
overcrowding, combined with poor sanitation, inadequate medical facilities,
meagre food supplies, and lack of potable water resulted in serious
outbreaks of dysentery and other diseases, including tuberculosis, at various
prtsons.!" In a report submitted to Parliament in 1996, the Director of
prisons said that 975 prisoners had died in prison between January 1991 and
December 1995, due to illness and harsh condtttons.!"
On the issue of arbitrary arrest and detention there are reports of criminal
suspects being arrested on the basis of flimsy evidence or uncorroborated
accusatlons.!" According to those reports, most detainees are held for more
than a month from commission of an offence to first court appearance. In
many cases an additional period of six months elapses before the accused is
committed to the High Court for trial. After committal, preparation of the
magistrate's court record for transmittal to the High Court takes months, in
some cases a year. Trial proceedings last an average of six months.!"
Some prisoners are reported to have been awaiting trial for four years which
is an improvement compared to past years where some had waited for as
long as ten years.!" These long delays were attributed to inadequate
resources, inefficiency, lack of trained personnel and broad rules of
















The right to a fair public trial is reported to be still fairly well respected.!"
This is borne out by several court decisions that reflect the independence of
the judiciary. The last known attempt by Parliament to overturn court rulings
was in the 1996 case of Fred M'membe and Bright Mwape v The Speaker of
the National Assembly and the Commissioner of Prisons and the Attorney-
General.128 Since then the government has generally respected the
independence of the judiciary. Inefficiency and the lack of resources,
however, have seriously hampered the judicial system. The resulting
congestion and long delays while the accused are in custody have been
reported to amount to denial of the right to fair trial.129 So is the inability of
many Zambians to afford legal representation. Many accused persons are
reported to be too poor to retain a lawyer, and the poor state of the
Government's legal aid department means that many citizens entitled to legal
aid find that it is unavailable.F"
The reality of the situation regarding prisoners' rights in Zambia has been
highlighted by one Lusaka lawyer.131 According to Mr Ostoph Dzekedzeke.
in practice, prisoners in Zambia have no legal rights but privileges which can
be withdrawn if the prisoner misbehaves. The usual privileges, according to
the commentator, include use of the prison library, receiving suitable
personal books and periodicals from outside and having a radio. Prisoners
are also allowed to send and receive letters, but prison authorities have the
right to read all incoming and outgofng mail. A prisoner may also be visited
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'The officer in charge shall permit a legal adviser of a prisoner
who is a party to legal proceedings to interview him in
connection with such proceedings in the sight but not in hearing
of a prison officer.'132
One aspect of prisoners rights' in Zambia that needs to be highlighted is the
violations of such rights in states of emergency. One such situation arose at
the end of 1997 when President Chuluba declared a state of emergency after
a failed coup atternpt.!" Zambian human rights activists have occasionally
raised concerns about the Zambian authorities using emergency regulations
to detain people and violate their rights. These concerns have been shared
by international human rights organisations. One such organisation,
Amnesty International, has recommended that the Constitution should be
amended to conform to the provisions of the ICCPR, particularly section 4
which prohibits the suspension of specific rights at any time.134 The
Constitution should also list core rights which are non-derogable. It is also
recommended that Article 26 of the Constitution should be amended so that it
provides adequate safeguards for detainees, including the right to have their
detention reviewed by the High Court at any time and to have unrestricted
and confidential access to a lawyer, to ensure that a detainee is provided
adequate protection of his rights from the moment of his detention.!"
Another recommendation is that legislation should be adopted to confirm the
role of courts in safe-guarding human rights, includinq giving courts the
mandate to supervise effectively the detention of prisoners, and the release
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Further safeguards should include legislation requiring assurances of access
to doctors, lawyers and family members, information about their rights be
given to them, judicial review without delay of their detention and an absolute
time limit on their detentions with the requirement that the authorities explain
to a judicial authority why detention should be extended. Finally, the
government of Zambia has been urged to ratify the UN Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
and incorporate relevant provisions into domestic law.137
The recommendations of Amnesty International noted above in many
respects reflect the differences between the constitutional rights of prisoners
in Zambia and South Africa. South Africa has not only incorporated the
recommended safeguards into the Bill of Rights but, has unlike Zambia,
refrained from attaching unreasonable restrictions and limitations to those
rights. It may also be noted in favour of South Africa that states of
emergency are a thing of the past. Violations of prisoners' rights associated
with such situations are therefore not among South Africa's present human
rights problems.
4.5 UGANDA
4.5.1. Prisoners rights under the Constitution of Uganda
The choice of Uganda for purposes of comparison with South Africa in
regard to prisoners' constitutional rights stems mainly from the fact that the
Constitution of Uganda was drafted and adopted at approximately the same
time South Africa was undergoing its own constitutional change. The
Ugandan Constitution like the Constitutions of the other countries discussed
above contains a bill of rights with provisions on the rights of prisoners, and it
137 Ibid.
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is no secret that, in drafting its Constitution, Uganda drew heavily on the
South African Interim Constitution.
In 1986 the National Resistance Movement (NRM) of Yoweri Museueni came
to power, bringing to an end fifteen years of inordinate violations of human
rights by the governments of Idi Amin and Milton Obote. Through a
proclamatlon.l" various parts of the 1967 Constitution were suspended. It
was not until 1995 that a new Constitution was adopted.l" Chapter Four of
the Constitution is entitled 'Protection and Promotion of Fundamental and
Other Human Rights and Freedoms'. Several Articles under Chapter Four
have direct or indirect relevance to prisoners. To begin with, Article 22(1) .
purports to protect the right to life by providing that no person shall be
deprived of life intentionally except in execution of a court sentence. This
limitation effectively maintains and upholds the death penalty in Uganda.
The specific rights of prisoners are dealt with by Article 23, which provides
for the protection of personal liberty. The limitations attached to this right are
similar to those attached to the corresponding rights in the Zimbabwean and
Zambian constttutions.l" Provision is made for a person who is arrested,
restricted or detained to be informed immediately, in a language he or she
understands, of the reasons for the arrest, restriction or detention.'?' He or
she should be informed of hisor her right to legal representatlon.!" An
arrested or detained person also has a right to 'be brought to court as soon
as possible but in any case not later than forty-eight hours from the time of
arrest' .143 An interesting innovation of the Ugandan Constitution is the right
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of the restriction or detention' .144 Article 23(5) further provides for reasonable
access to the detainee by the next-of-kin, lawyer and personal doctor.!" It
also provides for the right of access to medical cere.!"
Provision is made for the right to bail 'on such conditions as the court
considers reasonable' .147 Under Article 23(7) a person who is unlawfully
arrested, restricted or detained is entitled to compensation from that other
person or authority whether it is the state or an agency of the state. This
right has a counterpart in the Zimbabwe Constitution but, unlike its
Zimbabwean counterpart the Ugandan provision has no limitation attached to
it apart from the general limitation clause.l" In Uganda the right also
extends beyond private persons, to the state and its agencies. The South
African Constitution does not provide for such a right. Another right in the
Ugandan Constitution that is absent in its South African counterpart is to be
found in article 23(8), under which any period a person spends in custody in
respect of an offence is to be taken into account in imposing sentence on
conviction. Provision is also made for the right to an order of habeas corpus
which is inviolable and cannot be suspended.l"
Torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are outlawed
by Article 24. So too is slavery or servitude and forced labour."? In the case
of forced labour, however, the right is limited by excluding 'any labour
required in consequence of the sentence or order of court,.151 This implies,


















The right to a 'fair, speedy and public hearing' is provided for under Article
28. To a large extent the rights under this particular provision are similar to
those of its South African counterpart.l" They include the presumption of
innocence, the right to be informed of the nature of the offence, adequate
time and facilities for the preparation of the defence, and the right to legal
representation. One aspect of difference regarding the right to legal
representation is that under the Ugandan Constitution an accused is entitled
to legal representation at the expense of the state only if the offence for
which he or she is charged carries a death sentence or life imprisonment.l"
Also included under the right to a fair trial are the assistance of an
interpreter, facilities to examine prosecution witnesses and the presence of
the accused at his or her trial. A person may also not be convicted for an act
or omission which did not constitute an offence at the time it took place.154
The autrefois acquit and autrefois convict concepts are incorporated in Article
28(9) and the right against self-incrimination is guaranteed under Article
28(ii). Furthermore, this right extends beyond the accused person to include
evidence of the spouse.
Apart from some differences already mentioned, by and large, the rights of
prisoners under the Ugandan Constitution are similar to those under the
South African Constitution. The Ugandan Constitution, however, does not
include the right to challenge the lawfulness of one's detention, nor does it
include the right to conditions of detention that are consistent with human
dignity. Also omitted is the right of an arrested person to remain silent and to
be so informed. So too is the right of a detained person to communicate and
be visited. The right of appeal or review is also absent. The main difference
however lies in the extent of the limitations to the relevant rights. In addition








have specific limitations attached to them. This is not the case with the
South African Bill of Rights, to which only the general limitation clause
applies.
4.5.2. Prisoners' rights as interpreted by the Ugandan courts
Over the years several cases involving prisoners' rights have come before
the Ugandan courts. One such a case was Professor Isaac Newton Ojok v
Uganda.155 The appellant had been convicted of treason and sentenced to
death. He appealed to the Supreme Court of Uganda claiming, inter alia, that
the trial judge had been biased in the conduct of the trial and in the
formulation of her judgment. He also claimed that he had already received a
presidential pardon and that the trial judge had erred in law by rejecting the
defence of pardon. On the latter claim, the court held that it was quite clear
that the President had never granted any pardon to the appellant, nor was
the appellant a beneficiary of any amnesty process. The appellant was
however successful on the former ground which was based on the fact that
the trial judge assigned to the case was a blood sister of the Deputy Prime
Minister and National Political Commissar of the ruling National Resistance
Movement. The court agreed that there was a likelihood of bias resulting in
an unfair trial. The conviction was accordingly quashed, sentence set aside
and a re-trial by another judge ordered.
The right to a fair trial was more recently addressed by the Uganda High
Court in the case of James Sebugarambe v Uganda.156 The appellant had
been convicted by a magistrate for criminal trespass and disobedience of a
lawful order, and was sentenced to three years imprisonment. Among his
grounds of appeal the appellant argued that he had not been given an
155
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opportunity to examine the prosecution witnesses and that part of the
prosecution evidence was taken in his absence. Referring to Article 28(3)(d)
of the Constitution, the court held that it was a fundamental right that an
accused person should be afforded a chance to attend all the proceedings
involving his trial. The court found that the trial magistrate had acted
irregularly when he did not avail the accused an opportunity to attend the
proceedings at the locus in quo. Referring to article 28(3)(g) of the
Constitution, the court further held that, by denying the accused the right to
cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, the proceedings had become
tainted with grave irregularities. It was found that the accused's right to a fair
trial had been further violated when the magistrate failed to make an
interpreter available. The appeal succeeded.
In Byaruhanga Rugyema Jese and Nalubega Harriet v Uganda157 the issue
before the Uganda High Court was the right to bail. In his judgment Tabaro J
referred to Article 23(b)(c) of the Constitution which gives the right to bail on
conditions as the court considers reasonable. In his opinion, bail cannot be
taken away; only restrictions can be imposed depending on the gravity of the
offence. The discretion lies with the court. The judge emphasized the fact
that remand should not be punitive but rather a measure to ensure that the
accused will be available to face trial. He concluded:
'Let it not be forgotten that presumption of innocence is a
sacred cardinal principle of our penal system. If the accused
will honour his bail, is not a danger to the public or will not
interfere with the state evidence and witnesses, I would be
administering a wrathful law indeed not to allow these two
people to attend court from their homes.,158
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The Ugandan Constitution creates an interesting scenario by establishing a
Constitutional Court which in effect is the Court of Appeal that sits as a
Constitutional Court to determine constitutional mattsrs.:" The Supreme
Court however remains the final court of appeal. Hence decisions of the
Constitutional Court are appellable to the Supreme Court. This judicial
paradoxical hierarchy was put to test in the case of Salvatori Abuki and
Richard Obuga v Attorney-Genera/160 which was one of the very first cases
heard by the Constitutional Court. Initially there were two petitioners. One
died in prison and his petition abated. The other petitioner was convicted for
offences under the Witchcraft Act161 and, in addition to a 22 months prison
sentence, he was banned from access to his home in terms of an exclusion
order under section 7(1) of the Act. The petitioner sought to challenge the
constitutionality of the legislation in question on the grounds that, first, the
offence of witchcraft was not defined sufficiently as required by Article
28(12) of the Constitution and therefore infringed the right to a fair trial.
Secondly that making an exclusion order was not constitutional because it
amounted to inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment or punishment. The
Constitutional Court agreed with the petitioner that not only was the offence
insufficiently defined, the legislation in question was also archaic and
outdated, having been enacted in 1957, some five years or so before
independence (1962). The legislation was found to be vague and ambiguous
and therefore unconstitutional.
On the constitutionality of the exclusion orders, the court found that the order
was antisocial and may only serve to brutalise the offender and deny him or
her the opportunity to be rehabilitated. The exclusion order was pronounced
by the court null and void for being cruel, inhuman or degrading. In so doing,
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the South African case of S v Makwanyane,162 in particular the approach of
the South African Constitutional Court towards the concept of ubuntu on
which African values are based.
On appeal.!" the Supreme Court disagreed with the decision of the
Constitutional Court by reasoning that the term "witchcraft" was properly
defined by section 2 of the Act and the offences in relation to witchcraft were
also sufficiently defined in sections 2 and 3 of the Act, and, accordingly,
Article 28(12) of the Constitution was not contravened. On that count the
appeal was allowed. On the question of the exclusion order, however, the
Supreme Court agreed with the finding of the Constitutional Court that the
order amounted to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment
and accordingly was in contravention of Articles 24 and 44(a) of the
Constitution. To that extent the appeal was dismissed.
The above judicial arrangement raises several interesting questions. A
situation in which the decisions of a Constitutional Court can be overturned
can only be a source of judicial controversy. It certainly does not augur well
for the enforcement of the Constitution, the promotion of human rights in
general and the protection of prisoners' rights in particular. Luckily South
Africa is not subject to that kind of controversy. Its Constitutional Court's
decisions are final. 164
4.5.3 Prisoners' rights in Uganda as seen by observers
Although there has been some improvement recently, the Ugandan
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serious human rights problerns.!" In the context of prisoners' rights there are
many reports of security forces commonly beating and sometimes torturing
criminal suspects, often to force confessions. On 17 May 1999, a former
security guard who was charged with terrorist activity is reported to have told
a Kampala court that he was tortured by the police at Kampala's central
police station.166 In February 1999, family members found the badly
mutilated body of Patrick Ocan who was last seen in the custody of the
Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF).167 On 9 October 1999, police
beat a man while in custody in Buwenge, Jinja District; the man died after
being released the following day.168
Some human rights abuses in Uganda are perpetrated by the Uganda
People's Defence Force (UPDF) members and members of the Local
Defence Units (LDU's), who are usually insufficiently trained and ill-
disciplined. On 9 February 1999, two teenage girls were reportedly raped by
two LDU personnel at Kabujogera police post in Fort Portal.169 Other human
rights abuses were perpetrated by the police. During 1999, the police
Human Rights Desk, established in 1998, received 620 complaints, .including
allegations of excessive force, torture, assault, rape and murder.l" Of these,
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The Ugandan Human Rights Commission (UHRC) has played an important
role in investigating and monitoring human rights abuses in and out of jail.172
In its 1998 Annual Report the Commission documented several violations of
the rights to liberty by members of the Uganda police and the Uganda
People's Defence Forces (UPDF).173 The Commission also reported on its
investigation of a number of complaints related to detention in the so-called
'safe houses'. The arrests, detentions and treatment of suspects in the 'safe
houses' were said not to conform to the established legal procedures.!" On
the issue of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, the report
stressed 'the apparent "culture" of the police in Uganda in general which
subjects criminal suspects to harassment, humiliation, cruelty, abuse and
overall mistreatment during arrests and interrogation' ,175 In February 1999
the Commission completed investigations into the 1997 torture of Corporal
Twasha Kabushera and the 1997 deaths by torture of Paul Kollo and
Stephan Baryakaijuka. The cases were handed over to the courts for
prosecution.!" On 10 March 1999 the Commission awarded $400 (600 000
shillings) to Mary Iripoit 'for torture, degradation and deprivation of her
personal liberty at the hands of a former ISO (Internal Security Organistion)
officer in Soroti in August 1998',177
The above mentioned reports are corroborated by an Amnesty International
report according to which torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
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reported to have died after being tortured. The report also documents
several cases of detainees who were tortured by being beaten and burned
with molten plastic.'?" Other detainees were reportedly beaten and tortured
with electric shocks.l"
Regarding prison conditions, a very gloomy picture is painted by several
reports. Prison conditions are said to be very harsh and life threateninq.!"
There are reports of high mortality rates in prison due to overcrowding,
malnutrition, diseases spread by unsanitary conditions, and HIV/AIDS.
According to the Ugandan Human Rights Commission (UHRC), the situation
is compounded by severely inadequate medical services, seriously
unhygienic conditions and a situation of 'semi-starvation' among prlsoners.!"
In its 1998 Annual Report the Commission identified congestion as a serious
problem primarily brought about by the delay in the adminisration of justice.
The problem of keeping juvenile offenders in prisons with adults was also
highlighted and the use of excessive and exploitative hard labour was
condernned.l'"
Prison conditions are said to come closest to meeting minimum international
standards only in Kampala, where prisons provide medical care, running
water, and sanitation.!" However, these prisons are also among the most
overcrowded. It is estimated that the country's prisons (all of which predate
independence in 1962) hold about three times their maximum planned
capacity.l" Severe overcrowding is also a problem at juvenile facilities and
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defunct. Prisoners as young as 12 years of age perform manual labour from
dawn to dusk.!"
Arbitrary arrest and deprivation of liberty is a serious problem in Uganda.
Members of the security forces commonly arrest and detain citizens
arbitrarily without any regard to the procedural protections guaranteed by the
Constltution.!" One notorious operation is the system of arbitrary mass
arrest known as 'panda gari' (which literally means 'board the truck'). It is
usually conducted after bomb scares and political protests. Most persons
arrested in this manner are usually released after a short while, but not
before being tortured, beaten and generally harassed.
Pre-trial detainees (unsentenced prisoners) comprise nearly 75% of the
prison population. The average time in pre-trial detention is reported to be
between 2 and 3 years.!" As pointed out earlier, prison overcrowding has in
part been blamed on the excessive length of detention without trial.
Congestion and delay in the legal system has resulted in an increased
number of detainees each year. In November 1999 more than 400 prisoners
held without trial since at least 1997 staged a protest at Luzira prison in
Karnpala.l'" The prisoners refused to return to their cells until they received
assurance from the director of public prosecutions that their cases would be
brought to court. Not much was achieved by the protest. Amnesty
International is reported to have expressed grave concern at the common
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The right to a fair trial is largely impaired by an understaffed and weak
..
judiciary. The highest court is the Supreme Court. It is followed by the Court
of Appeal which also serves as a constitutional court for cases of first
instances involving constitutional issues.!" This is followed by the High
Court, and several levels of magistrates courts. The judicial system contains
procedural safeguards, including the granting of bail and the right of appeal.
However, an inadequate system of judicial administration and a lack of
resources, resulting in a serious backlog of cases, have circumscribed the
rights to a fair trial for many years.192 Many accused persons cannot afford
legal representation. The Constitution requires that the government
provides state funded legal representation to indigent persons accused of
capital offences.193 This however is rarely done because of lack of funds. In
the final analysis many accused persons go to trial unrepresented. Finally,
the right to a fair trial is also tampered with by the existence of a military
court system. Although the accused has the right to retain legal counsel,
military defence attorneys are often untrained and may be assigned by the
military command, which also appoints the prosecutor and the adjUdicating
officer.194 The sentence passed by a military court which can include the
death penalty, may be appealed against to the High Command but not to the
High Court, Court of Appeal or Supreme Court.?" Clearly the military court
system, which is not a constitutionally established organ, but which
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All the constitutions of the countries discussed above include provisions
relating to prisoners' rights. The main difference lies in the extent of the
detail to which such rights are provided. By comparison South Africa is
clearly ahead in terms of clarity and detail regarding the rights of prisoners.
Another factor that distinguishes South Africa from the rest of the countries
surveyed, is the fact that apart from the general limitation clause, the relevant
rights in the South African Bill of Rights are not unduly restricted. It has been
seen that the constitutional rights of prisoners in the other constitutions have
several limitations attached to them, sometimes in addition to a general
limitation clause. These limitations are in many respects reflected in the
approaches taken by the various courts in applying and interpreting the said
rights.
Regarding the role of the courts in applying the constitutional rights of
prisoners, South Africa again measures much more favourably in comparison
with its counterparts. This in part is due to the existence of an independent,
innovative and active constitutional court, an institution that is lacking in
many of the countries discussed. The result is that constitutional matters
generally and prisoners' rights in particular have tended to take a rather
peripheral position in the general jurisprudence of those countries. It can
safely be concluded that the rights of prisoners in South Africa enjoy more
constitutional and judicial protection than in many other African countries.
Whether that protection actually translates into reality is what the next part of
this study will attempt to determine.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE LAW VERSUS THE PRACTICE - A CRITICAL ANALVSIS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
It is one thing to provide for prisoners' rights in the Constitution, it is a
different matter altogether to implement them in actual practice. The
protection of prisoners' rights under international law has already been
comprehensively discussed above.' So too has the extent to which
prisoners' rights are provided for under the South African Constitutlon." The
purpose of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which prisoners'
constitutional rights are practically implemented and to assess whether
prisoners ' in South Africa actually enjoy and realise the human rights
protection accorded to them by the Constitution. To that end a survey was
conducted to determine the perceptions of prisoners regarding the protection
of their constitutional rights. A separate survey aimed at obtaining
information on the official position as portrayed by prison authorities was also
conducted. This chapter therefore attempts to determine the discrepancy, if
any, between the law and the practice based on the analysis of the findings
of the survey. In so doing an attempt will be made to prove or disprove the
hypothesis of this study and to highlight the problem under investigation.
It has already been pointed out that the quantitative method of research was
adopted," although some elements of the qualitative approach were applied.
Indeed, in order to research a topic thoroughly and provide meaningful
results, it is necessary to cut across the qualitative and quantitative
boundaries. A survey was accordingly conducted involving prisoners from
four prisons: Westville prison in Durban, Johannesburg prison in
Johannesburg, Pollsmoor prison in Cape Town and St Alban's prison in Port
Elizabeth. The prisons were mainly chosen because of their sizes and their
positions in the four main regional centres of the country. There were two
main questionnaires. The first questionnaire was directed at awaiting trial
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prisoners. Accordingly, the questions therein were based on the rights of
arrested and detained persons under section 35(1) and (2) of the
Constitution. The second questionnaire was directed at sentenced prisoners.
Accordingly , the questions therein were based on section 35(3) of the
Constitution.
In all, 4000 questionnaires were distributed. Half of these (2000) were
administered to awaiting-trial prisoners and the other 2000 to sentenced
prisoners. The questionnaires were distributed equally among all the four
prisons mentioned above. The choice of respondents was random. It was
not based on any criteria, like sex, age, nature of crime or any such like
categorisation. The only differentiation was between sentenced and
unsentenced prisoners. A high-ranking official was appointed at each of the .
prisons, by the National Department of Correctional Services to assist in the
survey." The function of the official was to facilitate the efficient
administering of the questionnaires, to assist prisoners in completing them, to
translate and explain the questions where necessary and to respond to a
separate questionnaire on behalf of the prison.
In keeping with the constitutional requirement of using 'a language that the
accused person understands', the questionnaires were translated in two main
African languages. Those destined for Durban and Johannesburg were in
English and Zulu. Those destined for Cape Town and Port Elizabeth were in
English and Xhosa. For purposes of simplicity and clarity most of the
questions were of a 'Yes' and 'No' nature.
Atotal of 2326 prisoners (a response rate of more than 50%) from all the four
prisons responded properly to the questionnaires. 1085 of the respondents
were awaiting-trial (unsentenced) prisoners and 1241 were sentenced
prisoners. These figures excluded all responses that showed signs of
impropriety or incompleteness. Such responses were discarded.
The advantages of using questionnaires in a study of this nature are quite
obvious. First of all, with questionnaires the researcher is able to reach
4
The officials, appointed by the Commissioner of Correctional Services were those in
charge of support services and communications at each of the prisons.
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respondents in distant places, but more importantly, questionnaires are an
excellent way of dispassionately tackling questions dealing with perceptions,
attitudes and representativeness. Moreover questionnaires 'are the only
realistic way of taking the pulses of hundreds or thousands of people'."
Obviously, there are certain disadvantages associated with the use of
questionnaires including misinterpretations and misrepresentations. Many
respondents may not take the questionnaires seriously, answering as they
think they should in order to portray or conform to a particular image. This is
certainly more so with prisoners, most of whom have a grudge against
society and the state that they perceive as being responsible for their plight.
The researcher usually has no control over such responses other than to
take cognisance of such shortcomings in interpreting the data.
For purposes of analysis, the discussion of the results of the survey is based
on the three categories of prisoners' rights as provided for under the
Constitution . These are; the rights of arrested persons (under section 35(1)),
the rights of detained persons (under section 35(2)) and the rights of
accused persons to a fair trial (under section 35(3)). The views of the prison
officials are also briefly considered and then the hypothesis of the study is
tested.
5.2. PRISONERS PERCEPTIONS OF THE REALISATION OR THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
5.2.1 Arrested persons
In spite of the common law maxim that ignorance of the law is no defence,
52,2% of the 1085 awaiting-trial prisoners who responded to the
questionnaire claimed they were not aware of their right to remain silent on
arrest. 69,1% of the respondents claimed the arresting officer had not
informed them that they had this right and 76,2% stated that they had not
been informed of the consequences of not remaining silent. This general
trend was observed among all the four prisons surveyed, but it was more
alarming at Westville prison where 77% of the 378 respondents claimed not
5
See Bickman and Rog (Eds) Handbook ofApplied Social Research Methods (1998) at 485 .
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to have been informed of their right to remain silent while 85,7% were not
informed of the consequences of not remaining silent. This data reflects a
gross abuse of the right to remain silent and to be so informed. The trend
changes somewhat, however, in regard to the right not to be compelled to
make any confession or admission that might be used in evidence against
the arrested person. Responding to the question whether at the time of
arrest they were asked to confess or admit what they had done, 52,8%
replied in the negative.
Regarding the right to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably
possible, only 40% of the respondents indicated they had been brought
before the court within 48 hours of their arrest. The other 60% were brought
after 48 hours. This trend is somewhat reversed in regard to the right to be
charged at the first court appearance. Responding to the question whether
they had been charged on their first court appearance, 51,4% of the
respondents answered in the affirmative while 48,6% answered in the
negative. As for the right to be informed of the reasons for further detention,
53,5% of the respondents claimed to have been denied this right. Only
46,5% said they had been informed of the reasons for thier continued
detention.
A summary of the responses to the questions pertaining to the rights of
arrested persons is depicted in the following illustration:
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Table 6: Summary of responses regarding rights of arrested persons
RIGHTS YES NO TOTAL
Informed of the right to remain silent 30,9% 69.1% 100%
Informed of the consequences of not 23,8% 76,2% 100%
remaining silent
Not compelled to confess or admit offence 52,8% 47,2% 100%
Brought to court within 48 hours 40% 60% 100%
Charged on first court appearance 51,4% 48,6% 100%
The above data clearly illustrates that the perceptions of the prisoners are
such that the rights of arrested persons are not very much respected and
implemented. This trend cuts across all the four prisons surveyed although
in terms of regions, KwaZulu-Natal seems to be the worst affected area,
judging from the responses from Westville prison in comparison to the other






























One of the basic constitutional rights of detainees is the right to legal
representation. In South Africa, as in many other developing countries, the
realisation of this right may be hindered by several factors including lack of
financial resources. Indeed, 78,4% of the awaiting-trial respondents claimed
they were unable to pay for a legal practitioner. Only 21,6% could afford the
services of legal counsel. Under the Constitution detainees are not only
entitled to the right to choose and consult with a legal practitioner of their
choice, but where substantial injustice would otherwise result, detainees also
have the right to have a legal practitioner assigned to them by the state at
state expense. According to the survey," all detainees who were able to
retain the services ot a legal practitioner had been allowed to do so. 74,2%
of those who claimed to be unable to pay for legal services had had a lawyer
appointed for them by the state. This data indicates that the right to legal
representation is fairly well protected.
The right to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity
recorded the most negative response in the whole survey. Asked to describe
the conditions in jail, 80,8% of the awaiting-trial prisoners who responded
said the conditions were inhuman and very bad. 17.4% thought the
conditions were bad but manageable. Less than 2% thought conditions
were fair or good. The following table illustrates these statistics:
Table 7: How would you describe the conditions in jail? (Awaiting-trial
prisoners)
Inhuman and very Bad but manageable Fair, just like Good, better
bad home than home
80,8% 17,4% 1,2% 0,6%
6 See note 4 above.
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The trend depicted by the statistics above was uniform among all the
respondents of all the four prisoners surveyed, as illustrated by the following
graph:







Badbut Fair,just like home Good,just like
manageable home
Not surpris ingly the responses depicted by the above statistics were very
similar to the responses regarding the kind of food served in prison. Asked
to describe the food, 86,7% of all respondents said it was very little and very
bad. 10,1% thought it was very little but not very bad while 2,8% said it was
just enough and good. 0,4% thought the food was very good and more than
enough. While it is agreed that people will always complain about
institutional food, the data reflected by these statistics indicates an
overwhelming perception of poor feeding and inadequate nutrition.
202
Table 8: How would you describe the kind of food you are given in
prison?
Very little and very Little but not very Just enough Very good and
bad bad and good more than
enough
86,7% 10,1% 2,8% 0.4%
Again the above-described trend cuts through all the prisons surveyed as
shown below:















Very little & Little but not Just enough & Very good,
very bad very bad good more than
enough
Besides adequate accommodation and proper nutrition there are other
constitutional requirements for conditions of detention consistent with human
dignity. These include exercise, provision of reading material and medical
treatment. In response to the question as to whether they were allowed to
exercise and play some games only 53,2% of the respondents answered in
the affirmative. Asked whether they were provided with newspapers and
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books to read only 18,4% said that they were. A surprising 81,6% answered
in the negative. This data is rather baffling considering that every prison
visited has a library, which is accessible to all prisoners. However, this
paradox could be explained by the fact that usually a small percentage of the
inmates have any sort of interest in newspapers and books. Others are
simply illiterate.
On the question of provision of medical treatment 78,7% of the respondents
claimed to have fallen sick at some time or other since they were detained
and 54,9% of them had been allowed to see a doctor. This figure might be
misleading and would seem to indicate some abuse of the particular right. It
should however be pointed out that many inmates who fall sick are treated
locally in prison sickbays without being referred to doctors. It may well be
said that this right is not generally abused.
Regarding the right to communicate and be visited, the results of the survey
showed a positive response. 61,4% of the respondents said they were
allowed to write and receive letters, while 54,8% were allowed to make and
receive phone calls. The latter figure should have been much higher but
some respondents indicated that they were only allowed to make and not to
receive calls, thus responding in the negative. There is also a limit on how
many calls may be made. The reasons for these restrictions have more to do
with administration and logistical issues than with human rights. Because of
this, there was a large discrepancy between the responses from the various
prisons surveyed. Only 36,4 % of the respondents at Westville prison said
they were allowed to make and receive phone calls. At the other prisons the
percentage was higher; St Alban's 56,7%, Johannesburg 55,4% and
Pollsmoor 74,7%. Much seems -to depend -on the rules of the various
prisons.
The highest percentage response in the whole survey was in reply to the
question whether detainees were allowed visitors. A staggering 94,8% of the
respondents stated that they were allowed visitors. Only 5,2% of the
respondents claimed that they were not allowed visitors. Interestingly, 41,4%
claimed that they had had their visitors turned away at one time or another.
This can be explained by the fact that for administrative reasons, prison rules
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prescribe ,scheduled visiting hours. People visiting outside those hours
would naturally be turned away. This does not necessarily amount to an
abuse of the prisoners' rights to be visited. Indeed, the overwhelming
affirmative response to the question whether prisoners were allowed visitors
shows that the right is observed and properly implemented.
A summary of the responses to the questions pertaining to the rights of
detained persons is depicted in the following table:
Table 9: Summary of responses regarding rights of detained persons
RIGHT YES NO TOTAL
Allowed to consult a lawyer if able to pay 100% 0% 100%
Had a lawyer appointed by the state because
unable to pay 74,5% 25,5% 100%
Good or fair prison conditions 1,5% 98,5% 100%
Allowed to write and receive letters 67,4% 32,6% 100%
Allowed to make and receive phone calls 54.8% 45,2% 100%
Allowed visitors 94,8% 5.2% 100%
Not had visitors turned away 58,6% 41,4% 100%
Allowed to exercise and play some carnes 53,2% 46,8% 100%
Provided with books and newspapers 18,4% 81,6% 100%
Good and enouqh food 3,2% 96,8% 100%
Allowed to see a doctor when sick 54,9% 45,1% 100%
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According to the data reflected in table 9 and the foregoing discussion, the
rights of detained persons are generally well protected. The main source of
serious concern is the perception of detainees in regard to prison conditions.
This is indicated by the extremely low percentage of those who think that the
prison conditions are fair or good and that the food is good and enough. The
general trend depicted above is relatively uniform among all the prisons
surveyed. The following graph illustrates that observation:
























A BeD E F G H
Allowed to consult lawyer if able
to pay
Had lawyer appointed by state because
unable to pay
Good or fair prison
conditions
Allowed to write and receive
letters





Allowed to exercise and play
some games
Provided with reading materials
Good & enough food









5.2.3 The rights of accused persons to a fair trial
The constitutional right to a fair trial encompasses fifteen specific rights.?
The survey, based on those specific rights, was conducted among 1241
sentenced prisoners in the four prisons already mentioned above." The first
aspect of the right to a fair trial is the right of the accused person to be
informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it. In response to the
question whether this right had been observed, 60,6% of the respondents
replied in the affirmative and 39,4% in the negative. This positive trend was
however reversed in answer to the question whether the respondents had
been given enough time to prepare their defence. 51,7% of the respondents
said they had not, while 48,3% stated that they had.
In view of the general complaint of delays in criminal trials, this data is
difficult to reconcile. It may be noted that when awaiting-trial prisoners were
asked how long they had been in detention, 42,8% replied that they had
spent more than a year, 22,9% had spent more than six months, and only
34,3% had been in detention for less than six months. These statistics echo
the responses of sentenced prisoners in regard to how long their trials took.
Of the 1221 sentenced prisoners who responded to the question as to how
long the trial had taken, 61,8% said more than six months, 13,4% answered
between two and six months, while only 24,8 % stated that their trials had




See Section 35(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
(Act 108 of 1996).
See 5.1 above; see also note 5 above.
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Fig. 6 Responses regarding time spent in detention awaiting
trial
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The data depicted in the above pie charts indicates that many suspects
spend a long time in detention while awaiting trial. The same applies to the
time spent in conducting the trial. These two factors are the major causes of
the serious problem of prison congestion and over-population as has already
been alluded to above and as will be indicated below."
One aspect of the right to a fair trial that appears to be well observed is the
right of an accused person to be present when being tried. 88,5% of the
respondents indicated they had been present at the trial, while only 11,5%
said they had not. In view of a number of possible legitimate reasons that
could prevent an accused from attending his or her trial, the general
perception is that this right is generally not abused.
The data regarding the right to legal representation in respect of detained
persons has already been analysed abovs.'? The trend seems to be much
the same in respect of accused persons. Not surprisingly 80.4% of the
accused respondents claimed to have been unable to afford the services of a
legal practitioner. For 83,9% of those however, lawyers had been appointed
by the state. All the 19,6% who were able to afford the services of a lawyer
had been allowed to do so. As with the perception of detained persons
therefore, the right of accused persons to legal representation is, according
to the data, reasonably well protected. So is the right to be so informed.
This is borne out by the fact that 82,3% confirmed that the magistrate had
informed them of their right to be represented by a lawyer. Only 17,7%
claimed not to have been informed.
Another aspect of the right to a fair trial is the right to adduce and challenge
evidence. In response to the question whether the accused had been
allowed to call all their witnesses, a large majority (76%) said they had not:
9
10
See 1.1 above and 6.3 below.
See 5.2.2 above.
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Table 10: Did you call all your witnesses?
YES NO TOTAL
24% 64% 100%
The indication here is that the right to adduce evidence was not well
observed.
Under section 35(3)(k) of the Constitution, an accused person has the right to
be tried in a language he or she understands or, if that is not practicable to
have the proceedings interpreted in that language. According to the data
collected, this right is generally well observed, for 66,6% of the respondents
said the trial was conducted in a language they understood. All those who
required the services of an interpreter had the services provided . This
positive trend is maintained in respect of the right not to be tried for an
offence for which that person has previously been acquitted or convicted.
The majority of the respondents (76,9%) confirmed they had not been
previously acquitted or convicted of the crime for which they were presently
in jail. Regarding the right of appeal or review, many of the respondnets
were either not aware of or chose not to exercise this right. Only 47,2% had
applied for leave to appeal and 37,9% had had the appeal granted.
A summary of some of the responses pertaining to the rigbt of accused
persons to a fair trial is depicted in the following table:
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Table 11: Summary of some responses regarding the right to a fair trial
RIGHT YES NO TOTAL
Informed of the charge with sufficient detail 60,6% 39,4% 100%
Given enough time to prepare defence 48,3% 51.7% "100%
Case heard in public trial before an ordinary 44,4% 55,6% 100%
court
Accused present at the trial 88,5% 11,5% 100%
Allowed legal representation if able to pay 100% 0% 100%
Had a lawyer appointed by the state because
unable to pay 83,9% 16,1% 100%
Informed of the right to legal representation 71.6% 28,4% 100%
Allowed to call all defence witnesses 24% 76% 100%
Trial conducted in language accused 66,6% 33,4% 100%
understands
Provided with an interpreter 100% 0% 100%
Previously acquitted or convicted for crime in 23,1% 76,9% 100%
jail for
Applied for leave to appeal 47,2% 52,8% 100%
Granted leave to appeal - _. --, .'.- " 37,9% 62,1% 100%
The data reflected in the above illustration shows that the right to a fair trial is
generally well observed. The main problem (not reflected in the table above)
seems to be the length of the trials or the right of an accused person to have
their trial begin and conclude without unreasonable delay. The abuse of this
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right is aggravated by the unreasonably long time unsentenced prisoners
spend while awaiting trial as illustrated earlier.
11
5.2.4 Other relevant constitutional rights
In analysing the responses to the survey in respect of other relevant
constitutional rights, the starting point is the right to dignity, which in the
specific context of prisoners is provided for under section 35(2)(e) of the
Constitution. In terms of that section, everyone who is detained, including
every sentenced prisoner, has the right to conditions of detention that are
consistent with human dignity. The data regarding the responses of detained
persons in respect to this right has already been analysed above." The
perceptions of sentenced prisoners on this aspect are much the same as
those of awaiting-trial prisoners. An overwhelming majority of sentenced
prisoners (72,3%) described the conditions in jail as inhuman and very bad,
24,8% said the conditions were bad but manageable. Less than 3%
considered the conditions in prison to be fair or good.
Table 12: How would you describe the conditions in jail? (Sentenced
prisoners)
Inhuman and very Bad Fair, just like Good, better
bad but manageable home than home
72,3% 24,8% 1,1% 1,8%
Through the eyes of sentenced prisoners therefore the conditions in prison
are perceived to be generally very bad. This trend is consistent among all
the respondents in all the prisons surveyed. Closely related to this, is
section 12 of the constitution which, among other things, prohibits torture and
11
12
See Figures 6 and 7 above.
See 5.2.2 above.
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cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Under this provision,
corporal punishment has been held to be unconstitutional." It has also been
outlawed by legislation, in particular, the Abolition of Corporal Punishment
Act.14 That notwithstanding, 50,7% of the respondents claimed to have been
tortured in some way during their imprisonment. The figure was much less in
respect to corporal punishment. Only 39,1% claimed to have been subjected
to corporal punishment (specifically caning or sjamboking). It is submitted
that these figures suggest a certain amount of abuse of the rights in question,
although it may be argued that some form of force is necessary in order to
maintain a reasonable amount of discipline and to protect some inmates
against violence from others.
Another relevant right is the right to equality", which inter alia outlaws unfair
discrimination. The effect of this is that all prisoners have a right to be
treated equally and not to be unfairly discriminated against in any way.
However, the perceptions of the prisoners are that this is not so. Asked
whether there was discrimination in prison, 73,5% of the respondents
answered in the affirmative. The 26,5% representing those who said there
was no discrimination tends to be a credible figure since people wouldn't
usually concede that there was discrimination if such discrimination was in
their favour.
Section 13 of the Constitution provides that no one may be subjected to
slavery, servitude or forced labour. The relevant aspect of this provision is
'forced labour'. Although the majority (66,2%) of the respondents said that
they had not been made to do any forced labour in prison, the 33,7% who
claimed to have been, need to be put into proper context. It ought to be
...remembered- that-the- Correctional Services Aces.. permits work 'to - keep
prisoners active for a normal working day...'17 It may well be argued that
some prisoners consider this type of work to be some form of forced labour.







See S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC)
·33 of 1997.
Section 9 of the Constitution.
111 of 1998.
Section 40(1) of the Act.
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5.2.5 What prison authorites say
In order to obtain a balanced perception of the dichotomy between the law
and the practice, a separate survey, involving prison authorities was
conducted. The survey was based on a questionnaire to which a designated
official from each of the four prisons in the study responded." The officials
were nominated by the authorities at the headquarters of the National
Department of Correctional Services, Pretoria to assist in this study, In each
case the nominated official was the head of support services and
communications at each of the prisons.
First of all, the four respondents all agreed that prisoners under their custody
were separated on the basis of sex and age, but not on the basis of criminal
record. Closely related to that was the question of the kind of accommodation
in the prisons. All but one of the respondents described the accommodation
as extremely over-congested. Only the respondent from St Alban's prison in
Port Elizabeth described their accommodation as congested but
manageable. None of the respondents indicated that there was no
congestion or that there was enough space for everyone. On this count
prisoners and their jailers are in agreement. What they are not in agreement
on, is the kind of food served in the prisons. While more than 96,1% of the
prisoners claimed that the food was bad and not enough, the authorities were
unanimous in saying that the food was good and enough. This discrepancy
may be due in part to the fact that people always complain about institutional
food and also that prison authorities will not readily admit that they are
starving their inmates.
..The respondent officials were also unanimous on the provision of suitable
exercise (at lease one hour in the open air daily) to the inmates. This was
slightly more consistent with the perceptions of the prisoners 53,2% of whom
said they were allowed to exercise and play some games. This is not the
case however in respect of provision of reading materials to prisoners. While
all the respondent officials claimed that they provide reading materials




respondent prisoners agreed that this was so. One is inclined to accept the
view of the authorities other than that of the prisoners. In the first place each
of the prisons surveyed has a library which is accessible to all prisoners.
Secondly, as already mentioned, many prisoners have little or no interest in
reading, while many more are outright illiterate.
In terms of section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution everyone has the right to have
access to health care services. In regard to prisoners this right is given
further emphasis through section 35(2)(e). All the respondent prison officials
claimed that sufficient medical care was provided to prisoners who needed it.
54,9% of all the prisoners who claimed to have fallen sick during their
incarceration stated that they had been allowed to see a doctor. It was noted
that some prisoners who fall sick are provided with in-house treatment at
prison sickbays without necessarily being referred to see a doctor, indicating
that the perceptions of the authorities are not in disparity with those of the
prisoners. Accordingly the right to health care is generally well observed.
The same applies to the right to communicate. Three of the four respondents
confirmed that prisoners were allowed to write and receive letters without any
restrictions. The respondent officaI from Westville prison conceded that
there were some restrictions on the number of letters written and received.
More restrictions were acknowledged in regard to the right to make and
receive phone calls. 50% of the respondent officials said that there were
some restrictions while the other 50% claimed there were none. It has
already been noted that 54,8% of the respondent prisoners claimed that they
were restricted from making and receiving telephone calls. It has also been
noted that such restrictions have more to do with administration and security
than with denial of the right. The explanation of the prison officials was that
phone calls were based on a privilege system. In some cases phone calls
were regarded as visits. It is submitted that these restrictions amount to an
abuse of the right to communicate, although the administrative and security
concerns of the prison authorities cannot altogether be disregarded.
The situation is certainly much better in regard to the prisoners' rights to be
visited. All the respondent officials claimed that there were no restrictions on
prisoners being visited by their spouses, relatives and religious counsellors
during normal visiting hours. This claim is consistent with the response of
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the prisoners 94,8% of whom conceded that they were allowed visitors. The
higher figure of 41,4% who claimed that they h?ld c,had their visitors turned
away did not put into consideration those visitors who chose to visit outside
normal visiting hours.
All the respondent prison officials denied the use of corporal punishment.
60,9% of the respondent prisoners agreed with them. It was earlier pointed
out that the 39,1% who claimed to have been subjected to corporeal
punishment may owe their claim to the necessary force that may sometimes
be applied in order to maintain discipline and protect some inmates against
violence from others. Indeed, when asked whether excessive force was
sometimes used in order to subdue unruly prisoners, 50% of the prison
authorities replied in the affirmative. Their explanation was that certain
circumstances may require the use of excessive force in order to restrain an
unruly prisoner and maintain order.
Although the right not to be held in solitary confinement is not specifically
provided for under section 35 of the Constitution, it is nevertheless deemed
to amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment.
Surprisingly, all the officials admitted to using solitary confinement in their
prisons. One official referred to it as 'isolation' and hastened to emphasise
that those in isolation were allowed all their other privileges like normal food
rations, visits, exercise, reading materials and so on. He also added that
such isolation was necessary for the maintenance of order and security. It is
submitted that this practice amounts to an abuse of prisoners' rights and is
inconsistent with not only the Constitutioin but also international law.
Finally,-all ·the respondent officials were unanimous on the non-use of hard
labour as a form of punishment in prison. This claim is consistent with the
responses of the prisoners, 66,3% of whom said they had not been subjected
to forced or hard labour. It has already been noted that some of the 33,7%
who answered to the contrary may have considered ordinary prison work as
forced labour. In general terms therefore, this right is well observed as
reflected through the data.
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A perception might be created that the findings of the survey analysed above
are primarily based on the opinions of the prisoners, thereby giving little
credence to the views of state authorities. It is submitted however that if one
were investigating family violence for example, more credence would be .
given to the responses of the victims (women and children) than those of the
perpetrators (men). The same is certainly true for this investigation.
Secondly, since it is impossible to get as many prison officials as prisoners, a
technique known as representative sampling has to be applied. A sample is
said to be representative if the analyses made on its sampling units produce
results similar to those that would have been obtained had the entire
population been analyzed or had it been larqer." It is therefore submitted
that the responses of the prison authorities analysed above are
representative enough and the data from the responses of the prisoners can
be relied on.
5.2.6 Testing the hypothesis
In statistical terms a hypothesis may be defined as 'a statement about the
value of a population pararneter'". Such statement is usually an assumption
about the population involved in a study. The assumption, which mayor may
not be true, is a general statement about the probability distribution of the
population. A hypothesis is usually formulated for the sole purpose of
proving or disproving it. In so doing the researcher determines whether the
imperical evidence does or does not support the statement (or hypothesis).
The process involves hypothesis testing which may be defined as 'a
procedure based on sample evidence and probability theory used to
. determine whether ·the hypothesis is a reasonable statement and 'should not
be rejected, or is unreasonable and should be rejected'.21
The hypothesis of this study was initially stated in the following terms: 'The




See Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias; Research Methods in the Social
Sciences (1992)
Mason and Lind; Statistical Techniques in Business and Economics at
334. '
Mason and Lind (note 20 above) at 335.
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observed and compare well with international norms and standards'.
Prisoners' rights under international law were discussed at length in Chapter
Two above. The rights of prisoners under the South African Constitution
were also discussed at length in Chapter Three above. It may safely be
stated that most, if not all, the rights of prisoners under international law have
been incorporated in the South African Constitution. Whatever lacuna may
have been left, has been taken care of by the Correctional Services Ace2 and
other pieces of legislation like the Mental Health Act.23 In theory, therefore,
South Africa has met the required international standards by putting on paper
the human rights norms relevant to prisoners. Having thus observed, what
remained to be statistically proved was whether the said rights are observed,
protected and implemented in actual practice. This was done by first stating
the null hypothesis (Ho) and the alternate hypothes (Ha) as follows:
Ho There is a high proportion of prisoners who feel their rights as
provided for under the South African Constitution are well
protected and implemented in actual practice (i.e. p < 0,5).
Ha There is a high proportion of prisoners who feel their rights as
provided for under the South African Constitution are not well
protected and implemented in actual practice (i.e. p > 0,5).
The next step was to choose the level of significance. Traditionally,
researchers usually select the level of significance of 0.05 or 5%. It was felt
that this was ideal for this particular study. The sample proportions were
determined by obtaining the sum total of all the responses indicating
protection of prisoners' rights (N1) on one hand and the sum total of all the
responses indicating abuse-of-prlsonars' rights (N2) on the other. In this
case N1 =20844 and N2 = 19934, therefore N =40778. Because of the
large sample sizes it was felt that the z proportions test would be used. Also
known as the binomial distribution test, this particular test is not only suitable
for large sample sizes, but it is also most appropriate when dealing with






With the level of significance (oc) at 0,05 or 5% the null hypothesis would be
rejected if z > 1,645.
Hence z = x-Npo
"'./Npo (1-po)
= 20844 - 40778(0,5)
"'./ 40778 (0,5) (0,5)





Since z =4,5 the null hypothesis (Ho) is therefore rejected and the alternative
hypothesis (Ha) is accepted. In other words the null hypothesis - that there is
a high proportion of prisoners who feel their rights under the Constitution are
well protected and implemented in practice - is totally rejected. The
alternative hypothesis - that there is a high proportion of prisoners who feel
their rights under the Constitution are not well protected and implemented in
actual practice - is therefore accepted. This means that the general
perception that exists in the minds of most prisoners is that their





The main conclusion that flows from the analysis of the data in the foregoing
chapter is that the constitutional rights of prisoners in South Africa are not
sufficiently protected and implemented. This, however, is a generalisation.
Some aspects of prisoners' rights, it has been seen, are quite well
implemented. These include the right to legal representation for those who
can afford, the right to communicate and be visited, the right to medical
treatment, the right to be present when being tried and the right to have an
interpreter if the proceedings are in a language the accused does not
understand. Other aspects however are a source of serious concern. In this
concluding chapter, apart from making general conclusions, specific
recommendations are put forward regarding those particular areas in which
abuse of prisoners' rights has been highlighted.
6.2 POLICE BRUTALITY
The police, as a major institution of state power is the main arresting agency
of the state. It is no secret that the old apartheid era was characterised by
inordinate viotetions iot human rights of which police brutality was a
significant feature. The police force's modus operandi was largely
characterised by a culture of torture and abuse. The results of this study
show that the police have not yet abandoned that culture. Hence, it has
been seen, the rights of arrested persons are seriously abused and violated.'
These findings were recently corroborated by a graphic national television
See 5.2.1 above.
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footage of police using suspects as human bait in dog-training exercises."
The incident which received widespread media coverage and public
condemnation was said to be only the tip of the iceberq." In a separate
report it is claimed that 'some SAPS (South African Police Services)
members continue to dispense the "short-cut" justice for which South Africa
has became notorious'.4 The report claims that certain torture methods
including inflicting cigarette burns, electric shocks and suffocation are
practices still embraced by policemen." Excessive use of police dogs on
suspects is another notorious aspect of police brutality.
It has been argued that in an atmosphere of apparent lawlessness, where
criminals are often armed, members of the police may have scant regard for
the rights of the suspects, eventually becoming case-hardened and cynical.6
It is submitted that a rising crime rate is not sufficient justification for the
flagrant disregard of suspects' rights. It has not been shown that tough bully-
boy police tactics have the capability of bringing down the crime rate.
It is recommended that meaningful measures should be undertaken by
government to instil a human rights culture in the police force. The starting
point is to identify and root out those elements of the police force whose
allegiance still ideologically and conservatively lies in the past. The next
step is to educate and sensitize all the remaining members of the police
force, in sufficient detail, in the letter and spirit of the Bill of Rights, and to
inculcate an ethos and culture of policing that is consistent with the Bill of
Rights. This is not to say that nothing has been done so far in this respect.
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programmes were held throughout the country to sensitize and acclimatize
members of the police force with human rights issues and the minimum
standards for law entorcernent." It is believed however that the human rights
sensitivity programme was frustrated by certain elements in the police,
including the top brass who are passionately resisting any programme that
smacks of transformation." The police force will not reflect the ideals of the
new democracy unless such elements of the old guard are done away with.
One way of eliminating police brutality and enforcing adherence to human
rights norms is by ensuring accountability of the police. This can be done in
three different ways. The first method is by ensuring accountability through
the courts. Like all citizens, the police are subject to the ordinary law of the
land administered by the ordinary courts. The availability of the courts to
provide remedies to citizens who complain of police misconduct is, indeed,
the ultimate safeguard to ensure control and accountability of the police in a
society governed by the rule of law. The conduct of the police can be
examined by the courts in several different contexts, namely:
(i) in civil actions against a police officer;
(ii) in criminal charges brought against a police officer alleged to have
committed a crime; and
(iii) in considering whether evidence ought to be excluded in prosecutions
because of police misconduct.
Another medium of ensuring police accountability is through internal
disciplinary procedures. Such procedures would be a more effective
instrument of accountability if the proceedings, or at least the results thereof,
were made public. This would not only enhance public confidence but would
7
8




also act as a deterrent to further police brutality. Another requirement for the
effectiveness of internal discipline procedures is the existence of a
comprehensive code of conduct. The code of conduct is supposed to provide
an ethical framework for the conduct of the police.
In 1997 an attempt was made at introducing a new code of conduct for the
South African Police Services (SAPS) personnel. However, this new code of
conduct has been heavily criticised. According to one commentator:
I •• • it is not meaningful to the day-to-day work of the police force.
For instance, it says nothing about the use of force."
Another criticism is that while every member of the police service is meant to
sign the code of conduct, only new recruits have been obliged to do so. It is
submitted that unless all members of the police force sign the code of
conduct, it will not have a collective binding effect and its provisions will
continue to be breached.
Both the court process and the internal disciplinary process can only be
effective if there is a proper citizen complaint procedure. This is the third
medium through which police accountability can be ensured. The complaint
procedure must be perceived by the public as a meaningful process which
fairly and publicly addresses the concerns and grievances of the victims,
~~he:~ise _~i t ~.ill n.0t~~rve much purpose.. ~c~ a~. at~~~e"t to re_~lis~ ._this_ i,deal
the South African government set up the Independent Complaints Directorate
(ICD) in 1997. It was mandated to investigate police brutality, deaths
resulting from police action and other allegations of police criminality or
misconduct. Since its inception the ICD has been inundated with complaints
against policemen. Unfortunately, the ICD is operating amid severe
9
David Bruce, senior researcher at the Centre for the Study of Violence and
Reconciliation as quoted in the Mail &Guardian.November10t016.2000.lbid.
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constraints. It is severely understaffed - there are about 45 investigators
countrywide to monitor a 128,000 strong police force - and it has experienced
severe budget cuts recently." It is recommended that this important
functionary be strengthened and reinforced. Funds should be made
available and more investigators should be recruited to strengthen the
Directorate. It is also recommended that the findings of the ICD be made
public on a regular basis. So too should the outcome of litigations involving
the police.
It is further recommended that the SAPS introduce and implement wide-
ranging human rights policies within its ranks. In July 1999 one such policy
was introduced - the anti-torture policy, which defined torture as 'any cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or any act by which severe
pain, suffering or humiliation, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for the purpose of obtaining from him or her or a third
person information or a contession'." It is suggested that more such policies
be not only introduced, but strictly implemented and their breaches severely
punished. It is also felt that such policies cannot have any effect unless
certain police methods are eradicated. For example, the anti-torture policy
will remain meaningless unless the use of police patrol dogs is severely
restricted and their handlers psychologically re-evaluated. Presently there
are 68 dog units in South Africa and there is growing evidence that the police
use dogs to punish suspects during either an interrogation or an arrest.F
Police dogs are also extensively used in crowd control and there are claims
that 'on numerous occasions dogs have been used as instruments of torture
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12 November 2000. .
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It is difficult to imagine how a person under arrest can exercise his or her
right to remain silent or indeed demand to be informed of this right when
vicious dogs are tearing at him or her. It is equally difficult to imagine how a
person in such a situation can avoid making confessions or admissions that
may be used in evidence against him or her.
6.3 PRISON CONDITIONS AND OVERCROWDING
If regard is to be had to the findings of the survey discussed in the previous
chapter," it can safely be concluded that most human rights abuses in prison
are directly or indirectly linked to the adverse conditions and severe
overcrowding in South African prisons. The enormity of the problem was
highlighted in Chapter One above" and confirmed by the data analysed in
Chapter Five.16 It was noted that both the respondent prisoners and officials
were unanimously in agreement about the inhuman prison conditions and the
alarming congestion. . Some commentators have expressed their opinions on
this quite candidly:
'Overcrowding jails are a symptom of the sickness of our
society - too many wrongdoers, too little space for what is
euphemistically called "correctional supervision" - the formal
name of the prison department'".
~~~~ _ sentiments are not out of tune if one considers the reality of the
situation. According to Judge J. Fagan, the inspecting judge in charge of the








See 'Who goes where?' Editorial, Eastern Province Herald, Thursday,
28 September 2000.
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to accommodate 100 668 prisoners." On 30 April 2000 those prisons were
accommodating over 172 271 prisoners, which meant that more than 72 000
prisoners were being kept in prison without the necessary infrastructure such
as toilets, beds, showers and such like facilities being available to them.
This is worsened by the uneven distribution of prisoners which results from
the inconsistent placing of prisoners in different jails on one hand, and the
need to separate different genders and categories on the other. Hence while
some prisons are more than 400% overcrowded, others are less than 100%
occupied." Clearly, such conditions do not support the promotion and
protection of human rights. .
There are several factors responsible for the current overcrowding in South
African prisons. However, in order to make any meaningful
recommendations as to how the situation may be resolved one first has to put
one's finger on the main cause of the problem. It is generally believed that
the cause is an unprecedented growth in the number of awaiting-trial
prisoners. According to Judge J Fagan, while the population of sentenced
prisoners has slowly increased (from 92 581 in January 1995 to 108 307 on
30 April 2000, Le 17% growth), the number of awaiting trial-prisoners almost
trebled (from 24 265 in January 1995 to 63 964 on 30 April 2000, Le 164%
growth).20 Consequently the average period that awaiting-trial prisoners
remain in prison has increased even more dramatically. Over the past four
years the number of awaiting-trial prisoners held for longer than three months
increased from. ,".·3957-to·27"357,·.an increase of591.%}~ So-almost half of
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months. These figures are in total agreement and quite consistent with the
data analysed in the previous chapter where it was seen that more than 65%
of the awaiting-trial prisoners claimed to have been in detention for more
than six months."
So what are the recommendations that one can make which would resolve
the problem of overcrowding and enhance the realisation of prisoners' rights?
Simplistically speaking, one option is to build more prisons, create more
space and provide adequate prison accommodation. This, however, does
not present itself as a viable option, considering the enormous cost involved
in building new prisons." In any case, there is much more involved in
establishing a new prison than merely putting up physical structures. In
November 2000 a new prison was opened in Empangeni, KwaZulu-Natal. At
the time of its opening it was operating at little more than a third of its
capacity because of a staff shortage." The staff shortage, it was reported,
was largely due to a lack of suitable accommodation in the town for the
prison's full complement of officers and warders." It was further reported
that at the time the 1392 inmate capacity prison had just over 500
prisoners." A spokesman for the Department of Correctional Services
indicated that the number of prisoners in the new prison would have to
remain low as long as there was a shortage of staff. It can therefore be seen
that apart from being costly, building new prisons does not immediately solve
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It is therefore recommended that such logistics be addressed first, for
example the issue of staff training and welfare. As far as staff training is
concerned, it is recommended that specialised prison staff training colleges
and schools be established. At the moment only Technikon South Africa and
the University of South Africa (UNISA) offer certain courses relevant to
correctional services. It is submitted that correctional services management
should be considered as a professional calling like nursing or teaching. For
that reason there should be a system of streamlined correctional services
qualifications that can be continuously upgraded. There should also be
continuous in-service training for correctional services personnel in order to
keep them up-dated with legal and penological developments. In that way,
junior and middle management personnel can understand how their duties,
obligations, rights and responsibilities, are affected by the Constitution and
especially the Bill of Rights. This would go a long way in addressing the
problem of human rights abuses in prisons.
The other option through which the problem of overcrowding can be resolved
is by reducing the number of prisoners, especially those awaiting trial. There
are two ways of doing this. Firstly, by reducing the inflow of prisoners from
the courts and secondly by getting those in prison out. The first method is
probably less tricky than the latter. Judge J Fagan has suggested that in
order to reduce the inflow of awaiting-trial prisoners the following should be
encouraqed;"




pre-trial diversion especially for juveniles;
greater use by police of their powers to release arrested persons on
bail;
See note 18 above.
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(iii) wider use by public prosecutors and clerks of the court of the
procedure of admission of guilt and payment of a fine without
appearance in court;
(iv) more information to be provided by investigating officers to
prosecutors to assist them in deciding what to ask magistrates to do
with accused before trial; and
(v) magistrates to make use of other options available to them other than
incarceration for those awaiting trial.
As far as getting awaiting-trial prisoners out is concerned the following
suggestions are made":
(i) withdrawal by prosecutors of trivial cases, weak cases and cases
where the accused have been waiting for trial for unreasonably long
periods;
(ii) consideration by magistrates of alternatives to further imprisonment
when matters come to court on remand dates;
(iii) preference to be given by prosecutors to cases of accused persons
held in prison over those awaiting trial outside prison; and
(iv) consideration to be given to all possible methods of expediting trials.
In terms of section 81 of the Correctional Services Act,29 certain measures






population is reaching such proportions that the safety, human dignity and
physical care of the prisoners is being affected materially'.30 Such measures
include the advancement of the parole date of certain categories of
. sentenced prisoners. This was done in January 2000 but the problem was
not solved. The ultimate method of getting prisoners out in order to reduce
the numbers seems to be by simply releasing some of them. This rather
drastic and controversial step was taken by the South African government in
September 2000 by setting in motion a process of releasing .about 18 000
awaiting-trial prisoners. Only those who had not been convicted or
sentenced were released. The other criteria included the fact that only those
who had been granted bail of R1000 or less and failed to pay could benefit
from this process. The reasoning was that by granting them bail such
prisoners had been allowed back into society but were in prison simply
because of poverty. It was stressed that the release did not amount to an
amnesty and that each of the prisoners would still have to stand trial.
The method of reducing prison overcrowding by releasing some of the
prisoners requires to be handled with extreme caution. Indeed, the release
of prisoners in September 2000 was met with widespread criticism and public
condemnation. Some felt that there was not enough justification to release
prisoners who had not yet had to answer their cases in a court of law.
According to one commentator:
'Far more important to this country than overcrowded jails is
that ordinary members of the public need to see justice done.
They need to see criminals tracked down, brought to the courts
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It was also argued that 'such arbitrary releases' were unfair to the victims of
crime and to the investigating police and detectives who had tracked down
the suspects. These fears expressed by the public were confirmed by
immediate reports of prisoners who had been released only to be involved in
crime a few hours later. In one case only hours after two accused men were
freed from Westville prison, they allegedly held up an off-duty policeman,
beat him up and stole his watch." In another incident, less than 24 hours
after being released a suspect on a car theft charge pointed a pistol at a
woman's head and hijacked her car." Such reports go to show that although
releasing prisoners is a practical and pragmatic way of reducing prison
overcrowding, it could lead to a vicious circle of crime and aggravate crime
levels.
In order to avoid taking drastic and unpopular measures, it is recommended
that more use be made of the procedure of alternative sentencing in trying to
alleviate the problem of overcrowding. This would require adopting the
approach known as restorative justice. What this approach entails is a kind
of justice that focuses on reconciliation and repairing the harm caused by
crime while at the same time it encourages the rehabilitation of the offender.
Restorative justice has a very broad application. While it is mainly aimed at
better meeting the needs of victims, it also focuses on crime prevention and
engages communities on the criminal justice process. Most importantly
however it serves as an alternative to incarceration. In short it is one simple
way of reducing the use of imprisonment by making more use of non-
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(i) postponing sentences with or without the various conditions set out in
section 297(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act;34
(ii) . handing down suspended sentences with or without conditions ;
(iii) discharging with a reprimand;
(iv) affordable fines;
(v) compensation to the victim;
(vi) community service;
(vii) correctional supervision; and
(viii) for juveniles, placement in the custody of a suitable person and/or
under the supervision of a probation officer or correctional official.
It is submitted that these alternative sentencing procedures, if applied
correctly and consistently would go a long way in reducing the overcrowding
in prisons, thereby enhancing the protection and implementation of the rights
of those for whom there is no alternative but incarceration.
It ought to be pointed out that all the above recommendations aimed at
reducing overcrowding in prisons in order to enhance better implementation
of prisoners' rights cannot be effective and meaningful unless all the
problems in the criminal justice system are seriously and urgently addressed.
Indeed, as one commentator has rightly pointed out, 'the police, prosecutors,
courts and correctional services are links in the chain of criminal justice that,
if weakened, could end in collapse' .35 It is no secret that the criminal justice
system is in a chaotic state.: The morale of the judicial officers and especially
the prosecutors is extremely low. They are constantly complaining of being
under-paid and over-worked. The situation came to a head in 2000 when a
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consequence of this state of affairs is a large backlog of cases in the courts
which causes awaiting-trial prisoners to wait inordinate periods for their trials
to be disposed of.
It is recommended that such cases which have been on the cause list for
unreasonable periods of time be withdrawn. It is further recommended that
the problems besetting the criminal justice system be addressed as a matter
of urgency. This involves, but is not limited to, employing more magistrates
and prosecutors, improving the working conditions of these judicial officers,
providing better court facilities, improving legal training and encouraging,
with incentives, fresh law graduates to join the public judicial service, other
than private legal practice. It is submitted that an efficient, motivated and
thorough criminal justice system is the starting point in reducing the number
of awaiting-trial prisoners, and thereby resolving the problem of
overcrowding. This would ensure more adequate protection and
implementation of the rights of prisoners.
6.4 JUVENILES
Although this study is not restricted to juveniles, but investigates the
constitutional rights of all categories of prisoners, it is necessary to make
specific conclusions and recommendations regarding juveniles as they are
the most vulnerable category of people, not only in prison but in society as a
.whole. Mention has already been -made of the -international instruments
relevant to juvenile justice, specifically the United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing RUles)36 and the
United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their






Constitution providing for the rights of a child, ·in particular section 28(1 )(g)
which sets out specific rights of children who get in trouble with the law.38
It is submitted that human rights abuses in prisons identified and discussed
in this study naturally impact more on juveniles than on adults. This is more
so in respect of abuses arising from overcrowding and harsh prison
conditions. KwaZulu-Natal has been reported to be the main culprit of the
human rights abuses of child prisoners." In June 2000 there was an
average of 550 awaiting trial juveniles at the Westville Youth Center
(prison)." This led to a situation where 60 to 90 children shared a cell
designed for 19 persons. The problems arising from such a state of affairs
are pretty obvious. These range from over-utilisation of facilities and under-
resourcing to social problems among the prisoners. These problems are
compounded by the unreasonable long periods that some of the children
have to spend awaiting trial. The findings of this study which indicate that
more than 42% of the unsentenced prisoners surveyed have been awaiting
trial for more than a year are supported by media reports which claim that
some children at Westville prison have been languishing there for up to three
years without being released or given bail."
It is strongly recommended that juvenile offenders should be completely
removed from the prison system. Several attempts by the South African
government in this regard have been unsuccessful. Efforts by the
Department of Correctional Services to remove juvenile offenders from prison
have primarily failed because of the lack of safe and secure outside facilities
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juvenile offenders in prison is by not getting them in at all in the first place. It
is therefore suggested that the starting point in resolving the problem is by
making use of alternative sentencing. This means that correctional
supervision should always be considered ahead of imprisonment. It also
means placement of the juvenile offenders in the custody of suitable
persons. Above all, it means more use of reform schools and other places of
rehabilitation specifically designed for minors. More use should also be
made of pre-trial diversion. Diversion is the referral of cases away from the
formal criminal justice system to an appropriate programme or plan.
It is also recommended that whenever government decides to release
prisoners as was done in September 2000, juveniles should always be
considered first. They should always be the first beneficiaries of such
'amnesties' because they are not supposed to be there in the first place.
This would not only serve to promote the rights of the child but would also
alleviate the problem of overcrowding discussed earlier. Where minors have
to be kept in a correctional facility, certain measures and safeguards should






orientating the children properly to the fact that they are in an alien
environment with certain rules and procedures;
determining whether the placement is in fact the correct one and if,
they have been misplaced by the courts, follow appropriate action to
remedy this;
assessing each child in terms of their individual needs',
holding regular interviews with all children either on an individual
basis or in a group setting;
laising with family (to pay bail, provide support, visit or bring clothes);
and
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(vi) holding programmes which involve educational, therapeutic and
recreational activities.
In order to implement the above measures there needs to be adequate
staffing and human resource personnel in terms of social workers and child-
care workers. It is therefore recommended that if children have to be kept in
any correctional facility sufficient specialised staff should be appointed to
take care of their needs and requirements.
There have been recent commendable attempts aimed at addressing the
plight of juvenile offenders. The South African Law Commission has recently
proposed, by way of recommendation, a cohesive child justice system which
strives to prevent children from entering deeper into the criminal justice
process while holding them accountable for their actions by means of various
diversion options and proqramrnes." These options and programmes
embody restorative justice principles which, as has already been mentioned,
focus on reconciliation and restitution rather than on retribution and
punishment, and lay emphasis on compensation to the victim by the offender
with the object of successfully integrating both victim and offender as
productive members of safe communities." The proposed system does
provide for the criminal prosecution of children who are accused of serious or
violent offences as well as those who repeatedly commit crimes. The
proposed system also allows for the secure containment of children who are
assessed to be a danger to others. The imprisonment of children awaiting
trial should only be permissible in certain defined circumstances but the
proposals must accord with the constitutional provisions that imprisonment of








The above recommendations of the South African Law Commission which
are based on international human rights standards and constitutional
. principles, are embodied in the proposed Child Justice Bill whose aim is to
move away from the current situation where the legal framework applicable to
children does not differ materially from that applicable to adults. The
proposed Child Justice Bill also aims to establish a specialised child justice
court and to extend the range of sentencing options available to such a court
and other courts in which child offenders are tried." At the moment the draft
Bill has still to be submitted to the Cabinet for approval after which it will
proceed on its journey through the usual legislative process. It is
recommended that this Bill be given full support and be swiftly passed into
law. The implementation of the provisions of that law will go a long way in
addressing the abuse of juvenile offenders and alleviating the general human
rights situation in prisons.
6.5 MENTALLY ILL PRISONERS
It has already been mentioned that this category of prisoners is governed by
the Mental Health Act,45 which defines 'mental illness ' as 'any disorder or
disability of the mind, [including] any mental disease, any arrested or
incomplete development of the mind and any psychopathic disorder'.46 This
definition is rather controversial because it is too wide. The Act further lays
down the procedure to be followed in order to detain a mentally ill prisoner.
There is no provision for any specific rights for such people. It is interesting
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Correctional Services Act47 about mentally ill prisoners. It is therefore clear
that this category of prisoners is overlooked and neglected. It is submitted
that mentally ill inmates form a very vulnerable category of prisoners and
specific rights should be accorded to them. In the case of juveniles, it has
been seen, there are specific rights over and above those provided for under
section 35 of the Constitution." The same should apply to mentally ill
prisoners. It is therefore recommended that legislative mechanisms be
introduced to provide for specific rights for mentally ill prisoners. It must be
remembered that some of them are in prison due to their mental illness.
Apart from making medical treatment available to them, therefore, specific
rights over and above those provided for under section 35 of the
Constitution, should be accorded to them.
6.6 RATIFICATION AND INCORPORATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
RELEVANT
Historically the South African legal system has always had difficulty in
.embracing international law. This was mainly because of political reasons.
A new political era however brought with it a shift both in foreign policy and
legal jurisprudence. Chapter 14 of the Constitution" formalises this new
status of international law in South African domestic law by first of all
confirming the common law position that customary international law is
recognised in South Africa ,50 and secondly by confirming that all international
agreements which were binding on the Republic prior to the enactment of the
Constitution would continue to be in force. 51 It also provides that '[W]hen
interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable
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interpretation that is inconsistent with international law,.52 This section is
complimented by section 39(1 )(b) which states that '[W]hen interpreting the
Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum ... must consider international law ...'53
It is recommended that South African courts should give maximum effect to
these provisions especially in regard to prisoners' rights.
One problem that has to be addressed is the fact that South Africa is not well
known for its haste in ratifying international treaties. For example, the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was ratified by South
Africa as recently as 10 December 1998. The same applies to the 1984
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. The 1966 International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights was signed on 3 October 1994, but has not yet
been ratified. It has also to be remembered that for any international treaty
to be incorporated into South African law it has to be enacted into law by
national legislation. 54 It is therefore recommended that South Africa should
move with haste and purpose not only in ratifying important international
treaties, but also in incorporating them into domestic law.
It ought to be mentioned however that some of the most important
international instruments relating to prisoners (like the United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the Basic Principles
for the Treatment of Prisoners and the United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice) clearly do not constitute
international treaties. Nevertheless, 'they were unanimously accepted by a
large international assembly at which several countries, including South
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instruments now form part of the South African common law on prisons."
The Standard Minimum Rules were first referred to by a South African court
in the 1990 case of S v Sfaggie.57 They were again referred to a year later in
S v Danie/s.58 Since then not much reference has been made to the Rules. It
is recommended that more consideration be given to the Standard Minimum
Rules and other United Nations instruments in the application of statutory
South African prison law. In so doing the rights of prisoners will definitely get
more judicial protection.
6.7 ACCESS TO COURTS
It has already been mentioned that many human rights abuses in prison are
a result of the overcrowding and prison conqestion." It has also been
mentioned that the main cause of overcrowding is the unreasonably high
number of awaiting-trial prisoners in jail.60 It is submitted that this situation
would easily be avoided if the right of access to attorneys and to courts was
well implemented and respected. The right of access to court goes hand in
hand with the right of access to an attorney. The constitutional guarantee of
due process means that an individual has access to courts to seek redress
and such right has little meaning if the individual does not have access to
legal assistance." It is therefore suggested that the starting point in
protecting the right of access to courts is to make legal services and
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The right of access to courts is perhaps the most basic of all prisoners rights
and it forms the foundation of all other rights an inmate has." Indeed
according to Mushlin:
'an inmate's right to unfettered access to the courts is as
fundamental a right as any other he may hold ... All other rights
are illusory without it,.63
Mushlin further points out that'... prisoners' rights exist only as long as, and
only to the extent that inmates are given access to courts'.64 Without such
access, prisoners would have no way of defending their rights through
judicial action." This being the case, it is submitted that in order to realise
the other rights of prisoners, courts must be made more accessible especially
to awaiting-trial prisoners. The state has a big role to play in this matter.
The most certain way of ensuring right of access to the courts is by assigning
legal counsel to all unsentenced inmates. This would obviously require
overhauling the Legal Aid Board. It is recommended that government
urgently addresses the current problems being faced by the Legal Aid Board
with a view to resolving them by providing more funding, better management
and more facilities and incentives.
One pragmatic way of ensuring the right of access to courts is by
establishing courts at the main prison centres where unsentenced prisoners
are held. This practical approach would solve many problems including
reducing prison overcrowding and avoiding prisoners escaping en route to






See Mushlin, Rights of Prisoners (1993) at 3.
Mushlin (note 63 above) at 4.
See D N Swart (note 59 above) at 53.
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6.8 THE PRIVILEGE SYSTEM
The privilege system hails from the past when prisoners had no rights and
anything they were allowed to do or have was called a 'privilege' or an
'indulgence'. This was laid down by the old Correctional Services Act
66
which provided that
'The Commissioner [of Correctional Services] may
(a) grant such privileges and indulgences as he
may determine to any prisoner
(b) withdraw or amend any privilege or indulgence granted .
in terms of paragraph (a) to any prisoner if it is in the
interests of the administration of prisoners'."
Although the new Correctional Services Act68 makes no mention of privileges
or indulgences, clearly the privilege system is part and parcel of present day
prison administration. According to the Department of Correctional Services,
the main objective of the privilege system is to encourage prisoners towards
good behaviour, to engender a sense of responsibility in them and to ensure
their interest and co-operation in their treatment." The system consists of
primary privileges and secondary privileges. Primary privileges are aimed at
the retention, maintenance or furthering of family ties while secondary
privileges are aimed at leisure-time activities, such as participation in sports
and watching television. It was mentioned earlier that during the survey, the
reason given by prison officials for the restrictions on making and receiving













It is submitted that the privilege system should be completely eradicated from
the prison institutions. Such an arrangement could only apply during those
times when human rights was an alien concept in the South African legal
system. Today, with a Bill of Rights that clearly sets out the rights of
everyone including prisoners, who needs privileges? In any case the
existence of such a system creates the danger of blurring the line between
privileges and rights. Moreover, those so-called privileges are set out, not in
the new Correctional Services Acf1 or in the regulations published with the
legislation but in Departmental Orders whose legal status is unclear. As
such, the likelihood of the Commissioner of Prisons and his subordinates
abusing their discretion is more than real. It is therefore recommended that
the privilege system has no place in the present day correctional services
system. The enjoyment of prisoners' rights will be better realised and
enhanced without it.
6.9 THE ROLE OF NGO's
Non-governmental organisations (NGO's) always play a critical role in
democracy, especially where liberty is removed. In the United Kingdom, for
example, non-governmental agencies play an important role in campaigning
for prisoners' rights and providing assistance in resettling released prisoners.
One such NGO is the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of
Offenders (NACRO). Established in 1966, NACRO employs about 1200 staff
members working on projects in prisons and in communttles.? By
commenting critically on prison conditions and working inside prisons,





See Thompson, 'The Role of Non-governmental Agencies and the Resettlement of
Prisoners', A paper presented at the 14th International Conference of the
International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law: Human Rights and the
Administration of Justice,S December 2000.
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In South Africa the two main NGO's involved in prison work are the National
Institute for Crime Prevention and the Rehabilitation of Offenders (NICRO)
and Business Against Crime. Unfortunately, the impact of these
organisations on the protection of prisoners' rights has been rather minimal.
Their approach is long-term and their role comes nowhere near the success
achieved by NACRO in the United Kingdom. There are thousands of NGO's
in South Africa but very few of them are involved in prisons in any sort of
way. It is recommended that NGO's get more involved in campaigning for
and overseeing the protection of prisoners' rights. Such involvement will
position NGO's as watchdogs and enhance the government's role in ensuring
proper protection of the rights of prisoners.
6.10 EDUCATION AND PUBLIC AWARENESS
Everybody is presumed to know the law, hence the maxim ignorantia iuris
neminem excusat (ignorance of the law is no excuse). . All people are
expected to have knowledge of the law so as to safeguard themselves and to
protect and enforce their rights. The reality of the situation in South Africa
(and many other developing countries) however, is that many people know
little or nothing about the law. Many people cannot enforce their rights
because they don't even know that they have them. This fact was illustrated
by the findings of the survey which showed that more than 52% of the
awaiting-trial prisoners who responded to the questionnaire were not aware
of their right to remain silent on arrest."
The starting point in protecting people's rights is by sensitizing them and
making them aware of the existence of such rights. This is more easily said
than done, considering that the South African population has more than 60%




is a likelihood that anyone can get in trouble with the law. Education and
public awareness of people's rights should be aimed at all people in the early
stages of their lives. It is therefore suggested that human rights be
introduced in primary and secondary schools as a subject of study. A public
awareness campaign targeting the youth would also go a long way in
sensitizing communities and individuals about their rights.
It is also recommended that human rights education be offered to prisoners
since they, more than anybody else, need this knowledge. It is interesting to
note that the Department of Correctional Services claims that education is
provided to prisoners, including 'tuition for illiterate prisoners; primary,
secondary and tertiary education and preparedness'. 74 The Department
.claims that it offers and encourages literacy education for prisoners in the
following programmes:
(i) vocational training in a variety of trades;
(ii) occupational skills training ;
(iii) constructive unskilled labour; and
(iv) literacy and adult education.
It is recommended that a programme on human rights education be included
in the prison education programmes. It is also recommended that prisoners
be introduced to some elementary aspects of the law in the hope that
knowledge of the law and the consequences of breaking it would lead to less
crimes and reduce the likelihood of recidivism.
74
See note 29 above.
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6.11 PRIVATIZATION OF PRISONS
Provision is made under the Correctional Services Acf5 for the Minister (of
Correctional Services) to enter into a contract with any private entity 'to
design, construct, finance and operate any prison or part of any prison ...' 76
The private entity (contractor) would be required to ensure that all prisoners
are treated with dignity. The Act states that within 21 days after the contract
has been awarded the contractor must apply to have their service declared
an essential service. In order to monitor the activities of the contractor, a
controller would be appointed to review the daily management and operation
of the contracted-out prison and would report to the Commissioner of
Correctional Services."
In tandem with the above, a R1.3 billion contract was entered into in July
1999 between the government and a private consortium, Ikhweai, to build,
staff and operate a 3000-bed private maximum security prison in
Bloernfontein." A second contract was entered into between the government
and the South African Custodial Services according to which a private
maximum security prison would be built for 3024 inmates in Louis Trichardt in
the Northern Province." Construction of these prisons has already begun.
The primary object of privatization of prisons is to make them more cost
effective and to provide for tighter management and raise the standard of
correctional services. Indeed it is common knowledge that private
enterprises are usually more efficient and effective than public enterprises.
However, another objective that would be inadvertently achieved would be








Sections 105 and 106(1).
See note 69 above.
Ibid.
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required to comply with all constitutional provisions and all international
conventions governing detention or imprisonment to which South Africa is a
party. Adherence to this requirement would be monitored by the controller"
and other organs established by the Correctional Services Act.81 It is
recommended that more and more prisons be privatised as this would
clearly go a long way in addressing the problems currently facing prisons and
would therefore enhance better protection of prisoners' rights.
6.12 LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION
Although the enactment of the new Correctional Services Act82 was an
important step in the right direction, there is certainly room for improvement.
A more comprehensive statute that incorporates provisions on the rights of
all categories of prisoners is recommended. It is particularly recommended
that the rights of mentally ill prisoners be included in such a statute.
Although it has been recommended that the proposed Child Justice Bill
should be fast-tracked and hastened through the legislative process, it would
certainly make more sense if the rights of juveniles were also included in the
suggested comprehensive statute. Prisoners' rights would be better
promoted through a single legislative framework other than through an
amalgamation of loosely related legislative enactments. In short legislative
intervention is urgently required.
In conclusion, two final questions; firstly, according to the findings of this
study does South Africa meet the required international norms and standards
in protectiing prisoners' rights? The answer: on paper yes, in practice no.





Appointed under section 10S of the Act.
For example the independent judicial inspectorate and the independent prison
visitors. .
Act 111 of 1998.
See Chapter 4, note 82 above .
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civilisation is to be seen most clearly in the way it treats its prisoners, can
South Africa on that count, stand high and stake a rightful claim to a position
among the civilised nations of the world? The answer as shown by the
findings of this study is unfortunately no, and so will it remain until the









This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South
Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and
affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and
freedom.
The state must respect, protect,promote and fulfil the rights in
the Bill of Rights.
The rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations
contained or referred to in section 36, or elsewhere in the Bill.
Application
8. (1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature,
the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic
person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into
account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty
imposed by the right.
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or
juristic person in terms of subsection (2); a court -
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or
if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that
legislation does not give effect to that right; and









provided that the Iimiation is in accordance with section
36(1 ).
A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to
the extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of
that juristic person.
Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal
protection and benefit of the law.
Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and
freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislation
and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination
may be taken.
The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race,
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin,
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience,
belief, culture, language and birth.
No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly gainst
anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3) .
National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit
unfair discrimination.
Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in
subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the
discrimination is fair.
Human dignity




11. Everyone has the right to life.
Freedon and security of the person
12. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person,
which includes the right-
(a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just
cause;
(b) not to be detained without trial;
(c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or
private sources;
(d) not to be tortured in any way; and
(e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or
degrading way.
(2) Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological
integrity, which includes the right-
(a) to make decisions concerning reproduction;
(b) to security in and control over their body; and
(c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments
without their informed consent.
Slavery, servitude and forced labour
13. No one may be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour.
Privacy
14. Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have-
(a) their person or home searched;
(b) their property searched;
(c) · their prosessions seized; or
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.
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Freedom of religion, belief and opinion
15. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion,
thought, belief and opinion.
(2) Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-
aided institutions, provided that-
(a) those observances follow rules made by the appropriate
public authorities;
(b) they are conducted on an equitable basis; and
(c) attendance at them is free and voluntary.
(3) (a) This section does not prevent legislation recognising-
(i) marriages concluded under any tradition, or a
system of religious, personal or family law; or
(ii) systems of personal and family law under any
tradition, or adhered to by persons professing a
particular religion.
(b) Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent
with this section and the other provisions of the .
Constitution.
Freedom of expression
16. (1) everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which
includes-
(a) freedom of the press and other media;
(b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas;
(c) freedom of artistic creativity; and
(d) academic, freedom and freedom of scientific research.
(2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to-
(a) propaganda for war;
(b) incitement of imminent violence; or
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(c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity,
gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to
cause harm.
Assembly, demonstration, picket and petition
17. Everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to
demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions.
Freedom of association
18. Everyone has the right to freedom of association.
Political rights
19. (1) Every citizen is free to make political choices,which includes
the right-
(a) to form a political party;
(b) to participate in the activities of , or recruit members for a
political party; and
(c) to campaign for a political party or cause.
(2) Every citizen has the right to free, fair and regular elections for
any legislative body established in terms of the Constitution.
(3) Every adult citizen has the right-
(a) to vote in elections for any legislative body established in
terms of the Constitution, and to do so in secret; and
(b) to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office.
Citizenship
20. No citizen may be deprived of citizenship.
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Everyone has the right to freedom of movement.
Everyone has the right to leave the Republic.
Every citizen has the right to enter, to remain in and to reside
anywhere in the Republic.
Every citizen has the right to a passport.
Freedom of trade, occupation and profession
22. Every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or
profession freely. The practice of a trade, occupation or profession
may be regulated by law.
Labour relations
23. (1 ) Everyone has the right to fair labour practices.
(2) Every worker has the right-
(a) to form and join a trade union;
(b) to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade
union; and
(c) to strike.
(3) Every employer has the right-
(a) to form and join an employers' organisation; and
(b) to participate in the activities and programmes of an
employers' organisation.
(4) Every trade union and every employers' organisation has the
right-
(a) to determine its own administration;
(b) to organise; and
(c) to form and join a federation.
(5) Every trade union, employers' organisation and employer has
the right to engage in collective bargaining. National legislation
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may be enacted to regulate collective bargaining. To the extent
that the legislation may limit a right in this Chapter, the
limitation must comply with section 36(1).
(6) National legislation may recognise union security arrangements
contained in collective agreements. To the extent that the
legislation may limit a right in this Chapter, the limitation must
comply with section 36(1).
Environment
24. Everyone has the right-
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or
well-being; and
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of
present and future generations, through reasonable
legislative and other measures that-
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation;
(ii) promote conservation; and
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and
use of natural resources while promoting




No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of
general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation
of property.
Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general
application-
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the
time and manner of payment of which have either been
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agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a
court.
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of
payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable
balance between the public interest and the interests of those
affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including
(a) the current use of the property;
(b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property;
(c) the market value of the property;
(d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the
acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the
property; and
(e) the purpose of the expropriation.
(4) For the purposes of this section-
(a) the public interest includes the nation's commitment to
land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable
access to all South Africa's natural resources; and
(b) property is not limited to land.
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable
citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.
(6) A person or community whose tenure is land is legally insecure
as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is
entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either
to tenure whichis legally secure or to comparable redress.
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June
1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices
is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either








No provision of this section may impede the state from taking
legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and
related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial
discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisions
of this section is in accordance with the provisions of section
36(1 ).
Parliament must enact legislation referred to in subsection (6).
Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realisation of this right.
No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home
demolished, without an order of court made after considering
all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit
arbitrary evictions.
Health care, food, water and social security
27. (1) Everyone has the right to have access to-
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;
(b) sufficient food and water; and
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support
themselves and their dependants, appropriate social
assistance.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources, to achieve the progression
realisation of each of these rights.
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.
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Children
28. (1) Every child has the right-
(a) to a name and a nationality from birth;
(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate
alternative care when removed from the family
environment;
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and
social services;
(d) to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or
degradation;
(e) to be protected from exploitative labour practices;
(f) not to be required or permitted to perform work or
provide services that-
(i) are inappropriate for a person of that child's age;
or
(ii) place at risk the child's well-being, education,
physical or mental health or spiritual, moral or
social development;
(g) not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in
which case, in addition to the rights a child enjoys under
sections 12 and 35, the child may be detained only for
the shortest appropriate period of time, and has the right
to be-
(i) kept separately from detained persons over the
age of 18 years; and
(ii) treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that
take account of the child's age;
(h) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the
state , and at state expense, in civil proceedings affecting
the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result;
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and
(i) not to be used directly in armed conflict,and to be
protected in times of armed conflict.
(2) A child's best interests are of paramount importance in every
matter concerning the child.






Everyone has the right -
(a) to a basic education, including adult basic educaiton;
and
(b) to further education, which the state through reasonable
measures, must make progressively available and
accessible.
Everyone has the right to receive education in the official
language or languages of their choice in public educational
institutions where the education is reasonably practicable. In
order to ensure the affective access to, and implementation of,
this right, the state must consider all reasonable educational




(c) the need to redress the results of past racially
discriminatory laws and practises.
Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own
expense, independent educaitonal institutions that -
(a) do not discriminate on the basis of race',
(b) are registered with the state; and
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(c) maintain standards that are not inferior to standards at
comparable public educational institutions.
(4) Subsection (3) does not preclude state subsidies for
independent education institutions.
Language and culture
30. Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the
cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do
so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.
Cultural, religious and linguisitic communities
31. (1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic
community may not be denied the right, with other members of
that community-
(a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their
language; and
(b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic
associations and other organs of civil society.
(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner
inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.
Access to information
32. (1) Everyone has the right of access to -
(a) any information held by the state; and
(b) any information that is held by another person and that is
required for the exercise or protection of any rights.
(2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right,
and may provide for reasonable measures to alleviate the
administrative and financial burden on the state.
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Just administrative action
33. (1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful,
reasonable and procedurally fair.
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by
administrative action has the right to be given written reasons.
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give affect to these
rights, and must-
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court
or, where appropriate, an independent and impartial
tribunal;
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in
sub-sections (1) and (2); and
(c) promote an efficient administration.
Access to courts
34. Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or,
where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or
forum.
Arrested, detained and accused persons
35. (1) Everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence
has the right-
(a) to remain silent;
(b) to be informed promptly-
(i) of the right to remain silent; and
(ii) of the consequences of not remaining silent;
(c) not to be compelled to make any confession or
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admission that could be used in evidence against that
person;
(d) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably
possible, but not later than-
(i) 48 hours after the arrest; or
(ii) the end of the first court day after the expiry of the
48 hours, if the 48 hours expire outside ordinary
court hours or on a day which is not an ordinary
court day;
(e) at the first court appearance after being arrested, to be
charged or to be informed of the reason for the detention
to continue, or to be released; and
(f) to be released from detention if the interests of justice
permit, subject to reasonable conditions.
(2) Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner,
has the right-
(a) to be informed promptly of the reason for being detained;
(b) to choose, and to consult with, a legal practitioner, and to
be informed of this right promptly;
(c) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the detained
person by the state and at state expense, if substantial
injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of
this right promptly;
(d) to challenge the lawfulness of the detention in person
before a court , and, if the detention is unlawful, to be
released;
(e) to conditions of detention that are consistent with human
dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at
state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition,
reading material and medical treatment; and
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(f) to communicate with, and be visited by, that person's
(i) spouse or partner;
(ii) next of kin;
(iii) chosen religious counsellor; and
(iv) chosen medical practitioner.
(3) Every accused person has the right to a fair trial, which
includes the right-
(a) to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to
answer it;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a
defence;
(c) to a public trial before an ordinary court;
(d) to have their trial begin and conclude without
unreasonable delay;
(e) to be present when being tried;
(f) to choose, and be represented by, a legal practitioner,
and to be informed of this right promptly;
(g) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the accused
person by the state and at state expense, if substantial
injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of
this right promptly;
(h) to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to
testify during the proceedings;
(i) to adduce and challenge evidence;
U) not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence;
(k) to be tried in a language that the accused person
understands or, if that is not practicable, to have the
proceedings interpreted in that language;
(I) not to be convicted for an act or omission that was not an
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offence under either national or international law at the
time it was committed or omitted;
(m) not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or
omission for which that person has previously been
either acquitted or convicted;
(n) to the benefit of the least severe of the prescribed
punishments if the prescribed punishment for the
offence has been changed between the time that the
offence was committed and the time of sentencing; and
(0) of appeal to, or review by, a higher court.
(4) Whenever this section requires information to be given to a
person, that information must be given in a language that the
person understands.
(5) Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill
of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence
would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the
admission of justice.
Limitation of rights
36. (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of
law of general application to the extent that the limitation is
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democrative society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into
account all relevant factors, including-
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of
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the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the
Bill of Rights.
States of emergency
37. (1) A state of emergency may be declared only in terms of an Act
of Parliament, and only when-
(a) the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion,
general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other
public emergency; and
(b) the declaration is necessary to restore peace and order.
(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation
enacted or other action taken in consequence of that
declaration, may be effective only -
(a) prospectively; and
(b) for no more than 21 days from the date of the
declaration, unless the National Assembly resolves to
extend the declaration. The Assembly may extend a
declaration of a state of emergency for no more than
three months at a time. The first extension of the state
of emergency must be by a resolution adopted with a
supporting vote of a majority of the members of the
Assembly . Any subsequent extension must be by a
resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least 60
per cent of the members of the Assembly. A resolution
in terms of this paragraph may be adopted only following
a public debate in the Assembly.
(3) Any competent court may decide on the validity of -
(a) a declaration of a state of emergency;
(b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency;
or
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(c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in
consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.
(4) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a
state of emergency may derogate from the Bill of Rights only to
the extent that -
(a) the derogation is strictly required by the emergency; and
(b) the legislation-
(i) is consistent with the Republic's obigations under
international law applicable to states of
emergency;
(ii) conforms to subsection (5); and
(iii) is published in the national Government Gazette
as soon as reasonably possible after being
enacted.
(5) No Act of Parliament that authorises a declaration of a state of
emergency, and no legislation enacted or other action taken in
consequences of a declaration, may permit or authorise-
(a) indemnifying the state, or any person, in respect of any
unlawful act;
(b) any derogation from this section; or
(c) any derogation from a section mentioned in column 1 of
the Table on Non-Derogable Rights, to the extent
indicated opposite that section in column 3 of the Table.
(6) Whenever anyone is detained without a trial in consequence of
a derogation of rights resulting from a declaration of a state of
emergency, the following conditions must be observed:
(a) An adult family member or friend of the detainee must be
contacted as soon as reasonably possible, and informed
that the person has been detained.
(b) A notice must be published in the national Government
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Gazette within five days of the person being detained,
stating the detainee's name and place of detention and
referring to the emergency measure in terms of which
that person has been detained.
(c) The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited
at any reasonable time by, a medical practitioner.
(d) The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited
at any reasonable time by, a legal representative.
(e) A court must review the detention as soon as reasonably
possible, but no later than 10 days after the date the
person was detained, and the court must release the
detainee unless it is necessary to continue the detention
to restore peace and order.
(f) A detainee who is not released in terms of a review
under paragraph (e), or who is not released in terms of a
review under this paragraph, may apply to a court for a
further review of the detention at any time after 10 days
have passed since the previous review, and the court
must release the detainee unless it is still
necessary to continue the detention to restore peace and
order.
(g) The detainee must be allowed to appear in person
before any court considering the detention, to be
represented by a legal practitioner at those hearings,
and to make representations against continued
detention.
(h) The state must present written reasons to the court to
justify the continued detention of the detainee, and must
give a copy of those reasons to the detainee at lease two
days before the court reviews the detention .
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(7) If a court releases a detainee, that person may not be detained
again on the same grounds unless the state first shows the
Court a good cause for re-detaining that person.
(8) Subsection (6) and (7) do not apply to persons who are not
South African citizens and who are detained in consequences
of an international armed conflict. Instead, the state must
comply with the standards binding on the Republic under
international humanitarian law in respect of the detention
of such persons.
Enforcement of rights
38. Anyone listed in this section has the right to appraoch a competent
court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or
threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a
declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a court are -
(a) anyone acting in their own interest;
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in
their own name;
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or
class of persons;
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.
Interpretation of Bill of Rights
39. (1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, trubunal or forum _
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom;
(b) must consider international law' and,
(c) may consider foreign law.
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(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum
must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. .
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other
rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common
law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are
consistent with the Bill.
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APPENDIX 2
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR AWAITING-TRIAL PRISONERS
Tick (v") Yes or No or choose the right alternative (A, B, C or DJ
1.. When you were arrested did you know that you had the right to remain silent?
IYes I No
2. Were you informed by the arresting officer that you had this right?
IYes I No
3. Did the arresting officer inform you of the consequences of not remaining silent?
IYes I No
4. At the time of your arrest were you asked to confess or admit what you had
done?
IYes I No
5. How long after arrest did it take to bring you before the court?
A within 48 hours
B after 48 hours
6. Were you charged on your first court appearance?
IYes I No
7. Were you informed of the reason for your continued detention?
IYes I No
8. How long have you been in detention?
A less than one month
B between one month and six months
C between six months and one year
D more than one year
9. Are you able to pay for a legal practitioner?
IYes I No
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10. If yes, have you been allowed to consult a lawyer?
IYes I No
11 . If not, has the state appointed one for you?
IYes I No
12. Have you tried to challenge the lawfulness of your detention?
IYes I No
13. How would you describe the conditions in jail?
A Inhuman and very bad
B Bad but manaceable
C Fair, lust like home
D Good, better than at home
14. Are you allowed to write and receive letters?
IYes I No
15. Are you allowed to make and receive phone calls?
IYes I No
16. Are you allowed visitors?
IYes I No
17. Have any of your visitors been turned away?
IYes I No
18. Are you allowed to exercise and play some games?
IYes I No
19. Are you provided with newspapers and books to read?
IYes I No
20. How would you describe the kind of food you are given in prison?
A Very little and very bad
B Little but not very bad
C Just enouoh and oood
0 Very good and more than enough
271
21. Have you fallen sick since you were detained?
IYes I No




QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SENTENCED PRISONERS
Tick (/) Yes or No or choose the right alternative (A, B, C or Dj
1. At the trial, were you informed of the charge with sufficient details?
IYes I No
2. Were you given enough time to prepare your defence?
IYes I No
3. Was your case heard in a public trial before an ordinary court?
IYes I No
4. How long did the trial take?
A less than 2 weeks
B between two weeks and two months
C between two months and six months
D more than six months
5. Were you present at the trial?
IYes I No
6. Did you have the money to afford a lawyer?
IYes I No
7. If yes, were you allowed to be represented by a lawyer?
IYes I No
8. If not, did the state appoint one for you?
IYes I No




10. Did you testify during the trial?
IYes I No
11. Did you call all your witnesses?
IYes I No
12 Was the trial conducted in a language you understand?
IYes I No
13. Did you require an interpreter?
IYes I No
14. Were you provided with an interpreter?
IYes I No
15. Had you been previously acquitted or convicted for the crime you are now in jail
for?
IYes I No
16. Did you apply for leave to appeal?
IYes I No
17. If so was the appeal granted?
IYes I No
18. Were you satisfied with the way the trial was conducted?
IYes I No
19. Were you satisfied with the decision and sentence?
IYes I No
20. How would you describe the conditions in jail?
A Inhuman and very bad
B Bad but rnanaoeable
C Fair, iust like home
D Good, better than at home
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21. Is there any discrimination at this prison?
IYes I No
22. Have you been tortured in any way during your imprisonment?
IYes I No
23. Have you been caned I sjamboked in jail?
IYes I No




QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PRISON OFFICIALS (COMMANDER OR AUTHORISED
OFFICIAL)
1. Do you separate prisoners on the basis of their sex, age or criminal record?
Ives ~
2. How would you describe the accommodation at this prison?
A over-congested
B congested but manageable
C not congested at all, there is enough space for
everyone
0 too much space, too few prisoners
3. How would you describe the kind of food given to prisoners?
A very little and very bad
B little but not very bad
C just enough and good
0 very good and more than enough
4. Are prisoners allowed to have suitable exercise (at least one hour in the open
air daily)?
Ives ~
5. Do you provide reading materials (eg. books, newspapers, magazines, etc) to
prisoners?
Ives ~
6. Do you provide medical care to prisoners who need it?
Ives ~
7. Do you allow prisoners to write and receive letters without any restrictions?
Ives ~




9. Do you allow prisoners to be visited by their spouses, relatives, religious
counsellors, during the normal visiting hours?
IYes I~
10. Do you sometimes punish prisoners by caning I sjamboking them?
IYes []2]
11. Do you sometimes use excessive force (ego torture) on some unruly prisoners
in order to subdue them?
IYes []2]
12. Do you sometimes use solitary confinement as a form of punishment for
unruly prisoners?
IYes []2]




INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, TREATIES AND OTHER
RELEVANT INSTRUMENTS
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981)
American Convention on Human Rights (1969)
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948)
Basic Principles for the Treatment of Offenders (1990)
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment (1988)
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (1984)
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (1979)
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(1948)
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(1975)
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (1950)
European Social Charter (1961)
European Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1973)
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)
Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the
Improvement of Mental Health Care (1991)
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Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant to the Role of Health Personnel,
Particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (1982).
Revised European Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
(1987)
Statute of the International Court of Justice (Annexure to the United Nations
Charter)
United Nations Charter (1945)
United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty
(1990)
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice (1985)
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
(1955)





























Congress of South African Trade Unions
Economic and Social Council
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Independence Complaints Directorate
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights
International Court of Justice
Inkatha Freedom Party
Internal Security Organisation (Uganda)
Local Defence Unit (Uganda)
Law and Order Maintenance Act (Zimbabwe)
Movement for Multi-party Democracy (Zambia)
National Association for the Care and Resettlement of
Offenders (United Kingdom)
Non-governmental Organisations
National Institute for Crime Prevention and the
Rehabilitation of Offenders
National Resistance Movement (Uganda)
Organisation of American States
Police and Prison Officers Civil Rights Union
Prisoners of War
Preservation of the Rights of Prisoners
South African Prisoners' Organisation for Human Rights
South African Police Services
Uganda Human Rights Commission
United Nations
United National Independence Party (Zambia)
University of South Africa
Uganda Peoples Defence Forces
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